Al-Ḥadr’s Revolutionary Ideas and the Islamic Da’wa Party in its Formative Period

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I. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to clarify the emergence of Islamic movements and changes in their subsequent course in modern Iraqi politics; with a special reference to the transformation of Muhammad Bāqir al-Ḥadr’s political thought and the activities of the Islamic Da’wa Party (Ẓiyb al-Da’wa al-Islāmīya) which he established and maintained from its inception until 1980, the year of his tragic death.

Increasing attention has been paid to Islamic political parties in Iraq, with the Da’wa Party at the head of the list; especially after the U.S. invasion to Iraq in the year 2003. We could trace the roots of most, if not all, modern Iraqi Islamic parties to the Da’wa Party (see Figure 1), while the Da’wa Party itself has remained in the mainstream through its rise into power during post Iraq War period. One of the founders and most the important ideologues of this party is al-Ḥadr. He is believed to be the most important thinkers not only of modern Iraq, but of the Islamic world in the 20th century, and a supernal mujtahid within the Shi’ite religious establishment.
Researchers are, however, focusing attentions on various subjects other than the movements and courses of Islamic political parties. A number of exceptional studies during the early days of this field discussed socio-economic backgrounds, and analyzed mobilizations by the Islamic movements in the slums like Thawra City without grasping the Islamic parties or organizations themselves [Batatu 1981; 1987]. Other studies dealt with these institutions as “fundamentalist” or “radical” organizations [Baram 1990; 1994], ignoring the emergence and evolution of these parties. Despite these studies, the scarcity of research is too apparent.

Among the first detailed works on Islamic movements is Joyce Wiley’s The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shia [Wiley 1992]. Using primary sources, she argues that the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) and the Islamic Liberation Party (Ḍiǧb al-Taḏrīr al-Islāmī) have influences in the creation of the Da’wa Party [Wiley 1992: 31-32]. Following her research, Faleh A.  

1 Important works on modern Iraqi politics include; modern political history in general [Tripp 2000; Sluglett and Sluglett 2001; Marr 2004], transformation of Iraqi society and Iraqi Communist Party [Batatu 1978], Iraqi Nationalism [Zubaida 2000; Sakai 2005], mechanisms of rule in authoritarian Ba’thist regime from various perspectives emphasizing Iraqi identities or historical symbols [Baram 1991; Makiya 1998; Sakai 2003; Davis 2005], Shi’ite societies, processes of their formation, and their transformation [Nakash 1994].

2 Part of the reasons scholar have not paid enough attentions to this field is a lack of sources on Islamic movements due to various reasons. Iraqi scholar Ṭālîf Ṭālûf pointed out that there are almost no detailed studies on the Da’wa Party, SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, that has changed its own name to al-Majlis al-ʿāmil al-Islāmī al-ʿIrāqī in 12th May 2007), or Islamic Task Organization (Muna ṣaṭama al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī) [Ṭālûf 2000: 6]. The Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies in Damascus clearly mentions that the reason for the lack of research in Arabic is that scholars working on this topic, especially on the Da’wa Party, were in danger for their lives and had no guarantee of safety before 1990 [MIID 1999: 7]. However, after the Gulf War of 1991, personal archives were opened gradually to the public, and access to this information became more widely available.
Jabar presented an overview of Shi’ite Islamic movements emphasizing the roles of middle classes non-\ulamā\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\) merchants in shrine cities, especially the cities of al-Najaf and Karbalā\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\) [Jabar 2003]. The contribution of his argument brings western sociological-anthropological framework into the analysis of Islamic movements. Criticizing dichotomy of the ruling Sunni elites and the oppressed Shi’ite majority, he avoids monolithic understanding of Shi’ite Islamic movements. Directing his attention to three actors, the \ulamā\(\text{\textsuperscript{\textregistered}}\), merchants in the shrine cities, and the intellectual middle classes, he concludes that Islamic movements in Iraq, starting from social protest in communal bases, has shifted to radical populist Islamism [Jabar 2003: 316]. These fine works, however, did not consider the ideological backgrounds which characterizes Islamic political movements\(^1\).

On the other hand, research on al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)adr, one of the key figures in Iraqi Islamic movements, is divided into two streams. The first, analysis of his thoughts, focuses especially on his economic and philosophical beliefs, partly based on his practice of Ijtihād [Mallat 1993; 1994; Wilson 1998], where his political ideas did not attract sufficient attention\(^2\). The second, description of his political activities, is discussed from a historical perspective [Mallat 1988; Aziz 1993]. From this point of view, al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)adr’s radical revolutionary activities attract excessive, even exclusive, attention, and his political commitments are discussed statically.

\(^1\) Although Jabar analyzed political thoughts of al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)adr, Mu\(\text{\textregistered}\)ammad Ba\(\text{\textregistered}\)r al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)Ulūm, Mu\(\text{\textregistered}\)ammad Taq\(\text{\textregistered}\) al-Mudarrisī, and Mu\(\text{\textregistered}\)ammad al-Shīrāzī [Jabar 2003: 277-314], he did not pay attention to relevant relationship between their thoughts and movements.

\(^2\) Although al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)adr is well known by the extensive topics he covers like Our Economy (Iqti\(\text{\textregistered}\)ādu-nā) or Our Philosophy (Falsafatu-nā), analysis on his political thought is yet to be done. As almost all scholars on Iraq point out that al-\(\text{\textregistered}\)adr played important roles in the political field, no one has yet clarified what is original in his political thought.
Al-adr and the Da™wa Party did not initially hold the politically radical positions they later did. This paper aims to give a wider analysis of his political thought contextualizing his activities in the political history of Iraq.

Moreover, there have been few analyses on the relationship between al-adr and the Da™wa Party during his life, or that of the Shi™ite religious establishment and the Da™wa Party; which is considered to have crucial importance in understanding the Islamic movements in Iraq. This paper tries to analyze Islamic movements focusing on four aspects, (1) interactions between al-adr and the Da™wa Party, (2) relations between the party and the religious establishment, (3) cross-effects between Islamic movements and the central governments, and (4) transformation of al-adr’s thought. This paper combines the analysis of political thought (that of al-adr) and Islamic movements (that of Da™wa Party) in order to show their dynamism within the framework of political change in Iraq from 1950’s to 1980.

In the course of this analysis, I will use newly opened archives on Islamic movements in general, the Da™wa Party in particular, and relatively new arguments on al-adr’s political thought in Arabic; “Transformation in al-adr’s Thought”. These materials will be used to examine how the shift from political participation to revolutionary movement occurred inside Iraqi Islamic movements. A general view of Iraqi Islamic movements is exhibited in the Figure 1.

II. Political Participation: al-adr and Formation of Political Organization

1 As far as archives on the Da™wa Party, I will mainly use the party document [HDI 1981-1989].

First of all, I will provide a brief sketch of al-ʻadr’s activities, then explain the formation of the Da’wa Party underlining the socio-political backgrounds and characteristics of the party organizations. Through these works, the peculiarities of the Islamic movements in this period will be shown.

1. Al-ʻadr, the Pioneer

Al-ʻadr, was born in 1935 in al-Kāfīmīya, and then moved to al-Najaf, where he was educated to be one of the traditional ulamā in the Shi‘ite religious establishment. However, not being content with the traditional ways of thinking and acting, that were prevalent in the religious establishment, which had no appropriate answers to the political, social, and economic problems in Iraq at that time, he took an initiative to create a new Islamic political party, the Da’wa Party. Experiences in Muntadā al-Nashr, a school founded by Muḥammad Riā al-Mu‘affar, which offered composite curriculums between western-style school systems and traditional one in the Shi‘ite religious establishment, can be seen to have considerable effects on his way of thinking in later periods [al-ʻusaynī 2005: 47].

In the late 1950’s, al-ʻadr started his political activities such as writing series of articles “Risālatu-nā” in Aqwā magazine published by al-Najaf Ulamā Association (Jamā‘a al-Ulamā fī al-Najaf al-Ashraf), playing a leading role in

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1 About the year of al-ʻadr’s birth, the arguments vary from 1930 to 1935. Reliable hypothesis of his birth year are 1930 [Jabar 2003: 97,102], 1931 [Wiley 1992: 76], 1935 [Mallat 1993: 8; al-Nu‘mānī 1997: 42; Walbridge 2001: 132; Sankari 2005: 47,72; al-ʻusaynī 2005: 33-34]. In the research in Arabic, however, there is consensus that he was born in 25th of Dhū al-Qa‘da 1353 in the Hijrī calendar. There is some confusion in converting the Hijrī calendar to the Christian one; when converted correctly, he was born in 28th of February 1935.
founding the Da™wa Party, and writing party document “al-Usus al-Islâmiya”. However, increasing pressure from traditional ulamâ in the Shi™te religious establishment forced him to withdraw from political affiliation, especially from the Da™wa Party in 1961. In these circumstances, he made an effort in researching and teaching in al-Øawza engaging the party in the field of political thought [al-Øâ]îrî 1986: 73-76; Sankari 2005: 108-109]. All works of al-Øadr are listed in Table 1.

After the establishment of the Ba™thist regime in 1968, with its increasing inclination toward authoritarianism, the political situations around al-Øadr changed dramatically. Especially after mid 1970’s, conflicts between the Ba™thist regime and Islamic movements (mainly the Da™wa Party) caused the Islamic movements to change their direction towards revolutionary struggle. Facing these difficulties, al-Øadr tried to bridge between the Da™wa Party and the Shi™te religious establishment, in which he had already advanced in his seniority [al-Øâ]îrî 1986: 100-102; al-Khursân 1999: 162-163].

In 1979, Iran witnessed the Islamic Revolution. Al-Øadr openly expressed his sympathy to this revolution calling for the Iraqi people to support it [Ra-ëf 2001: 33-34,147]. A response which brought the Ba™thist regime a growing sense of crisis and let to his subsequent secret execution in April 1980 for the fears that he had a huge potential to mobilize the Iraqi masses to the Islamic revolution.

2. Formation of Political Organization: Da™wa Party
In the 1950’s al-adr expressed his anxiety to declining social and political influences and roles that the Shi'TMite religious establishment should play by saying:

“Viewpoint of the religion in the Western world is following; the religion should be a personal matter, not spread to the society. Because of this perspective, there would be no strong relation between religion, society, and normal life…This wrong understanding of roles of religious increased errors in contemporary Muslim” [al-adr 1982: 110-111].

Much of his sense of crisis is based on the expansion of Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), not only in the Baghdad slums but also in Shi'TMite shrine cities; mainly al-Najaf. Hanna Batatu points out that most of the members of ICP in al-Najaf were sons of relatives of Shi'TMite Ulama, and a ratio of Shi'a in the executive command of ICP increased from 20.5% in 1941-48 periods to 46.9% in 1949-55 periods [Batatu 1978: 485-573,700,752].

What alarmed al-adr was the decline of Shi'TMite religious establishment with the rise of ICP and secularism in Iraqi society. Consequently he voices his concerns, “We have to make an effort to make Muslim people to realize their inappropriate circumstances and factors which destroy ideal Islamic Umma” [al-adr 1982: 68].

So al-adr thought up three directives in order to remedy the above mentioned situation. Firstly, reformation of the Shi'TMite religious establishment especially educational systems inside al-awza, secondly, playing active roles in the al-Najaf Ulama Association, and thirdly, the formation of the Da'TMwa Party.

For the reformation of al-awza, he introduced examinations into traditional curriculums aiming at modernizing and institutionalizing the religious establishment [Aziz 2001:141-142]. It is worth mentioning that many texts written by al-adr
were used in one of the largest school under Muḥsin al-Hakīm [MTMD 2002: 129]. Moreover, religious school Kullīya Uṭūl al-Dīn was founded in Baghdad in which al-Ḥadr and leading Ṭālīmāt of the Daʿwa Party were teaching many students using al-Ḥadr’s books including al-Ṭālīm al-Jādīda li-l-Uṭūl, al-Iqtiṭād al-Islāmī, Ṭūlūm al-Qurʾān [ṬM Abd al-Ḥamīd 2002: 34-35].

Al-Ḥadr played an active role in the al-Najaf Ṭalīmāt Association, which was founded in 1959/60, supported by his own brother Ismāʿīl al-Ḥadr and uncle Murtaḍā Allāh 1982: 16]. Through this association, he wanted to make a space to participate and play a socio-political role in the Iraqi political arena. As I mentioned above, he contributed an article entitled “Risālatu-nā” in Aṭwār magazine, in which he describes it as following,

“Aṭwār is not only a reflection of the enlightening lights of Islam. We have been making efforts to enlighten the Umma, finding treasures of Islam, and to reflect the Islamic lights to the thoughts and daily incidents by which real life of Umma was fluctuated” [al-Ḥadr 1982: 24-25].

Moreover, he regarded the creation and activities of a modern organizational political party as having crucial importance in their ability to participate to Iraqi politics effectively. Following this realization, he began the creation of a new organized party. Al-Ḥadr pioneered to legitimize the idea of a political party based on Islamic teachings while prevalent belief of the day was to see political party as un-Islamic.

There are conflicting opinions concerning the formation of the Daʿwa Party1. After reviewing all these opinions against

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1 These are divided into three opinions; all are dependent on views presented by members of the party in the formative period. Founding year; firstly October 1957
historical dates, I would sum up the formative process in the following manner. Five reformists ṬMulamāḥ and non-ṬMulamāḥ (Mahdī al-ʿakīm, ṬAbd ʿāḏib al-Dukhayyil, ʿāḏiq al-Qāmūsī, ʿālib al-RifāṬMī, ʿāliḏ al-Adīb) had the plan to establish a new Islamic political party from around 1956 [al-Nizārī 1990: 38-41; al-Khursān 1999: 48-69]. They consulted al-Ṭadr about this plan, then brought this agreed-plan to the high-ranked mujtahid Murtaḍā al-ṬAskārī in to ask him join the creation of this party (see Table 2). After legitimatizing of formation of a political party by naming it Islamic DaṬMwa, al-Ṭadr emphasized the necessities of an Islamic political organization to join the political arena by saying that, “it is not only permitted in our age, but is the duty for us to gather efforts for Islam and distribute them according to wisdom… and to choose the most appropriate means to organize these efforts” [al-Ṭadr 2005b: 716]. In other words, he tried to clarify that it is necessary to form political party organizations in order to play active roles efficiently in the modern Iraq. Emphasizing the party’s role, al-Ṭadr maintains that the ideal ruling system should be based on shūrā including ṬMulamāḥ in the shūrā council on order to guarantee Islamic law [al-Ṭadr 2005a: 704-706].

Important aspects of the DaṬMwa Party in its formative period are, (1) cooperation with the ShiṬMite religious establishment, (2) alliance between ṬMulamāḥs and non-ṬMulamāḥ lay members.

(1) We can see this from cooperative activities between the party members and the al-Najaf Ulamā’ī Association. Collaborating with another Ulamā’ī association, the Baghdād and Kūsimiya Ulamā’ī Association, the Da’wa Party actively opposed the nationalization of banks and large-scale factories in 1964 [al-Khursān 1999: 146; al-Ωakīm 2000: 243-244]. Al-adr wanted to cooperate with the Shi’ite religious establishment, consenting to this direction, the party acted within the framework of the Ulamā’ī association [al-Mu’mīn 1993: 50,96]. Moreover, paying attention to the organizational level of the party, it had the Committee of Public Relations for Contacting Religious Authorities (Lajna al-Alāqāt al-Ωamma li-l-Ittiḥād bi-l-Marja’īya wa Ulamā’ī wa al-Shakhṣīyat al-Muhimma) in order to create and maintain relationships to the Shi’ite religious establishment [al-Khursān 1999: 89-93; al-Ωusaynī 2005: 85-86], which shows that the party considered this kind of solidarity as important for expanding party influence.

(2) Table 2, a list of the leading members of the party in its formative period, shows that there is an alliance of intellectual lay members and Ulamā’īs in the religious establishment. Roger Shanahan points out clearly one of the characteristic of the Da’wa Party is cooperation between clerics and technocrats [Shanahan 2004: 943-944]. The Party did not intend to create a revolutionary movement, but to enlarge their Islamic presence within the existing status quo. Al-adr himself maintains, “Islam in its methodological perspective is not necessarily revolutionary as is the domain of thought. On the

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1 The core members of this Committee are Murta ḍ al-Askari, Mahdi al-Ωakīm, and al-Dukhyiyil; all of them had strong relationships to the Shi’ite religious establishment [al-Ωusaynī 2005: 86-87].
other hand, Islam makes a room for revolutionary change only in the limited conditions” [al-ADR 1982: 101-102].

In short, the formation of an organization in this context means promotion of participation into the political field in a democratic manner. Al-ADR wanted to make a room for the Shi’ite religious establishment to play political roles through the activities of an Islamic political party; needless to say the Da’wa Party. It was a benefit for the party itself to cooperate with the religious establishment in order to participate in Iraqi politics as a political actor.

We could conclude that, characteristic of Islamic movements in this period, al-ADR tried to participate in Iraqi politics through formation of the Da’wa Party, which was considered to be a organization of Islamic reform. At the same time, this can be said of the Da’wa Party as well, because it also tried to participate in politics in cooperation with the religious establishment, or getting support from it.

### III. Authoritarian Regime of Iraq in 1970’s and Changes of Directions in the Islamic Movements

#### 1. Political and Economical Factors

The tendency in Islamic movements were, however, gradually changing as political and economical situations shifted in Iraq. In other words, the intention of al-ADR and the Da’wa Party was to participate in politics by means of the party apparatus in a democratic way incrementally to direct leadership of the state by institutionalized religious establishment. An overview of research and the party documents shows the Iraqi Islamic movements had
their turning point in the mid 1970’s [MIID 1999: 26-27]. Why this shift occurred? We could point out four important factors.

Firstly, oppression from the central government continued to intensify especially after formation of authoritarian Ba’thist regime in 1968. Depending on the massive growth of oil incomes¹, the regime used these rents for welfare on one hand, and intensified the suppression to the Islamic movements on the other. Moreover, using this oil income, the Ba’thist regime intensified recruitment of the middle class in the huge cities like Baghdad to the Ba’th Party apparatus and governmental administrations [Jabar 2003: 62]. The oppression concentrated on the supporters of al-‘aḍr and the Da’wa Party, and many Iranian students in al-‘awza were expelled from Iraq being labeled that they were members of the Da’wa Party [Rauf 2000: 118; 2001: 109]. The regime enforced regulation which allowed them to execute a person solely because they were a member of the Da’wa Party (Regulation No.461) [Rauf 2000: 121]. Realizing the momentum in oppression of Islamic movements in Iraq from 1968, we may characterize 1974’s execution of 5 high-ranked religious leaders in the party as a watershed moment for them. In these political circumstances, it was unavoidable that the Islamic movements centralize religious authority and make use of their abilities to mobilize Iraqi mass in institutionalized manner.

Secondly, relative to the duration of oppression from the Ba’thist regime, pressure from traditional ‘ulamā in the Shi‘ite religious establishment had a long time to influences the change of al-‘aḍr’s idea and the activities of the Da’wa Party. Although the influence of this traditional ‘ulamā, who

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¹ Oil income in 1971 is estimated 840 million U.S. dollars, 1,843 million dollars in 1973, and increased in 1979 21 billion dollars [Owen and Pamuk 1998: 162,260]. Iraqi oil income increased nearly 30 times within only 8 years.
considered political activities by high-ranked mujtahids in the religious establishment were not only inappropriate but deviations [Jaˇfar 1996: 474], declined in the mid 1970’s, these pressures were strong enough to force al-ˇadr to stop writing the articles “Risālu-nā” in Aˇwām and leave the party in 1961. Al-ˇadr noted in the afterword of Falsafatu-nā that he would write Mujtamaˇu-nā (Our Society) analyzing state-society relationships in the ideal Islamic state [al-Sadr 1998: 344]. He mentioned, however, on his plans afterward as follows, “Our society did not permit me to write Our Society”\(^1\). These continuing pressures is one of the important factors of change of direction.

Thirdly, the transformation of relations that we can recognize between the Daˇwa Party and the Shiˇte religious establishment as a result of splits in the leading members of the party. As previously stated, the Daˇwa Party had a cooperative relationship with the religious establishment through reformist ulamā like al-ˇadr and al-ˇAskarī. Moreover the first non-ulamā leading figures of the party Muammad Hādi al-Subaytī agreed this policy [al-Khursān 1999: 161]. After the mid 1970’s, however, many of the party apparatuses were destroyed by the regime, and leading members have to leave Iraq. Consequently, as Raˇuf points out, the party and the religious establishment started to compete for the leadership of the anti-regime Islamic movements in Iraq [Raˇuf 2000: 54,75]. Although this competition was temporary, al-Sadr and leading members in the party felt strong need to reconstruct the cooperative relationships to resemble those in the formative periods. This recognition resulted in hastening the change both in

\(^1\) Al-Sadr’s words quoted in [ˇAbd al-ˇamīd 2002: 183].
the part of political thought of al-adr and real activities of the Da\textsuperscript{TM}wa Party.

Fourthly, we have to mention the extensive innovations of the Islamic jurisprudence in al-Najaf especially after late 1960’s. This is the positive factor that caused the transformation of al-adr’s thought. In al-Najaf at that time, many \textsuperscript{TM}ulamā\textsuperscript{[]}'s, namely Rū\textsuperscript{0} Allah Mūsāvī Khomeynī’s Wilāya al-Faqīh, Fa\=l Allāh’s al-Marja\textsuperscript{TM}īya al-Mu\textsuperscript{[]}assasa, Mu\textsuperscript{0}ammad al-Shīrāzī’s Shūrā al-Marāji\textsuperscript{TM}, started to argue that \textsuperscript{TM}ulamā\textsuperscript{[]} should lead politics and rule the state directly [Ra\textsuperscript{[]}ūf 2000: 84-85; Yamao 2007: 171].

As Mallat pointed out clearly, “testimonies from militant circles shed light on the hesitations of the older \textsuperscript{TM}ulamā\textsuperscript{[]}....as the central government was getting increasingly authoritarian and sectarian, the hesitation slowly gave way to the ascendancy of activism” [Mallat 1993: 17]. The conditions were fertile to produce creative political thoughts about Islamic state in al-Najaf at that time.

2. Implications of this Change to Iraqi Politics

The change in circumstances affected to al-adr’s thought and policies of Islamic movements in a complex way. What, then, did this mean to the Islamic movements? I would like to illustrate the implications that the change of in the Islamic movements may have had in the Iraqi politics.

Loss of the possibilities of democratic participation into politics by means of party organization like the Da\textsuperscript{TM}wa Party means two things for Islamic movements; (1) restriction of activities in Islamic political organizations and that of the Shī\textsuperscript{TM}ite religious

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1 Islamic political thoughts constructed in al-Najaf are similar in that all of them maintain \textsuperscript{TM}ulamā\textsuperscript{[]} or specialist of the jurisprudence should lead a politics and rule a state, but are different in determinations of \textsuperscript{TM}ulamā\textsuperscript{[]} and methods of ruling a state.
establishment, (2) weakening applicability in the al-adr’s political thought which emphasizes the system of Shūrā in terms of political participation in the democratic way.

Consequently, al-adr tried to widen the room of religious establishment’s roles within the Iraqi politics in a different way. In other words, as the assertion of democratic political participation became increasing untenable, al-adr and the Da Party started moving toward placing control of the state directly in the hands of the ulamā’. As pointes out, al-adr made an effort to compromise shūrā and wilāya al-faqīh to make a new al-wasaʿīya design [Abd al-Ωamīd 2002: 172-174] (italics added).

As a result of these political changes, we can notice serious segmentations of the Da Party’s leadership especially after 1974’s attack by the Baṭhist regime. A split of the party was started in 1972 when the regime tried to destroy the party apparatuses1. The leading figure at the party after 1972 was Ārif al-Baʿrī, a high-ranked mujtahid in the religious establishment [al-Khursān 1999: 180]. He made a considerable effort to bridge the party and the religious establishment. The year after this assumption of the position, however, the regime re-started an oppressive attack to al-Baʿra branch and arrested a large number of the party’s leading members. At the peak of this oppression, in December 1974 the regime executed five high-ranked mujtahids in the party leadership [al-Mumin 1993: 115-123]. This situation resulted in, as al-Khursān mentions, that the Da Party became like a body without head [al-Khursān 1999: 188].

As a result of this, the Da Party was divided into two parts, Iraqi Committee (Lajna al-Irāq) which played active roles

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1 We can confirm the main segmentations of the party’s leadership once in 1972, and more than twice in 1974. See [al-Khursān 1999].
inside Iraq composed by comparatively new leaders, and General Leadership (al-Qiyāda al-TMĀmma) which was composed by senior leadership outside Iraq [al-Khursān 1999: 212-217]. In other words, dual leadership between inside-Iraq leadership and outside-Iraq leadership started in this period.

We should pay attention, however, that this segmentation does not mean a decline of the party’s activities and its influences on the Iraqi society and politics. On the contrary, because of the drought in the southern parts of Iraq in the late 1970’s, political and economical frustrations have been increasing among the Iraqi people living in the sough. In these circumstances, the DaTMwa Party successfully mobilized those frustrated masses and appealed to people there [Batatu 1987: 211]. It was in this period that the DaTMwa Party started to mobilize the Iraqi masses widely.

All things considered, the intention of al-峁adr and the DaTMwa Party shifted gradually to the design that maximized the roles of Islam in the Iraqi political sphere, and to lead the Iraqi state within the framework of Islam. This direction is one of the important characteristics we could find in Islamic movements in the modern Iraq. A peculiarity of the Islamic movements after this shift is yet to be seen. We will analyze this matter in the next section.

IV. Reinforcing Relations: Revolutionary Movements and al-峁adr’s Later Thought

1 Leading figures of Iraqi Committee were 峁abā商贸Abbās (leadership), Fayāl Hillī, Fā’il al-Zarkānī, Mahdī TMZ Abd al-Mahdī. General Leadership was divided into three factions; (1) al-Subaytī faction, (2) al-عينī faction, (3) al-Baṭrī faction [al-Khursān 1999: 212-217].
1. Theoretical Perspective of Islamic State in al-adr’s Political Thought

To begin with, we examine ideological aspect of the change. A poignant illustration of al-adr’s political thought in the later period is the argument that institutionalized religious authority should lead politics and rule the state. By saying this, he tried to bridge the modern (nation) state and the Islamic state. Then how did he build up this argument?

Primarily, he maintains that sovereignty belongs only to the God. Human beings are representatives of the God in this world, and exercise this sovereignty as His representative. He calls this representation “deputyship (khilāfa)” [al-adr 2000: 127]. This deputyship is the basis of the rule of human. This means, he explains, that “God the Sublime entrusted to the human being the rule on this world … the basic concept of human rule of the same human being and legitimacy in human exercise of ruling power as representative of the God is based on this deputyship” [al-adr 2000: 128].

However, we can easily assume that human beings entrusted to carry out deputyship do not necessarily act in an appropriate manner. In other wards, “when someone exploits this deputyship for his own greed … it is expected that he finds possibility of corruption or evil in exercising this deputyship in a wrong way” [al-adr 2000: 131].

In order to solve this problem, he continues, the God makes another plan, “righteous-guidance (shahāda)”. This righteous-guidance is the intervention of the God for the purpose of

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1 Islamic terminology “shahāda” is usually translated to “witness” or “certification”. However al-adr uses this word to express not only witness mistakes or deviations of human rule, but also intervene in order to correct them and guide to the right way. That is why I translate “shahāda” to “righteous-guidance”.

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amending/correcting human rule or way of living [al-adr 2000: 132]. For al-adr, the reason the God makes this righteous-guidance is to protect humans, as representative, from deviation, and to guide them to the right purposes [al-adr 2000: 135].

Then we should ask who is responsible to this righteous-guidance. Al-adr pointes out as following:

“We can find the role of righteous-guidance firstly in the prophets, secondly in Imāms who have divine extensibility (imtīdād rabbānī) of the prophet in this line, and thirdly in the religious authorities who are considered to have reasonable extensibility (imtīdād rashīd) of the prophet and Imāms in this line” [al-adr 2000: 136].

From al-adr, the prophets and Imāms have been made responsible to play two roles; namely deputyship and righteous-guidance simultaneously. We should, however, notice here that there are two essential differences between the prophets-Imāms line and religious authorities. Firstly, the prophets and Imāms were appointed by the God, but religious authorities are chosen by Umma as a result of long pain-taking efforts [al-adr 2000: 137]. In other words, the prophets and Imāms were appointed as certain persons, but religious authorities are just the framework not persons. Secondly, prophets and Imāms certainly are infallible, but religious authorities are not necessarily infallible [al-adr 2000: 138].

Because of these fundamental differences, in the periods of ghayba, the two responsibilities of deputyship and righteous-guidance should be divided into different actors. Religious authorities could not play these two roles at the same time as they are lacking in infallibility [al-adr 2000: 159].

Then, who are responsible to these two roles in the periods of ghayba? Al-adr maintains clearly;
“In the age of ghayba, Islam distributed these two responsibilities of the line to religious authorities and Umma, in other words, to legal ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-sharīṭ) and temporary shūrā (al-shūrā al-zamanīya)” [al-adr 2000: 161].

In short, he argues that religious authorities are responsible to the role of righteous-guidance using their legal knowledge on one hand, and the role of deputyship should be played by Umma making consensus in decision-making system shūrā on the other. However, al-adr emphasizes that we should have flexible interpretation of these Islamic concepts of rule when the Islamic law is losing its controlling power to societies and politics especially after the inflow of the concept of a nation-state. Al-adr states;

“As far as Umma is ruled by dictator far from the Islamic true state of the general deputyship, religious authorities should take the role of deputyship too. In this case, two responsibilities—deputyship and righteous-guidance—should be (re-)incorporated into religious authorities” [al-adr 2000: 160] (italics added).

Without doubt, he built this argument keeping Saddam’s regime in his mind. Islam loses its political and social roles gradually in secularized nation-states especially under an authoritarian regime. He maintains in these circumstances that roles of deputyship and righteous-guidance should be re-incorporated into religious authorities for the purpose of re-widen socio-political roles of Islam.

We could conclude three characteristics regarding his thought in this period. Firstly, al-adr built his argument on possibilities of ṭulmā’s rule in the modern state through the combination of the deputyship and righteous-guidance, not “wilāya” like Khomeynī did. More importantly, he tried to testify that Islamic
state could be legitimized in the modern state combining interpretation of circumstances and Islamic jurisprudence; this is the second point. Thirdly, he tried to bridge between democratic modern state, which is legitimized by people’s approval, and Islamic state by arguing that religious authorities should be chosen by Umma in terms of shūrā. This is ideological shift that is reflected in the movements of Islamic parties.

2. Institutions of Islamic State

Then how does al-adr try to construct an Islamic state while also making a modern state? In short, he has considerably concrete ideas about the systems and the institutions of a realizable and a sustainable Islamic state. We will see this from three aspects of his thoughts and activities, namely (1) preparation of economic infrastructures, (2) design that ruling ulamā of the state should be institutionalized, and (3) emphasis of the Dawa Party’s role in it.

Firstly, al-adr paid a lot of attention for the preparation of economic infrastructures in the Islamic state. He has written many theoretical books and articles about Islamic economy, Iqtiādu-nā at the head of the list. In these works, he continues to present an alternative Islamic economy to socialism, communism and capitalism. Moreover he proposes to construct the “al-Lajna al-Māliya” (Finance Committee) which registers state and personal properties [al-adr 2005c: 729-730]. This shows that he considered the economic basis to be important in constructing Islamic state, and preparing this infrastructure should increase the feasibility of constructing an Islamic state in the modern Iraq.

His emphasis on economic aspects can be clear as we consider the religious tax specified to Shi'Ta, khums that ordinary people pay one fifth to their religious authorities. This system guarantees to the Shi'Tite religious establishment financial independence from the state, and at the same time they need to administrate the financial matter by themselves. This specific aspect to Shi'Tite societies, we could assume, create al-adr’s concerns for the need of economic infrastructures. Compared to Sunni Islamic movements which tend to prioritize ideological aspects, keeping an eye on economic basis is peculiarity to Shi'Tite Islamic movements in general, and to al-adr in particular.

Secondly, he discusses that leading Tmulamā[I in al-Œawza who take responsible to the state-rule should be organized and institutionalized. This would guarantee, he believed, a stability of the Islamic state. Al-adr highly estimates religious authorities who’s concerns are socio-political problems, and name them “al-marja'Tīya al-āliŒa/ al-rashīda” (rightly guiding authority). However, existence of this authority is not enough to construct the Islamic state he designs. He mentions; “We need now to prepare ideationally and mentally in order to cooperate in constructing the rightly guiding authority to serve Islam…. We also need to gather the efforts and supports as much as possible from all over the world” [al-adr 2005c: 728,730] (italics added).

Historically speaking, religious authorities played their roles as a single man that he calls “individual practices” [al-adr 1989: 387]. He tried to transfer from individual practices to what he calls “al-marja'Tīya al-maw ūTīya” (objective authority) which is institutionalized by making councils of the authorities [al-adr 1989: 387].

That is, when we make up ruling system of religious authorities as institutionalized organization, decision-making process could
have independence comparatively from changes or transformations which may occur inside a single authority [al-adr 2005c: 731]. And he mentions another merit, this type of ruling system could guarantee its own stability, especially when a religious authority die, succeeding authority would find a fixed system constructed by former authorities in front of him. He does not need to start from the beginning [al-adr 2005c: 731].

We could consider an important aspect which lies in the Shiite religious establishment in a wider perspective. There is an increasing number of religious authorities we can find after the death of single marja al-taqlid Usein Borujerdī in 1962. Al-adr emphasizes the importance to integrate this dispersed authorities into centralized organization. This would result in, he argues, creating effective administration in the Islamic state [Raūf 2000: 100].

Thirdly, he considers the roles of a political party, such as the Da wa Party, indispensable in managing administration in the Islamic state. Al-adr maintains very clearly the importance of strong cooperation between the party and the religious establishment;

“...I am now convinced that Islamic movement cannot accomplish its own purpose without aids from the religious establishment. At the same time.... It is crucially important for the religious establishment to cooperate with Islamic movement in order to accomplish its missions.... The relationship between the party and the religious establishment should be organized tightly in order not to be destroyed by the regime”

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1 In this context, Islamic movement indicates Da wa Party.
2 Al-adr’s words quoted in [al-Mumin 1993: 125-126].
3. Towards Revolutionary Movement: Change of Directions in the Da\textsuperscript{wa} Party

Sympathizing these ideological changes in al-\textdagger adr’s thought and political changes in Iraq, the party itself was gradually changing direction towards revolutionary movement. The party held the convention of Makka in 1977 in order to discuss party’s policies critically\textsuperscript{1}. This was turning point of the party in terms of relationship between itself and the Shi\textsuperscript{ite} religious establishment. For example, the Iraqi Committee held meetings with al-\textdagger adr during February and March of 1979 to discuss who should take responsibility in the oppositional Islamic movements. They agreed that although religious authority should lead the movements considering the party’s opinions, both should act as a unity. Also they made the agreement to cooperate, (1) in collecting and buying weapons, (2) in constructing demonstrations, (3) in publishing leaflets of the party, and (4) in holding meetings every week [al-Khurs\textdaggeran 1999: 262-263,269]. Moreover, it was decided in the meeting between al-\textdagger adr and \textgreek{as}an Shubbar, the party leader from the formative period (see Table 2), that the religious establishment acquired money and aided to the Da\textsuperscript{wa} Party in order to accomplish a revolution [al-Khurs\textdaggeran 1999: 278]. The party official document stressed in 1978 that it was crucially important to make a strong cooperative relationship with al-\textdagger adr in order to fight together against the central government and construct an Islamic state [HDI 1989:

\textsuperscript{1} In this convention, following points were discussed; (1) enforcement of Islamic thoughts in the party and applying them to the party activities, (2) urgent need in increasing of the party’s members and their influence, (3) enforcement of Islamic educations and that of calling (da\textsuperscript{wa}) in the party members, (4) needs of the party’s social activities, (5) qualifying the party leadership, (6) estimations of the party’s activities [al-Khurs\textdaggeran 1999: 231-248].
vol.4, 171-172]. It should be pointed out that the Iraqi Committee of the party acted under al- adr’s direct command [al- usaynī 2005: 143].

On the part of al-adr, he tried to widen his influences by means of sending his own wakīl (representative) to all Iraq [Rafī‘ 2000: 137-138], and to construct wukalā’ s networks (representatives networks) [Jabar 2003: 231]. More than 80% of these representatives were members of the DaTmwa Party [al-Khursān 1999: 265].

Moreover, the DaTmwa Party widened its mobilization of the Iraqi masses in Intifā’ afar in 1977 and Intifā’ a Rajab in 1979. The former occurred from the pilgrimage to Karbalā’ at the occasion of al-TmArbaTmīn in that year. And the latter was the oppositional demonstration to the third arrest of al-adr in Jun 1979, which was assumed to be a great opportunity for expanding membership of the party2. The DaTmwa Party tried to get sympathizers inside the Iraqi army and among masses, and the party’s leadership approved for the party to shift to the “political stage” officially [HDI 1989: vol.4,167; al-Khursān 1999: 293]3. At the same time, because of al-adr’s efforts, increasing number

1 One of the remarkable example, al-adr dispatched one of the most brilliant his disciples Ma‘mūd al-Hashimī to Iran and Britain, where he founded Islamic Liberation Movement (arak al-Ta‘arrur al-Islāmī). He played a important role in making Political Committee (al-Lajna al-Siyāṣiya) composed by students of al-awza following the order from al-adr. Moreover al-Hashimī played as middleman between the Shi‘ite religious establishment, the DaTmwa Party, and Iranian government bringing correspondences among al-Khomeynī and al-adr [a-Khursān 1999: 265-267; Rafī‘ 2001: 167].

2 It is said that there were about 1000 core members and a few thousands sympathizers of the DaTmwa Party according to the report presented by the regime [al-Khursān 1999: 314-315].

3 The DaTmwa Party has 4 stages of development in its political program, namely (1) ideological stage, (2) political stage, (3) revolutionary stage, and (4) ruling of revolutionary government. See [HDI 1981: vol.1, 219-234; 1984: vol.3, 259-263].
of supporters joined to al-\\text{\textasciitilde}adr’s activities and the Da\\textsuperscript{TM}wa Party’s struggle. The sympathizers organized delegations (wuf\\textsuperscript{TM}d al-bay\\textsuperscript{TM}a) and sent them to his house, where they often had an assembly for reinforcing Islamic struggle [Raf\\textsuperscript{\textasciitilde}uf 2000: 137-138]. Using these opportunities, al-\\text{\textasciitilde}adr and the party organized the Iraqi masses to their oppositional movements [Raf\\textsuperscript{\textasciitilde}uf 2001: 163].

To conclude, al-\\text{\textasciitilde}adr recognized that the Da\\textsuperscript{TM}wa Party should play crucial role as the bridge between societies and the state as increasing oppression from the Ba\\textsuperscript{TM}hist regime forced to him and the Islamic movement to re-envision the role of the Shi\\textsuperscript{TM}ite religious establishment within an Islamic state. Consequently al-\\text{\textasciitilde}adr developed his political thought, and following this change, the Da\\textsuperscript{TM}wa Party’s direction followed closely to al-\\text{\textasciitilde}adr’s, and shifted to revolutionary movement.
V. Conclusion

This paper explained dynamics of Islamic political movements in modern Iraq and the change of their direction through, (1) transformation of al-ʿadr’s political thought, and (2) shift of DaTmwa Party’s activities during the mid 1970’s.

Al-ʿadr’s initially had a vision of the realization of an Islamic state with the concept of the Islamic principle of Shūrā, he proposed to create the DaTmwa Party in a relatively democratic period in modern Iraqi history, legitimating/justifying it from the Islamic jurisprudence point of view. When the party was firmly established and was gaining more popular supports within Iraq, BaTmthist regime with its increasing authoritarianism stood as a strong obstacle. Al-ʿadr had to develop a revolutionary theory in his course to realize Islamic state in Iraq. Simultaneously, the DaTmwa Party enforced its increasing inclination toward revolutionary movement, cooperating with the ShiTmite religious establishment. In this period, al-ʿadr stressed the need for consideration of feasibilities of Islamic state in the modern “nation state” making a concrete plan of the state by, (1) building and planning economic infrastructures, (2) designing of institutionalized Tmulamāl in al-∅awza lead the state, (3) emphasizing to the role of Islamic party, the DaTmwa Party.

This paper has demonstrated how this transformation was caused in a thought of al-ʿadr as well as policy orientation of the DaTmwa Party. The changes found in the DaTmwa party paralleled, to some degree, to the transformation of al-ʿadr’s thought, and corresponds to political changes in Iraq.