

*The Discursive Strategies of the Neo-Orientalist Discourse:
A Discourse-Historical Perspective*

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ABSTRACT:

The notion of neo-orientalism is usually considered as the new-millennium manifestations of the traditional 18th century orientalism. Unlike the traditional one which mainly focused on India during and after the colonization era, it is generally associated with the confrontation between the West and the Arabic-Islamic world after the dramatic event of the 11th of September in the US.

This study is based on the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) of Ruth Wodak as a model of analysis in examining the neo-orientalist discourse. A collection of research studies, newspaper articles, and interviews performed by thirteen western prominent authors have been selected as the data of the study. They were classified into three groups of pioneers, supporters, and academics according to their influence in the western intelligentsia and media in addition to the nature of their works.

The study has proved that the neo-orientalist discourse of the pioneers and their supporters uses a highly-intensified language charged with racism, provocation, and Islamophobia with occasional hate speech. The neo-orientalist discourse of the academics, on the other hand, was found to be more objective, judicious, and encouraging with a clearly-mitigated language.

Key words: Neo-orientalism, Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), Islam, the West.

1. Introduction

The Greco and Byzantian wars with the Persians originated in the 5th c. BC and continued till the rise of the Muslim world in the 7th century, is usually considered the first combat between the “West” and the “East” in the old history of the world. History tells us that Alexander the Great got sick in Mesopotamia (now Iraq) after defeating the Persians and died there (Depuydt: 1991). Despite the constant political and religious instability that the ancient Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and Levant witnessed in the first six centuries after Christ, there was no clearcut line that distinguished these geographical parts of the old world with the European Christendom until the spread of Islam in the 7th Century.

The Quranic verses urged the people to choose not only between polytheism and monotheism, but also between a new and old interpretation and understanding Judaism and Christianity. As an example of the natural consequence of such new interpretation of essential concepts mentioned in the old and new testaments, was “Al Mubahala” (prayer curse) event; a debate that occurred between Prophet Mohammed and a Christian delegation from Najran (south of Saudi Arabia now) at 631 A.D. (Wilferd:1996).

“Then whoever disputes with you concerning him [’Iesa (Jesus)] after (all this) knowledge that has come to you, [i.e., ’Iesa (Jesus)] being a slave of Allah, and having no share in Divinity) say: (O Muhammad SAW) “Come, let us call our sons and your sons, our women and your women, ourselves and yourselves - then we pray and invoke (sincerely) the Curse of Allah upon those who lie.” (Quran, Al-Imran:61)

During the golden Islamic era which lasted along the Middle Ages, there was little European interest in understanding this “different” world. On the contrary, there was a series of bloody wars that lasted for long centuries and extended from the borders of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey now) to those of Andalusia (Spain now). The first printed version of translating the meanings of Quran (Arabic into Latin) was in the 16th century, though there was some interest in the semitic languages (Arabic, Hebrew, and Aramaic) by the Council of Vienne (1311 A.D.) at some European universities like Oxford (Busi, G.:2006).

Apart from the linguistic European interest in the East which followed the discovery of Sir William Jones of the similarities between the old Indian Sanskrit and Latin, the 17thc. onward interest was mainly economic due to the increasing trade in the Mediterranean region (Lockman, Z. 2004). This early European economic interest in the Arabic-Islamic world has changed dramatically in the colonization era in the 19thc. An important facet of such change was the

archeological discoveries of the ancient world in different places in the region which shocked the academic European societies since 1850s (Potts, D. T.:2012), despite the fact that the main concern was to examine the historical events mentioned in the Jewish and Christian holly heritage.

Due to the imperialist character of the colonization era, the stereotyping and racist mode of thinking of the eastern societies in general and the Indian society in particular, was a common hallmark of the early orientalist studies started since the first decades of the 18thc., and continued up to the end of World War II (G. Go: 2004). For instance, James Mill (1773-1836), a Scottish historian and philosopher, described the eastern societies as “static and corrupt” (Mill, J.:1858), whereas, the great German philosopher Karl Marx (1818-1883) criticized the economic narrowness of the eastern village economies (Iqbal, H.:2008).

After World War II, the western academic discourse on the Arabic-Islamic world has been affected by several political, economic and religious issues, most importantly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the American geopolitical interest in dominating the region.

The term “Orientalism” spread after the publication of a famous book which has the same title written by Edward Said (1935-2003), who was a Palestinian American professor of English literature at Columbia university and a prominent intellectual of the postcolonial studies. In this book, Said associates strongly between the orientalist academic studies and the imperialistic attitude of the West in dealing with the Arabic-Islamic world. The western orientalist scholars, according to Said stereotype the Arab-Muslim societies as inferior underdeveloped groups of peoples which are in need to the superior western power to teach them the new doctrines of the civilized societies (Mamdani, M.: 2004). As a consequence, the general public opinion in the West has been prepared well by the orientalist studies to accept the idea that the “underdeveloped” Arabic-Islamic culture is a potential threat to the western civilization (Chris, K.: 2004).

Edward Said’s negative observations on orientalism have been criticized heavily in the Academic arena in both the United States and Europe, whereas largely approved in the Arabic-Islamic academic world. He was accused of “Occidentalism”, which is a one-sided stereotyped image of the western world full of anti-sentiments (Lary, D. 2006). Thus, some scholars assume that he misleadingly presented the West in the same way he criticized the western orientalist’s treatment of the East. Moreover, another aspect of the criticism is the imprecise geographical generalization of the term itself which might or might not include the United States, Canada, Australia in addition to Europe (Sharp, J.: 2008).

On the other hand, the concept of neo-orientalism, which is a sort of contemporary manifestations of the classical orientalism, has been mainly used to criticize the western prejudice and extremity against the Islamic world in general, and the Arabic-Islamic world in particular after the 11th of September (Munawar, A.: 2015).

The classical and modern approaches to orientalism are similar in many aspects. Behdad, A. & Juliet William (2010: pp. 283-300), for instance, consider neo-orientalism as a new version of the classical orientalist perceptions basically based on the concept of western superiority and dominance over the east. Yet, the neo-orientalist studies have their own distinguished characteristics. These studies have been conducted not only by western scholars but also by some Middle Eastern male and female authors who write and publish their studies in collaboration with some western institutions specialized in studying Islam (ibid: 290).

More importantly, the neo-orientalist studies are mainly concerned with the Arabic-Islamic world due to the dramatic event of the 11th September. Altwaiji, M (2014) proposes that the year 2001 was the opening of a brand-new era of thinking of the people in the Middle East. It is “a year zero or a transformational moment in Arab-American relationship in which the Americans see Arab Muslims as fanatical, violent, and lacking in tolerance. On the other hand, Arab Muslims see the Americans as selfish, immoral, and greedy.”

2. Theoretical Background

Discourse as implemented in DHA is understood as a “context-dependent practices associated with specific fields of social actions”. It has to have an argumentative discursive nature related to the macro-topic under discussion. On the other hand, it has to be investigated as a dynamic process and be subject to the analyst’s perspectives, which might always be modified and continued (Reisigl & Wodak: 2015).

Discourse in DHA, moreover, is closely associated with the ideology of a specific social group. Yet, the concept of the supremacy and dominance of discourse, essential in the other versions of CDA, is not clear. Instead, the historical dimension is more emphasized. The dogmas shared by the different members of the social groups as explained in (Weden, 2005: 93) based on (Fairclough: 1989) and (Van Dijk: 1998) who emphasize on the political aspects of discourse and its hegemony, is replaced by the importance “demystifying the hegemony” through investigating the “intertextuality and recontextualization” of the texts, topics and topoi along the history of the discourse (Wodak, R. & Michel Meyer: 2001 & Wodak, R.: 2016).

The concepts of “intertextuality and recontextualizations” are indispensable in DHA which take us back to the roots of discourse analysis in Halliday’s cohesion (Halliday & Hassan: 1976) (see Obaib, A., & Fahad, A. K.: 2012). Yet, these concepts in DHA are more sociological and historical than linguistic. The cohesive devices have turned to be mere tools used to shed some light on the discursive strategy of investigating the argumentation of the discourse (see 4.4.3).

Accordingly, in order to analyze a discourse, one might use the metaphor of ocean icebergs. The macrostructural topic of the discourse is only an iceberg of several microstructural topics used in several discourses. Both the macro and micro structural discourse are strongly intertextualized and constantly recontextualized with reference to several aspects, such as the nature of topics selected, the treatment of topoi in the general argumentation of the discourse (see Figure 1. & 3.).

Both the macrostructural and microstructural discourses should be thought of as a comprehensible argument which embraces a group of topoi which are the “content-related warrants that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion” (Kienpointner,1992: 194) cited in Wodak & Meyer, 2001:74).

Moreover, following Fairclough (1995a, 14), Reisigl & Wodak (2015: 90) describe genre as a “socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity”. The macrostructural and microstructural discourses, hence, are a complex net realized by a cluster of genres that might be oral (e.g., audio and videos interviews) or written (books, reviews, newspapers articles etc.).




Figure 1: Interdiscursive and Intertextuality in Neo-orientalist Macrostructural Discourse Based on Reisigl and Wodak (2016)

Another crucial concept in DHA is how discourses might be turned into fields of actions. The idea of fields of action is defined as “segments of the receptive reality, which contribute to constituting and shaping the frame of discourse” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 80).

The discursive strategies particularly in the political discourses should not be thought of as mere articles in newspapers, research studies, a dialogue among academics in a restricted group of intellectuals, or even an inspirational speech delivered by a political leader in his election campaign, rather they might be used in engineering the public opinion to be prepared to accept some specific actions that ossiculate between a collection of legislations to declaring sanctions or wars on other countries (see Figure 2.).




Figure 2. The Power of the Neo-orientalist Macrostructural Discourse Based on Reisigl and Wodak (2016)

4. The Discursive Strategies of the New-orientalist Discourse: The Research Study

4.1. Activation

Since the 11th of September in the US, and London and Madrid explosions in Europe, there has been a need to understand the relationship between Islam and the West. Many western authors in different fields such as academics, journalists, historians, sociologists, and politicians have been involved in searching answers for questions like: Do these attackers represent a radical Islamic movement rejected by the majority of Muslims? How are the US and Europe supposed to deal with Muslims in general and the western Muslims in particular? How do the Islamic religion and Muslims think about the West? Is there a chance for Muslim countries to establish modern democratic states?

In order to answer questions like these, a new version of orientalism has appeared with a clearly defined discourse. Despite the fact that the people involved in dealing with the neo-orientalist discourse are different in tone and effect, they share specific discursive qualities as will be explained below.

4.2. Data Collection

The data of this study is a collection of articles and interviews of thirteen American and European authors selected on the basis of a lecture delivered by the Iraqi scholar Khazal Al Majidi in Arabic in Malmo-Sweden on 24th Feb. 2023 entitled “The Neo-orientalists and Muslims in the West”¹. The neo-orientalist authors were classified into three groups (pioneers, supporters, and academics) with reference to the nature of their professions and contributions (see Table 1).

The central macrostructural discourse used in the newspaper articles, research studies, and interviews selected is the relationship between Islam and the West. The data was explored with reference to the five criteria used in the analysis (nomination, prediction, argumentation, perspectivation, and intensification and mitigation) taking into consideration the five research questions formulated in analogy with these five criteria together with specific linguistic devices associated with each strategy (see Figure 3) (Reisigl & Wodak: 2015 & 2016)

¹ [YouTube -الإستشراق الجديد والمسلمون في الغرب - الدكتور خزل عل الماجدي \(1003\)](#)

Table 1: List of the Neo-orientalists Selected

Group one: Pioneers	Group Two: Supporters	Group three: Academics
<p>1. Bernard Lewis. (1916-2018). British American Historian specialized in oriental studies.</p> <p>2. Samuel Philips Huntington. (1927-2008). American Political scientist.</p> <p>3. Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (born 1952). American Political scientist.</p>	<p>1. Daniel Pipes (born1947). American Historian.</p> <p>2. Gisèle Littman (born 1933) (Bat Ye'or). Egyptian-born British author.</p> <p>3. Bernard-Henri Lévy (born 1948). French public intellectual</p> <p>4. Gilles Kepel (born 1955). French political scientist and Arabist, specialized in the contemporary Middle East and Muslims in the West.</p>	<p>1. Christoph Luxenberg. An Arab-German historical linguist.</p> <p>2. Patricia Crone. (1945-2015) A Danish historian academic. Early Islam</p> <p>3. Angelika Neuwirth (born 1943). Historian academic. German Islamic studies scholar and professor of Quranic studies.</p> <p>4. Ernest Gellner. (1925-1995). Socio-anthropological Academic. British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist.</p> <p>5. Enzo Pace (born 1944). Socio-anthropological Academic. Italian sociologist of religions.</p> <p>6. John Louis Esposito (born 1940). An American academic, professor of Middle Eastern and religious studies, and scholar of Islamic studies.</p>

4.3 Research questions

The following five questions have been proposed:

Q1: What are the main terminologies used by the neo-orientalist authors to refer to the discursive construction of the Islamic social actors, events and actions with reference to their relationship with the West?

Q2: To what degree do the neo-orientalist authors use negative and positive aspects in dealing with the Islamic discursive qualities with reference to their relationship with the West?

Q3: How do the neo-orientalist authors justify their argumentation concerning the relationship between Islam and the West? What are the main topoi and fallacies repeatedly used in their argumentation?

Q4: To what extent were the neo-orientalist authors objective and subjective in their argumentations?

Q5: To what extent were the arguments intensified and mitigated in the illocutionary force found in the neo-orientalist discourse?




Figure 3: The Model of Analysis Based on Reisigl and Wodak (2016)

4.4 Qualitative and Quantitative analysis

4.4.1. Nomination

4.1.1.1. The Pioneers: The main terms used by Lewis, B. (2006) move around the religious ideologies of “we” (the westerners) and “they” (the Muslims). The two clearly different groups of people in the mind of this author have different “civilizations” based on “Christendom” and “Islamdom”. These clearly different civilizations have been in a continuous “clash” since a long time ago. Religion, to Muslims, is the major, if not, the only source of “identity”, to whom all the Muslims are “loyal”. The middle-ages Islamic jargon, usually used by terrorist organizations, such as “the land of the unbelievers”, “sharia”, “Muslim state”, “dhimmis”, “infidels”, “bay’a” and “Dajjal” is heavily used in describing the current Islamic issues.

Huntington, S. (2012), on the other hand, shares with Lewis, B. (2006) the same idea of “the clash of civilizations” based on the “civilization identity”. The “cultural clash of civilization” with Islam is ascribed to new world “interactions” which “intensify civilization-consciousness”. The western progress has triggered the willingness of the “re-Islamization of the Middle east”. Thus, the two authors assume that the West faces “centuries-old military interaction” with Islam which is considered a “rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage (and) our secular present”.

Fukuyama, F. (2001), alternatively, presents the concept of “the end of history” to the benefit of the West assuming that all previous “ideologies” such as “monarchy, socialism, and fascism” have collapsed in their conflict with the “dominant capitalism and democracy” of the West, “Radical Islam” is no exception as it would collapse sooner or later. He adds that Islam is the “only cultural system (which) reject(s) modernity lock, stock, and barrel”. The metaphoric expression in this sentence implies the idea that Islam, in contrast to any other existing ideologies, is not able to coexist with the western values of modernity.

4.1.1.2. The Supporters: In his discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Pipes, D. (2023) assumes that “Islam by its nature includes drive to power”; Muslim pursuit of power has been influenced by the previous ideologies of “fascism and Marxism”. He adds that the “Arab-speaking” governments and the Palestinians should “understand that Israel won’t be defeated, but the Palestinians need to be defeated”. Commenting about Oslo agreement, he continued his intimidated tone advising the Israeli people to “give them (the Palestinians) nothing, make them go through defeat, let them feel the pain.”

Littman, G. Bat Ye'or (2017), does not only keep track of the pioneer neo-orientalists in using the middle-ages Islamic jargon such as “Dhimmi”, but she also produces her own derived expressions like “dhimmitude” and “Eurabia” referring to the societal circumstances of the Jewish and Christians under the old Islamic reign, and to the “Euro-Arab Axis” which she believes is constructing in Europe. The “European tolerance” and “submission” to Muslims in Europe, according to her, started in the 1960s when “many former Nazis” established an “antisemitic and anti-American” movement in France whose main aim is the “Islamization and the destruction of the Judeo-Christian civilization.”

One of the main discursive premises usually presented by the French public intellectual Levy, B. (2019) is the “appeasement” of Islam radicalism by European governments in general, and the French one in particular assuming that the “appeasement of radicalism only encourages more radicalism”. He highlights on the “threat” to the “western liberal and democratic values” represented by the “five ancient empires” including “Islamism”. He adds that the western liberalism is able to “integrate Islam, but not to be devoured” by it, emphasizing that the West is the “only empire where its grave is always a cradle”. The metaphor associated with Islam is that of greed and danger, whereas he associates the metaphor of reinforcement and power with the West.

In the course of his discussion to the social life of the French computer technician who attacked five colleagues at the police headquarter in Paris on 3 October 2019, Kepel, G. (2019), tries to explain the concept of “combatting jihadism” by referring to the Egyptian Islamist theorist “Sayyid Qutab” who distinguished between two “phases of Jihad”: “Phase of weakness” and “phase of strength”. Kepel believes that Muslims in Europe has been under “the influential jihad ideologue of the third generation”, and the West should be ready for the “fourth generation” of jihadism after the “fall of Raqqa in October 2017” (ibid).

4.1.1.3. The Academics: The academic neo-orientalists approached the relationship between the West and Islam from different perspectives; mostly linguistic and historical. An Arab German professor who chose the pseudonym “Christopher Luxenberg” asks for a “re-reading of Koran”, assuming that in order to understand the correct meanings of the Koranic verses, we need to take into consideration the “influence of Aramaic upon the language of Koran” because many vocabularies considered as part of “classical Arabic is of Aramaic derivation”. He suggests that it is more likely that the Koranic verses were taken from the scriptures written by the evangelical mission of the Syrian Christian missionaries using a

“mishmash language” of Syro-Aramaic and the Bedouin Arabic (Luxenberg: 2019).

On the basis of a similar historical approach in dealing with “early Islam”, Crone, P. (2008) tries to shed some light on the life of prophet Mohammed. She refers to the writing of the contemporary Byzantine, Greek, and Armenian writers who had referred to him as “a false prophet appeared among the Saracens” as no prophet comes “with sword and chariot” with the implicature of the Islamic early invasions. She rejects the doubts concerning the existence of the prophet, and confirmed the fact that he recited specific verses which were collected, after his death. Moreover, she criticized other scholar’s allusions of the Syro-Aramaic origin of the Koranic verses describing them as “highly charged politically.”

A different perspective to the relationship between the West and Islam is presented by the other western academics designated in this paper. Neuwirth, A. (2013) states that “the claim that Islam lacks an enlightenment is an age-old cliché” presented by the traditional orientalist. She adds that Islam does not need secularization because “the sacred and the secular already existed side by side in Islam”. She reminds the westerners that “the Islamic culture was far superior to that in the West or outside the Islamic world as a whole.”

In an interesting comparison between the “failure of Marxism” and the “success of Islam”, Gellner, E. (1982) considers Islam as “one striking counterexample to the secularization thesis” citing the example of the Iranian revolution in 1979 as the “most dramatic manifestation of the social and political vigor of Islam”. Islam, moreover, is considered a “high religion”; “a religion equipped with a scripture, a doctrine, and a professional core of interpreters”. Such potentialities armed Muslims with “international dignity” that help them to stand against the western values of modernity.

The Italian sociologist of religions, Pace, E. (2005), discusses the contemporary social life of the Muslim minority in Europe. On the basis of the statistics of several research studies, he assumes that the majority of Muslims in Europe do not consider religion as an integral part of their identity; thus “speaking of a Muslim invasion of Europe makes no sense”. Most of European governments “force Muslims to speak with one voice in the negotiation with the state” because of the “xenophobia”, “stigmatization” and the “prejudice” of the popular opinion against the Muslim minorities.

On the same ground, stands the American scholar of Islamic studies Esposito, J. (2016). He speaks about the “growth of far right, anti-government, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim political parties and candidates”, as well as the “Islamophobic” which he defines as “anti-Islam, and anti-Muslim attitudes and behaviors” ascribed to the

“social media websites that feed bias, discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes.”

4.4.2. Prediction: The Standards of Negativity and Positivity

In order to investigate the negativity and positivity in the neo-orientalist discourse with regards to the designated authors, fourteen negative-positive standards have been proposed. The data was investigated with reference to these standards by assigning values to each negative or positive remark. The values were distributed with reference to the strength of negativity and positivity into three levels (see Figure 4 & Table 2).




Figure 4: Standards of Negativity and Positivity in the Neo-orientalist Discourse

Table 2: Statistics of Negativity and Positivity in the Neo-orientalist Discourse

Negative		N1 Hate	N2 Ext.	N3 Intime.	N4 Islam. Pho.	N5 Race.	N6 Prov.	N7 Dist.	N8 Gen.	N9 Stereo.	N10 Pre. Judg.	N11 Super.	N12 D. Crit.	N14 Sub.	N15 Drama
G1 Pioneers	1	6	0	3	30	0	15	33	22	6	4	2	0	0	6
	2	3	15	0	9	0	3	18	14	10	0	6	0	1	7
	3	15	9	0	24	9	24	21	8	2	0	16	0	1	7
Total: 69.17 %		24	24	3	63	9	42	72	44	18	4	24	0	2	20
Positive		P1 Accom.	P2 Moder.	P3 Encourage.	P4 Understand.	P5 Impartial.	P6 Pleasing	P7 Exposing	P8 Specification	P9 Differentiation	P10 Judicious	P11 Modesty	P12 C. Crit.	P14 Objectivity	N15 Lessen
G1 Supporter	1	6	6	21	18	21	9	21	12	0	8	0	0	3	0
	2	0	3	3	0	12	0	30	4	0	2	0	0	4	1
	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0	8	0	0	0	0
Total: 30.81 %		6	9	24	18	33	9	54	20	0	18	0	0	7	1
Negative		N1 Hate	N2 Ext.	N3 Intime.	N4 Islam. Pho.	N5 Race.	N6 Prov.	N7 Dist.	N8 Gen.	N9 Stereo.	N10 Pre. Judg.	N11 Super.	N12 D. Crit.	N14 Sub.	N15 Drama
G2 Supporters	1	9	6	30	21	3	18	12	14	2	2	16	0	0	2
	2	24	30	0	48	3	48	54	10	2	0	0	2	0	9
	3	6	6	6	39	0	39	6	8	0	2	4	4	0	2
	4	3	3	0	36	0	33	0	2	10	2	0	2	0	11
Total: 84.89		42	45	36	144	6	138	72	34	14	6	20	8	0	24
Positive		P1 Accom.	P2 Moder.	P3 Encourage.	P4 Understand.	P5 Impartial.	P6 Pleasing	P7 Exposing	P8 Specification	P9 Differentiation	P10 Judicious	P11 Modesty	P12 C. Crit.	P14 Objectivity	N15 Lessen
G2 Supporters	1	3	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	3	2	3	6	0	0	3	0	3	10	0	4	0	0	0
	4	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	10	10	10	0	10	0
Total: 15.07		16	3	9	0	3	3	3	18	20	12	14	0	10	0
Negative		N1 Hate	N2 Ext.	N3 Intime.	N4 Islam. Pho.	N5 Race.	N6 Prov.	N7 Dist.	N8 Gen.	N9 Stereo.	N10 Pre. Judg.	N11 Super.	N12 D. Crit.	N14 Sub.	N15 Drama
G3 Academics	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	16	0	2	0	0	7	6
	2	0	0	0	3	0	3	30	10	8	0	0	6	6	8
	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total: 15.72%		0	0	0	3	0	3	57	26	8	2	0	6	13	14
Positive		P1 Accom.	P2 Moder.	P3 Encourage.	P4 Understand.	P5 Impartial.	P6 Pleasing	P7 Exposing	P8 Specification	P9 Differentiation	P10 Judicious	P11 Modesty	P12 C. Crit.	P14 Objectivity	N15 Lessen
G3 Academics	1	3	0	0	9	0	0	15	2	0	10	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	48	3	0	57	0	0	12	0	0	20	0
	3	35	15	30	33	0	6	6	0	0	10	6	0	9	2
	4	0	3	18	36	9	0	6	10	0	0	0	2	10	0
	5	3	3	0	51	0	0	39	0	0	32	0	2	19	0
	6	0	0	0	24	0	0	24	2	0	4	0	0	8	0
Total: 84.27%		41	21	48	201	12	6	147	14	0	68	6	4	66	2

The total negativity found in the second group (the supporters) was the highest (84.89%), the lowest in the third group (the academics) which was (15.72%), and that of the first group (the pioneers) comes in the middle (69.17%). Facts distortion, Islamophobia, and generalizations were the highest in the pioneers' data, whereas Islamophobia, provocation, and facts distortion were more obvious in the supports' data, and facts distortion was the most prominent among the other negative standards in the academics' data.

As for positivity, the highest percentage was identified in the micro-discourses of the academic group (84.27%), the lowest in those of the supporters' group (15.07), and in between comes in those discourses of the pioneers' group (30.81%). Understanding Islam, exposing facts, and presenting judicious arguments were the most prominent in the remarks introduced by the authors listed within the academic group, whereas exposing facts, impartiality, and specification were identified in the remarks of those authors listed in the pioneers' group.

4.4.3. Argumentation: The Inter-textualization of Topoi and Fallacies

All the designated neo-orientalists listed in the first and second groups (see table 1) discuss the macrostructural discourse of Islam and the West in terms of specific intertextualized topics (see figure 3) sharing a comparative series of topoi and fallacies.

Several topics were discussed by Lewis, B. (2006), such as the relationship between Islam, identity and loyalty, the role of church and mosque in the social life of Christians and Muslims, the Danish cartoons controversy, and Islam and democracy. Although he shows a good knowledge of the role of Islam in shaping the social identity of Muslims, he fails in a generalization fallacy in assuming that Muslims, as Arab speakers, were so “fortunate” to know the modern terminologies through Christians Arabs. Moreover, he talks about the “lively sense of history” in the Muslim world, citing an example of the Iraqi people during the war of Iran whom he describes as a “largely illiterate general public” who were subject to a “historical allusion”. How can a group of people who have a good knowledge and awareness of history would believe such allusions?

In his discussion of the “civilization awareness” arose due to the “economic modernization” in the West, Huntington, S. (1993), assumes that such awareness triggered the “nation-state” and religious identity in the Arabic world. In fact, the process of modernization produced a majority of believers in several European secular ideologies along the second half of the previous century. What he calls the “re-Islamization” of the Arab world occurred due to several political factors associated with specific local considerations. By and

large, Arab Muslims everywhere have been interacting with the western modernity so amenable along the whole postcolonial era.

The central argument of Fukuyama, F. (2001) is based on the idea that the western civilization represents the last level in the historical progress of the world civilizations; a state of affairs he describes as “the end of history”. Accordingly, the western values such as liberalism, capitalism, and democracy have surpassed all other competing ideologies such as communism, fascism, Confucianism, and Islam. Disregarding the spiritual aspects of Islam as a religion and including it with other materialistic ideologies is an apparent fallacy. Correspondingly, connecting the modern western values such as “liberal democracy” with Christianity is another obvious one.

Moreover, Pipes, D. (2023) fails in the same fallacy of Fukuyama, F. (2001) in seeing Islam as a political power. In comparing between the “Muslim hostility” and “non-Muslim toxic hatred”, he assumes that the Muslim hostility “tends to be about the very existence of the state”, disregarding all the peace agreements that have been signed under the regulations of the United Nations and its Security Council.

Bat Ye’or (2017), on the other hand, discusses the relationship between the Arab-Muslim immigrants and the Europeans criticizing the governments’ tolerance in the name of stabilizing the cultural diversity and expecting the “Islamization of Europe”. This false assumption, which she calls “Eurabia” contradicts the fact that the European governments have been backing up the United States and Israel in the Security Council since assigning the Belfour declaration by the British government in 1917. Moreover, comparing the middle-aged Islamic conception of “dhimmi”, which the majority of the contemporary Muslims haven’t heard of, with “the system of slavery or apartheid” is another false assumption.

Similar to the previous neo-orientalists listed under the groups of pioneers and supporters, Levy, B. (2019) and Kepel, G. (2019), continue in presenting a series of fallacies usually associated with the macrostructural discourse in dealing with the relationship between Islam and the West. On one hand, they keep considering Islam as a “political ideology” comparing it with other secular ideologies, and, on the other hand, they accuse the European governments, in general, and the French one in particular in being so lenient with “Radicalism in Islam”. Furthermore, they support Fukuyama’s conception of “the end of history” in believing in the extraordinary power of the western values to stand against and eventually defeat the spiritual values of Islam.

The last fallacy found in the investigated data of this study is produced by Luxenberg, Ch. (2019) listed under the academic group in the course of his discussion about the early Islam. The author proposes that Koranic verses classified as Mecca's Suras were taken from the scriptures of the Syrian Christians during "their evangelical mission to nearby countries... made use of a mishmash of languages". Anyone reads the Koran would know that it is full of criticism to several Christian assumptions particularly with reference to Christ. For instance, Al Ma'ida :17: "They have certainly disbelieved who say that Allāh is Christ, the son of Mary. Say, "Then who could prevent Allāh at all if He had intended to destroy Christ, the son of Mary, or his mother or everyone on the earth?"

4.4.4. Perspectivization:

In order to explore the perspectivation of the neo-orientalists selected in this study with reference to the relationship between Islam and the West, the following negative and positive standards were used (see table 2):

- Facts distortion vs. exposing facts
- Generalization vs. specification
- Stereotyping vs. differentiation
- Prejudgment vs. judicious
- Exposing superiority vs. modesty
- Destructive criticism vs. constructive criticism
- Subjectivity vs. objectivity

As for the first group of pioneers, it was clear that the remarks that distorted the facts (72 times) were more common than those which exposed them (54 times), the generalization remarks (44 times) were more evident in their minds in comparison to the specification ones (20 times), the stereotyping remarks, similarly, were used (18 times) in comparison to differentiation ones (0 times), and those which exposed superiority (24 times) were more than those which exposed modesty (0 times). Yet, there were less prejudgment remarks (4 times) and subjective remarks (2 times) than judicious remarks (18 times), and objective remarks (7 times) consecutively.

The second group of supporters showed comparative results to the previous one. Remarks that distorted the facts were far more common (72 times) than those which exposed the facts (3 times), the generalization remarks (34 times) and those which showed superiority of the West (20 times) were also more prominent than the specification remarks (18 times) and those which showed modesty (14 times). Yet, the stereotyping (14 times), prejudgment (6 times), and subjectivity (0 times) were less common than differentiation (20 times), judicious (12 times) and objectivity (10 times) consecutively.

The results showed a reversed perspective in the minds of the neo-orientalists listed in the Academic group. Remarks that exposed the facts (147 times) were more common than those that distorted them (57 times), judicious remarks, similarly, were far more than those which implied prejudgment (2 times), those remarks with modesty (6 times) and objectivity (66 times) were more than those exposed superiority (0 times) and subjectivity (13 times). Still, there were more generalization remarks (26 times) than specification ones (14 times), more stereotyping remarks (8 times) than differentiation (0 times), and more remarks that imply destructive criticism (6 times) than those with constructive criticism (4 times).

4.4.5. The Illocutionary acts of Intensification and Mitigation

One of the major features of the macrostructural discourse investigated in this study is the intensification of language used by the neo-orientalists. The most intensified language was used by those listed under the pioneers' and supporters' groups (44 intensified remarks), whereas, there were (14 intensified remarks) in the data associated with the academics' group. Mitigation, on the other hand, was more obvious in the language used by the neo-orientalists listed within the academics' group.

For instance, Lewis, B. (2006), in the course of describing Muslim's reaction towards portraying the Prophet, he moves from the assertive illocutionary act of describing the state of affairs to the expressive one by expressing his own mental state of misunderstanding: "Muslims are shocked when they go into churches and see pictures and statues being worshipped. This they see as idolatrous". In using the intensified adjective "shocked", and the middle-age Islamic term "idolatrous", he is disregarding hundreds of years of coexistence between Christians and Muslims in the East, and the thousand churches distributed along the whole Islamic world. In another topic, Lewis, B. (2006) keeps using the hypothesizing assertive illocutionary act in talking about the Iranian Islamic revolution describing the Iranians as "having no understanding or experience of the free debate of an open society... therefore, the use of a nuclear weapon would not bother them in the least." Such resolute premises can always be explained in terms of the over-all atmosphere of Islamophobia.

Within the same Islamophobic atmosphere presented by the expressive illocutionary act, Huntington, S. (1993), quoting Lewis, B. (1992) in describing the Islamic reaction against the western civilization: It is "perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both". Within the same domain of illocutionary act, Huntington, S. (ibid) continues drawing the flaming

borders between the “west and the rest” including Islam by assuming that the western values “have little resonance in Islamic cultures.”

Moving within the same Islamophobic atmosphere presented in expressive illocutionary act, Fukuyama, F. (2001) introduces his “end of history” theory by assuming that the 11th Sep. Islamic attacks was targeting the modern values of capitalism and “the very existence of western civilization”.

Those neo-orientalists listed under the supporters’ group recapitulate comparative intensified concepts. In his discussion to the Israeli-Palestinians conflict, Pipes, D. (2023) uses the directive illocutionary act of commanding by stating that the “Palestinians need to be defeated... give them nothing, make them go through defeat, let them feel the pain... Israel should tell the government of Gaza that a single rocket... means one day without any water or food or medicine or energy”.

Moreover, Bat Ye’or (2017), following the same strategy of other neo-orientalists in borrowing some Islamic middle-ages ways of thinking, insists that the “dhimmitude” represents “the very core of Islam”, and repeating the pioneers’ assumption that Islam is after “the destruction of the Judeo-Christian civilization”. In fact, by using the condemning commissive illocutionary act, she calls those Europeans who show some sympathy to the European Muslims’ issues as “Christian traitors joining and supporting the Muslim forces against their own people”.

Apart from the intensified language used by the neo-orientalists listed in the first and second group, the majority of the academic group used a clearly mitigated language. Some of the perceptions introduced by the academics are a reaction against those who intensify their language and thought in dealing with the relationship between Islam and the West. For instance, as a reaction against those historians who plant some doubts in the “early Islamic period”, Crone, P. (2008) uses the challenging directive illocutionary act by stating that “there is no doubt that Muhammad existed, occasional attempts to deny it notwithstanding... (the) two German works, by Günter Lüling and Christopher Luxenberg are open to many scholarly objections... perhaps that the field become highly charged politically”. She adds, by using the same challenging illocutionary act, that these works have been selected by “the press and paraded in a sensational vein on the strength of what to a specialist was its worst idea- to instruct Muslim living in the west that they ought to be enlightened.”

Moreover, Neuwirth, A. (2013) responses to the idea of the superiority of the West introduced by the neo-orientalists such as those listed within the first two groups, using the same directive illocutionary act of challenging: “The claim that Islam lacks

Enlightenment is an age-old cliché. Pride in the Enlightenment, even though this pride has died out somewhat, continues to lead people to believe that Western culture is a way ahead of Islam”. In the same mitigated language and illocutionary act, she adds that “for a very long time, the Islamic culture of knowledge was far superior to that in the West or outside the Islamic world as a whole”.

In his course of comparing between the “failure of Marxism” and the “success of Islam”, Gellner, E. (1982) uses the assertive illocutionary act of suggestion. He assumes that Islam is a “high religion”; i.e., “religion equipped with a scripture (and) a doctrine”. Answering those neo-orientalists who assumes that Islam is not able to get along with the new values of western modernity, he assumes, by using the directive illocutionary act of challenging, that Islam is based on “a genuine well-established local call international dignity: a very low level of magic, low ritualization, egalitarianism and all kinds of features which make it compatible with modern conditions”.

4. Conclusion

The arguments presented by the majority of the neo-orientalists concerning the relationship between the Arab Muslims and the West would lead the Muslim layman to ask what if this “zero year” of 2001 hadn’t happened, would they have changed their minds? As it has been clarified, there’s a great deal of criticism by some western academics to these arguments which were associated with and continued along the time of colonization era. Perceptions such as “the superiority and dominance of the West”, “the clash of civilizations”, “the West and the rest”, “the end of history”, “early-Islam fallacies”, “Eurabia” etc., which Neuwirth, A. (2013) describes as “an age-old-cliché”, didn’t appear all of a sudden, rather they were the results of hundreds of years of confrontations between the West and the Arabic-Islamic world.

It seems that most of the neo-orientalists have joined the relay race team of the classical ones with a more racist, extremist, provocative and Islamophobic discourse. The considerable percentage of negativity found in the macrostructural discourse of the first and second groups of the designated neo-orientalists have been transformed into specific western actions of wars and sanctions in the Arabic-Islamic World during the last two decades.

On the other hand, those research studies that deal with what they call the “early Islam” which are considered an integrated part of the macrostructural discourse of the neo-orientalists have been described by many western academics such as Crone, P. (2008) as “highly charged politically”. The media propaganda associated with these studies would do a little help in reutilizing the 18th century enlightenment in the West. Most of the academics listed in the third

group in this study, unlike those listed in the first two groups, have proposed that secularizing Islam is out-of-the-way and is doomed to failure due to its very nature which might coexist with the new western values of modernity.

It is important to note that the views of neo-orientalists, as with any academic or intellectual discourse, are not necessarily representative of the entire Western or Islamic world. While some Western academics may hold negative views of Islam, there are also many who recognize the complexity and diversity of the Islamic world and reject simplistic and essentialist characterizations. Likewise, there are many Muslims who reject extremist interpretations of their religion and seek to engage in dialogue and cooperation with the West.

It is also important to recognize that the relationship between the West and the Islamic world is not unidirectional, but rather shaped by historical, political, economic, and social factors. The actions of Western governments, including wars and sanctions, have had a significant impact on the Muslim world, and it is important to consider the perspectives and experiences of Muslims themselves in any analysis of this relationship.

In conclusion, while neo-orientalist discourse may continue to exist and influence certain individuals and policies, it is not the only perspective on the relationship between the West and Islam. It is important to engage in nuanced and informed discussions that take into account the diversity and complexity of both the Western and Islamic worlds.

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الإستراتيجيات الاستطردية لخطاب الاستشراق الجديد من منظور نظرية الخطاب التاريخي الملخص:

غالباً ما يُنظر إلى مفهوم الاستشراق الجديد على أنه تجليات الألفية الجديدة للاستشراق التقليدي في القرن الثامن عشر. على عكس الاتجاه التقليدي الذي ركز بشكل أساسي على الهند أثناء وبعد عصر الاستعمار، فإنه يرتبط عمومًا بالواجهة بين الغرب والعالم العربي الإسلامي بعد الحدث الدراماتيكي في الحادي عشر من سبتمبر في الولايات المتحدة.

اعتمدت هذه الدراسة على منهج الخطاب التاريخي (دي اج أي) لروث ووداك كنموذج للتحليل من أجل فحص الخطاب الاستشراقي الجديد. تم اختيار مجموعة من الدراسات البحثية والمقالات الصحفية والمقابلات التي أجراها ثلاثة عشر مؤلفاً غربياً بارزاً كبيانات للدراسة. تم تصنيفهم إلى ثلاث مجموعات من الرواد والمؤيدين والأكاديميين حسب مستوى تأثيرهم في الثقافة والإعلام الغربي بالإضافة إلى طبيعة أعمالهم.

أثبتت الدراسة أن خطاب المستشرقين الجدد للرواد وأنصارهم يستخدم لغة شديدة التركيز مشحونة بالعنصرية والاستفزاز وكراهية الإسلام مع خطاب الكراهية العرضي. من ناحية أخرى، وجدت الدراسة أن خطاب المستشرقين الجدد للأكاديميين أكثر موضوعية وحكمة ومشجعاً وذات لغة مخففة واضحة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاستشراق الجديد، تحليل الخطاب، المنهج التاريخي، الإسلام والغرب.