A Pragma-dialectic Study of Interreligious Polemics

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Abstract
The paper is an attempt at studying one particular type of polemics, viz, interreligious polemics. It is concerned with the debate held between Jamal Badawi and Samuel Green on the former’s leaflet "Muhammad in the Bible" and Green’s reply to it in the Christian-Muslim Discussion Paper (2004 Appendix1 ). An eclectic pragma-dialectic model has been designed for the analysis of the issues raised in the debate. The analysis reveals that the debate between Badawi and Green is an eristic one. This indicates that the goal behind polemical activities is to win the debate by violating standard norms. There seems no agreement between the disputants on a specific procedure that could be followed to decide on their problems. The disputants follow a contest model. Each of Badawi and Green just seeks to be acknowledged as the winner as each begins and ends the debate with the sense that he is the only right. Therefore, the debate, in the end, proposes no solution, nor is it resolved; all its issues have just been dissolved.

1. Introduction
Language is not always transparently used. It might sometimes be manipulated, for one purpose or another, and then falsely functions in an ambiguous way. One of the pragmatic aspects of language use is the argumentation function of language. In this regard, pragmatics seems to have a precious tradition that works against the ambivalence related to the argumentation function of language. It is the tradition that works against that misuse of language, which consists in pseudo-arguments and fallacy.

Polemics appears to be closely related to this particular function of language. However, what is polemics first? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it means “the art or practice of arguing a case formally and usually forcefully”. When singular, the word polemics refers to “such speeches or pieces of writing” (OED s.v. polemics). The New Webster’s Dictionary of English adds that polemics refers to the art or practice of theological disputation. Etymologically, the word is the Greek polemikos from polemos, which means ‘war’. ‘Polemical’ is the adjective which means arguing a case very forcefully, often with the intention of being controversial or provocative (ibid.). The term “polemics” has another sense in ordinary English usage; it may connote simple hostility, or opposition for its own sake or something like this. But Griffiths (1996: 1) uses the term to refer to “the kind of engagement that does and should occur when those who take what they believe seriously encounter others equally serious about, and committed to, their beliefs”.

In its everyday sense, polemics is seen, according to Foucault (1984) as a serious play of questions and answers in which the rights of each person are, in some sense, immanent in the discussion. Rabinow (1984) believes that nowadays three models of polemics can be recognized, viz, a religious, a judiciary, and a political model. In the religious model, or heresiology as often called which is the concern of this study,
polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed. It denounces this negligence as a moral failing.

After all, the purpose of polemics is not argument for argument’s sake, as it is commonly believed, but the critical evaluation of truth claims. In defining polemics, Dascal (n. d: online) introduces the following words of Aristotle:

> The man who is seeking to convert another in the proper manner should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious way...he who asks questions in a contentious spirit and he who in replying refuses to admit what is apparent...are both...bad dialecticians

This suggests that the general tendency in polemics should follow a certain ‘manner’ that is described as ‘proper’, presupposing that there are certain qualifications, if not restrictions, on that manner.

The present work tries to shed light on the interreligious polemical debate held between Dr. Jamal Badawi and Samuel Green on the former’s leaflet “Muhammad in the Bible”. Hence, the following questions are posed: to what extent can polemics be described as controversial and provocative? How much does polemics cope with pragmatic principles and maxims? What is the role of intention in the interpretation of a particular polemical text, viz, religious polemics?

It is, thus, hypothesised that: first, the polemical debate tends to use certain linguistic strategies and tactics that are designed to undermine the opponent’s arguments and overcome him deceitfully. Second, the strategies of polemics run diametrically counter to Grice’s maxims, so that flouting them is the basis of polemics.

2. Polemics and Interreligious Dialogue
The most striking and institutionally prominent instance of polemics could mostly be found in departments of religious studies in universities and colleges, in theology departments, and among divinity schools. Yet, it is unfortunate that whenever religion is the central topic, the real polemical dimensions of people’s intellectual life “are swept under the rug, or treated as the kind of embarrassment that reasonable people ought to pretend isn’t there” (Griffiths, 1996: 3). The neglect of the intellectual activity of interreligious dialogue is sometimes said to be due to the prominence of the judgment that such a dialogue, which is believed to represent the only proper mode for intercourse among religious communities, has its own “definite institutional and theoretical place in the culture, an activity that now has a fairly lengthy history and that has produced its own bureaucratic organisations, organs of publication, and professional experts” (ibid.).

Moreover, such a dialogue is deemed to be as a practice that ought to cease as it is believed to be of no discernible benefits and has many negative effects. But in fact, this belief is based on a radical misapprehension of the nature and significance of religious commitments; a misapprehension of culture without genuine awareness of its own religious and intellectual roots. The serious discussions on interreligious questions are ruled out in principle by those institutions that have created interreligious dialogue as a recognisable discursive formation in culture (ibid.). Therefore, it is evident that polemical dialogues and confrontation are integral and essential to the intellectual life, and that any attempt to systematically remove them from that life is unhealthful simply because what goes for the intellectual life goes also for the religious life.

3. Communication and Argumentation
Within argumentative discourse, the basic function is persuasion
and convincing. Typically, such a function should be the aim behind the use of argument in persuasive dialogues. Thus, the participants in a dialogue should not go beyond the function of this kind of discourse. Yet, it is possible to find some kind of manipulation of argumentation for the sake of serving some other functions. An opponent, for instance, might be involved in an argument that is intended just to come up with one result only, i.e., to win the debate in that argument. This is what traditionally called ‘eristic’ argument. (Emeren & Grootendorst, 1995).

It is significant in a place to study the effect of such a kind of argument on the entire process of communication. The basic aim behind communication is exchanging information among people regardless of the ultimate consequence of the process, which is to agree, partially or totally, or disagree at all with this or that piece of information.

To argue for or against the nature of consensus or disagreement, one may think of some other dimensions of the argument itself. It is right that man is cooperative in nature and intuitively tends to reach some more levels of understanding during his life in a way that, at least, improves life. However, the question here is that: to what extent is man free-minded and objective to accept or reject the knowledge he exchanges?

Thinking of the nature of this question could give rise to some more considerations concerning the nature of the relationship between communication and argumentation. In fact, communication does not always mean stating things explicitly in a transparent language, though this should be the case in successful communication. Therefore, the possibility of miscommunication is often there. Communication might include many linguistic phenomena that face the analysis of dialogues in everyday life.
Pragmatically speaking, Mey (1993) discusses several examples of these phenomena. Within micro-pragmatics, he (ibid.: part II) discusses the issues related to reference, presupposition, speech acts, implicature, etc. These phenomena are seen from the points of view of text, context and co-text in relation to society, discourse, and conversational analysis.

These pragmatic components have been thought of as suggestive solutions for many problems in syntax, semantics, and in language use in general. It seems that the core of pragmatic analysis is inference or the ability to recognise the meaning of the speaker’s utterance in a particular context. While studies in syntax and semantics prove to fall short to these problems, recent development in pragmatic theory suggests more than one way to look at the point. Among such new trends is the theory of relevance.

Based on semantic perspectives, deductive and inductive inference represents earlier attempts in understanding ‘understanding’ in relation to the coding-encoding process of communication. These types of inference are based on inventing a direct method to link the different parts of the discourse on bases of logical principles. It is noticeable that the logical relationships have been put in forms of rules that are believed to best help man advances from the given premises to the conclusions. They might be thought of as means of transfer of inferences and intentions of the language users.

A deadly shortcoming of this kind of treatment is the use of logic as a tool, i.e., as a set of logical rules, outside language itself for analysing a set of related linguistic aspects like ‘code’, ‘encode’, ‘decode’, ‘language user’, ‘meaning’, and ‘syntax’, etc. Nonetheless, one could claim that these rules are, in fact, mere means of reasoning no less no more. If this is the case, the problem could be graver since such a claim presupposes that one
should think of the process of reasoning far from the use of the linguistic components put forward in reasoning.

3.1 The Pragma-dialectical Approach to Argumentation

Weger (2001: 313-4) argues that the pragma-dialectical perspective has, in fact, extended the traditional normative logical approach to argumentation. It evaluates arguments “by creating standards for reasonableness that have a functional, rather than a structural, focus [emphasis added]”. Any argument, accordingly, can be evaluated in terms of its usefulness in moving a critical discussion toward resolution instead of evaluating it in terms of the relationship between premises and conclusions. This approach signifies both the significance of normative standards for judging the strength or ‘cogency’ of single argumentative acts as well as the necessity of reconstructing the arguments in order to achieve certain communicative goals.

Argumentation, then, is seen as a communicative process wherein arguments are functional units the significance of each is considered in relation to the amount of success in achieving the communicative objectives behind their use. “The functional perspective on argument is based first on the belief that argumentation is a communicative activity. And second,…on a functional view of communication in which messages are studied in terms of the purposes they serve and the goals they achieve” (ibid.: 314).

Whereas the traditional logical approach evaluates arguments in terms of decontextualised abstract structural features of these arguments as they are applied across situations, the rhetorical perspective concentrates on the evaluation of the quality of arguments’ persuasiveness. Nevertheless, the pragmadialectical approach proceeds to suggest ‘normative guidelines’ for evaluating the quality of an argument that requires attention to the
communicative functions and the structure of the argumentative moves used in advancing a standpoint (ibid).

3.2 The Development of Pragmadialectics

Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) present a concise but condensed survey of the recently developed movement of pragmadialectics. As the term points out, the pragmadialectical perspective on argumentation is a combination of two views: a dialectical view of argumentative reason-ability and a pragmatic view of the moves made in argumentative discourse. Each has been inspired by a group of specialists.

Firstly, the dialectical conception of argumentative reason-ability is inspired by critical rationalists and other analytic philosophers, such as Karl Popper, Hans Albert, and Arne Naess, as well as by formal dialectical logicians, such as Charles Hamblin, Paul Lorenzen, Else M. Barth and Erik C. W. Krabbe. This coalition is manifested in the pragmadialectical ideal model of ‘critical discussion’ where each party shows his contribution to the overall formula of the model. This coalition, it seems, gives the pragmadialectical research its basic five components.

These five components of the pragmadialectical research program are explained from philosophical and theoretical research to empirical, analytical and practical research. [Emphasis added] (ibid.: 390).

Yet, the model is collectively conceived as aiming at resolving a difference of opinion. To achieve such a goal, the model needs to put “the acceptability of the ‘standpoints’ at issue to the test by applying criteria that are both problem-valid as well as inter-subjectively valid” (ibid.: 387). While problem-validity refers to an assessment of the suitability of certain theoretical tools to fulfill the purpose for which they are designed, inter-subjective
validity refers to the acceptance of such tools by the company of people to whom it is supposed to be applied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule 1</th>
<th>Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rule 2</td>
<td>A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party asks him to do so.</td>
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<td>Rule 3</td>
<td>A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.</td>
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<td>Rule 4</td>
<td>A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint.</td>
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<td>Rule 5</td>
<td>A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a premise that he himself has left implicit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule 6</td>
<td>A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule 7</td>
<td>A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied.</td>
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<td>Rule 8</td>
<td>In his argumentation, a party may only use arguments that are logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed premises.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule 9</td>
<td>A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it and a conclusive defense in the other party retracting his doubt about the standpoint.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule 10</td>
<td>A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and he must interpret the other party’s formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.</td>
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Secondly, the pragmatic conception of the argumentative moves as speech acts in a
discursive exchange is firmly rooted in John L. Austin and John R. Searle’s philosophy of verbal communication, Paul Grice’s theory of conversational rationality, and other studies of verbal communication by discourse and conversation analysts. The pragmatic conception has been manifested in the definition of the moves that the arguers make in the various stages of the resolution process of the difference in opinion. These moves are ‘speech acts’ such as presenting a standpoint, casting doubt on a standpoint, advancing arguments in favour of a standpoint, and concluding what the result of a discussion is.

3.3 The Protocol of Amsterdam School
For Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003: 388), “Eemeren and Grootendorst presented the basics of their pragmadialectical theory of argumentation for the first time in English in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984)”. This fundamental book is said to be strongly philosophical and theoretical, from the point of view of reason. Nevertheless, when viewed analytically, it is actually significant because it introduces the four different stages that any critical discussion consists of. These stages become later what Braybrooke (2003a: 513-4) calls the protocol of Amsterdam School “for accounts of discussion that they seek to complete in detail for discussions of all kinds and even in the presence of what may seem at first sight unregulated clamor”. Eemeren and Houtlosser’s (2003) stages are:

- Stage one: the confrontation stage in which a difference of opinion manifests itself.
Stage two: the opening stage in which the procedural and material points of departure for a critical discussion about the standpoints at issue are established.

Stage three: the argumentation stage where the standpoints are challenged and defended.

Stage four: the concluding stage which closes the critical discussion and in which the results of the discussion are determined.

Braybrooke (2003a: 513-4) lists these stages of the protocol but puts them in different terms. He calls the first stage the ‘try-out stage’ in which someone expresses commitment to a standpoint, i.e., a certain proposition. “Sometimes, the try-out stage could be called the provocation stage…But ‘try-out’ fits the many cases in which the speaker is not being provocative, or even trying something on” (ibid.: 534n)

If another incompatible standpoint challenges this one, the arguer, then, moves to the second stage or the debate-opening stage, where he may agree to argue for and against the different standpoints in a reasonable way.

The Amsterdam protocol is said to have the merit of being applicable to the close analysis of many basic requirements of well-formed discussions. Besides, it is applicable to many different sorts of discussions, such as those between friends and within families, on trains or at race-tracks, in scientific communities, in business relationships, in courts, in the bureaucracy, and in legislatures (ibid.: 514).

Thinking of a question like ‘Where do the propositions adopted in the standpoints come from?’ Braybrooke (ibid.: 515), in a form of contribution, believes that there is still one stage earlier than the try-out stage in which the initial standpoint is expressed; it is a stage where an issue is broached. “The initial standpoint can then
be seen as a position on the issue...Then, moving to the confrontation stage…”

Weger (2001: 315) states that Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) organise critical discussion rules around the four stages. Table 1 above presents a complete list of the discussion rules identified by them (ibid.). These rules are organised around the functions argumentative speech acts perform at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of the discussions.

For example, a married couple discussing which movie to see on a Saturday night involves elements that are essentially similar to the stages of a critical discussion. The wife may assert her opinion regarding which movie to attend and her husband follows by casting doubt upon her choice (confrontation stage). Since the couple has an established relationship, rules for discussing differences of opinion and commonly accepted share common starting points (opening stage). If the wife decides to advance her standpoint, each party will offer argumentation as a way of casting or removing doubt about the wife’s choice about which movie to see (argumentation stage). Argumentation will continue until the wife withdraws her bid or until the husband agrees to the wife’s suggestion (closing stage) (Weger, 2001: 317).

Moreover, “these rules range from the prohibition to prevent each other from advancing a particular position in the confrontation stage of the discussion to the prohibition to generalise the result of the discussion in the concluding stage” (ibid.). Accordingly, any move in the discourse violates the rules can be seen as an obstruction to the achievement of the critical target of the discussion and may be considered fallacious, in this particular sense (see also Rühl (1999)).

This approach represents a new way for the analysis of fallacies. Instead of viewing the fallacies in terms of the valid/invalid dichotomy, it defines fallacies “as discussion moves that violate
in a particular way a particular rule for critical discussion that applies to a particular stage of the discussion” (ibid.). The single norm of logical validity is, thus, replaced by a collection of different norms, expressed in the rules for critical discussion, with which the argumentative discourse has to comply. Accordingly, many of the traditional fallacies can be approached more clearly and consistently, and many new fallacies that have escaped notice earlier can be detected now.

4. Pragmatic Argumentation

Walton (1998: 715) believes that “the new pragmatic approach to argument evaluation is called dialectical in the ancient Greek sense, implying that every argument has a proponent and a respondent who engage in a so-called dialogue, or goal-directed type of conversational exchange, in which the argument is being used by the proponent for some purpose”. The two parties contest with each other in an adversarial or agonistic exchange, that is, they struggle with each other trying to be victorious over the other. At the same time, they are supposed to be collaborative as they take part in an orderly exchange that requires cooperation and they follow rules, or maxims, of polite discourse. “Each party must make moves that are appropriate for the stage of the dialogue that the conversation is in” (ibid.).

Recently, a new perspective to approach argumentation has developed; it is the theory of argumentation. In one of its bases, such a theory accounts for argumentation schemes. Feteris (2002: 353) states that ‘a specific kind of argumentation scheme’ is pragmatic argumentation. She (ibid.) mentions that different authors look at pragmatic argumentation differently; some consider it as a scheme based on a ‘causal relationship between the argument and the standpoint’, others consider it as a scheme based on causal regularity, on the evaluation of rules, or on rules of conduct. For Řeemer and Grootendorst (1992: 97, 102)
‘instrumental’ or ‘pragmatic’ argumentation is an argumentation scheme based on a causal relationship in the sense that it refers to the consequence of whatever is mentioned in the standpoint. A standpoint may recommend a particular course of action or goal to which the argumentation mentions the favorable effects or consequences. For Walton (1996) pragmatic argumentation is an argumentation that refers to the consequences of a certain act, measure, policy, or a rule such as a legal rule. According to Feteris (2002: 353), a judge uses pragmatic argumentation, for instance, “to defend an interpretation of a statutory rule by showing that the consequences of this interpretation are in accordance with the aim of the rule” (3).

Bonevac (2003: 451) believes that “pragmadialectics, the theory of argumentation developed by Eemeren, Grootendorst, Rees, and others, has a number of advantages over other approaches to argumentation”. Though it is dynamic, context-sensitive, and multi-agent, pragmadialectic theory and practice, however, it is not yet fully in harmony. Therefore, key definitions of the theory fall short of explicating the analyses that pragmadialecticians actually do. Nevertheless, Rees (2003) does not share Bonevac’s (2003) fear that the theoretical definitions adopted in pragmadialectics do not permit such analyses.

There will be no problem with the pragmadialecticians’ actual analysis if the definitions of terms are made clearer: the two basic terms in the theory of argumentation, i.e. protagonist and antagonist, refer to ‘roles’ that participants in a critical discussion may take. “They do not refer to persons. So, several people may participate in a discussion, some of which may be protagonist of one particular standpoint, while others may take the role of antagonist of this standpoint and/or protagonist of opposing standpoints” (Rees, 2003.: 461).
The theory is dynamic in the sense that as “a dynamic theory of language can integrate pragmatic and semantic components into a unified theory, pragmadialectics fits nicely within such a dynamic framework” (ibid.). It is context-sensitive because it fits well with the theory by emphasising the role of context in the analysis of an argument. This should be a characteristic of any theory designed to account for pragmatic features of language. Thus, the meaning of a sentence as used in a context is best understood in terms of the context that results from the assertion of the sentence. Such a sentence-meaning is understood as a mapping from contexts to contexts. Furthermore, it is multi-agent because it “extends to dialogue…while analysing a wide array of strategic moves” (ibid.). In addition, it makes use of logic, which traditionally evaluates arguments as sound or unsound, valid or invalid, though nowadays’ logic tends to use the argumentative context, especially in discussions of fallacies. It also benefits from rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric takes the roles of arguer and audience more seriously while arguments are conceived to be advanced by a ‘faceless arguer’ toward a ‘faceless audience’.

More interestingly, Bonevac (2003: 452) argues that pragmadialectics is a real theory of fallacy and argumentative structure. Accounts of fallacies and argumentative structure in logic and rhetoric ‘hardly deserve to be called theories’. They mostly consist of observations and generalisations that, if well justified or objectively approached, cannot resist criticism or be independently strong enough. They, by no means, yield an overall theory capable to explain what fallacious or non-fallacious arguments have in common.

4.1. Walton’s Notion of Pragmadialectic Rules
As the nature of Walton’s treatment of fallacy has emerged, the basic account of fallacy in pragmadialectics has been effectively
rejected and a new pragmatic theory has been promoted in Walton (1995). Finding the former insufficient in both scope and power of analysis, Walton, according to Tindale (1997: 349), pushes his critique beyond the account of Amsterdam School of Pragmadialectics. He is mainly dissatisfied with the dependence on rules; rule-violation is not a sufficient way of identifying a fallacy or of evaluating a particular argument as fallacious. His “pragmatic theory makes the very issue of fallacy identification a challenging intellectual exercise, involving numerous considerations and a close reading of contexts” (ibid.: 352).

For Walton, the concept of fallacy has been described as being of a dual nature. A fallacy can be described in terms of two layers: the first involves the identification of the type of argument involved and the underlying form or structure of that argument; the second involves the possibility of misusing the form of that argument in a dialogue. Walton (1995: 17 in Tindale 1997: 349) suggests that:

fallacies are first and foremost identified as being certain distinctive types of arguments, as indicated by being instances of their characteristic argumentation schemes. Then the fallacy is analysed as a certain type of misuse of the argumentation scheme.

The first layer requires recognising the argumentation scheme, or the distinctive type of argument. According to the traditional pragmadialectic notion of fallacy, every type of argument should have an underlying argumentation scheme. A fallacy, then, could be identified in the light of these schemes. For Walton (ibid.), however, a fallacy is not the argument itself, but the use of that argument. Hence, there has been a suggestion that each argument has a fallacious use corresponding to a non-fallacious one.

To extending his theory to account for as many fallacies as possible, Walton introduces two other proposals:
First: The idea of an argumentation theme, which means a sequence of argumentation modeled in a profile of dialogue that reveals how the argument is used in a protracted manner.

Second: The idea that argumentation is contextually rooted and that context is primary. The context makes the argument and there will be no same argument in two different contexts. Contextualisation would solve problems where an argument seems fallacious in one context and non-fallacious in another.

The most original with Walton is his second layer of the concept of fallacy. Walton talks about the ‘wrong use’ of an argument, where the ‘use’ refers to the type of dialogue involved. Thus, an argument is a fallacy if it involves an underlying dialectical shift from one type of dialogue to another. Furthermore, the dialogue itself is correct and appropriate; what is incorrect is the shift, or change of use, in that argument, which may fool a participant or spectator (ibid.: 350).

Yet, rule-violation is not completely absent from the final version of his theory. A contributive significant notion related to this layer is the type of rules an arguer violates in committing a fallacy. Pragmadialecticians, such as Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003: 388), investigate issues on the pragmadialectical norms in relation to the problem-validity and inter-subjective validity of these norms, see, for example Table 1 on rules for critical discussion.

Dissatisfied with the validity of such rules, Walton invokes Grice and defines a fallacy in terms of failure in commitment to the Gricean cooperative principles. This specification of rules highlights new characteristics of fallacy. A good successful argumentation, accordingly, stands out as ‘collaborative’, ‘responsible’, and ‘goal-driven’. Tindale (1997: 349.) adds that: fallaciousness is an attitude that interrupts the cooperative endeavours of arguers reasoning in a
dialogue. Its incorrectness is more than simply logical, but indicates a violation of some of the deeper features that make argumentation such a worthwhile and instructive activity.

The notion of rules, consequently, has changed with Walton using the term in a new sense; it refers to Gricean principles of cooperation.

Indeed, Walton’s model of ‘dialogue shifting’ represents the principal type of ‘wrong use’ identified in his theory. Nevertheless, the model escapes instances of wrong use, whether of an argumentation scheme or theme, such as when one party shuts up the other party by closing off the dialogue too soon, or moves too far ahead in the sequence of moves required within the dialogue type (ibid.: 351).

Following this model, many writers identify fallacies in terms of Gricean cooperative principles. Klement (2002: 385), for instance, identifies the genetic fallacy, alongside other forms of reasoning as ad hominem, ad misericordiam and ad populum as falling in the category of fallacy of relevance. Such arguments are considered as fallacious because matters related to the identity of who make the statements, the kind of belief they have, the way they advance the argument, and what brings them to do so are all taken to be irrelevant to the statements’ truth or an argument’s soundness.

4.2. Grice’s Maxims and Relevance
Grice Maxims actually represent a new perspective to the study of language in relation to its users and context in argumentation and comm.-unication. A better understanding of the message could be so possible that inference might be based on bridging gaps between the users’ intentions and the linguistic elements in the participants’ utterances.
Grice claims that utterances automatically create expectations that guide the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning. He, accordingly, describes these expectations in terms of the maxims of Quality (truthfulness), Quantity (informativeness), Relation, and Manner (clarity) which speakers are expected to observe (Grice, 1961, 1989: 368-72).

This follows that a conversation is a cooperative activity governed by a set of general rational principles that account for the relationship between, in Grice’s terms, “what is said” and “what is implicated”. Furthermore, the interpretation of any utterance is a collaborative process behind which both participants should have the common goal of better understanding.

Serious observations of the cooperative maxims surely treat gaps in inference and interpretation. Even if the speaker intends to violate any of such maxims, the collaborative process requires the hearer to provide the closest assumptions that cope with the maxims and provide a better interpretation of the speaker’s utterance. This collaborative behavior mostly represents some common conventions in language interchange. In turn, such common conventions must imply another cooperative assumption with the ultimate goal of gaining a full understanding of the speaker’s utterance. The latter assumption presupposes the goodwill of both participants to understand each other.

This, however, is not always the case. Some speakers intend to achieve some other goals rather than the communicative goal of ‘better understanding’. They might tend to develop one-sided prevalence of idea over their partner. The process of give-and-take in the conversational interchange, then, could be frozen into a give-and-give processes without taking into consideration the partner’s ideas seriously. It has been found that the speakers in such a kind of dialogue tend to pay attention to their partners’
roles with the intention of not really understanding them for the sake of understanding them cooperatively. They, rather, intend to manipulate such roles and integrate them within theirs, in a plot-like way, in order to win the debate and impose one’s ideas on the opponent. To describe such a kind of violation, the researchers propose the term ‘ill-will’, as opposed to that of ‘good-will’.

4.3. Flouting the Maxims
In the light of the Gricean Co-operative principle, ill-will represents a clear example of violating most of the maxims of this principle, i.e., flouting these maxims. Levinson (1983: 104) describes ‘breaching’ or ‘flouting’ the maxims in terms of direct and indirect ways of ‘observing’ the maxims. Apparently, the linguistic significance of such maxims lies in the fact that they often generate inferences beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered. He (ibid.: 103) states that the speaker may rely on the addressee’s utterance in order to amplify what he says by some straightforward inferences based on the assumption that the speaker is following the maxims. The speaker in such cases may presuppose that his partner is always able to follow the maxims. This may give rise to the case of misinterpretation and miscommunication due to an unintended violation of the maxims. Consider the following, for instance:

A. : (to a passer by): I’ve just run out of petrol
B. : Oh, there is a garage just around the corner.

Instead of understanding A’s utterance as a request for some petrol, B takes it for sure that A is seeking a place to fill in his car. The source of problem could be flouting the maxim of relation or some other maxim. Nonetheless, the inference of the speaker’s intention seems far-fetched.

Far-fetched intentions, accordingly, hinder communication in a way or another and so do ill-wills that might cause greater harm to it. When cooperation is just superficially intended and
communication is meant to be just a means for the further end of winning the debate, the entire enterprise of conversational interaction tends to be unnatural. Each speaker aims at defending himself against his opponent by whatever available means. In such cases, persuasion itself, as an aim of the dialogue, could be flouted and that dialogue would be devoid. This might be considered as an indirect way of observing, as the opposite of flouting in Levinson’s terminology, the maxim where the speaker deliberately and ostentatiously flouts the maxims. The manipulation of maxims here might represent a sense of over-flouting, which a speaker intends to deceive his/her addressee via a kind of maneuver.

4.4. The Theory of Relevance
The Grecian conversational maxims have their central role in the explanation of how possibly speakers mean more than they actually say. These maxims “have been repeatedly examined by linguists and the significance of each one of them weighed against that of the other” (al-Jawadi, 2005: 30). At the top of these principles is that of relevance. Their re-evaluation suggests the principle of relevance is the sufficient maxim among them. Thus, the Theory of Relevance has suggested itself as a substitute to the Cooperative Principle on the basis of the rationale that “in any given context, we have to assume that what people say is relevant” (Mey, 1993: 80).

Wilson and Sperber (2002: 249) believe that Relevance theory could be seen as an attempt to work out in details one of Grice’s central claims that:

an essential feature of most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1989: essays 1, 4, 14, 18, Retrospective Epilogue) in Wilson and Sperber (ibid.)
Accordingly, Wilson and Sperber (ibid.: 250) identify what they call inferential pragmatics. For them, the goal of this kind of pragmatics is to account for the way the hearer infers the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided. The interpretation a rational hearer should choose is one that best satisfies those expectations. Though sharing Grice’s intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance, Relevance theorists question several aspects of his account such as:

a. The need for a co-operative principle and maxims,
b. The focus on pragmatic process that contributes to implicatures rather than to explicit,
c. Truth-conditional content,
d. The role of deliberate maxim violation in utterance interpretation, and
e. The treatment of figurative utterances as deviations from the maxim or convention of truthfulness.

Relevance, however, is, intuitively, a potential property not only of utterances and other observable phenomena, but also of thought, memor-ies, and conclusions of inferences. Furthermore, an input is relevant to the individuals when they connect it with the background information that they have in order to result in the conclusions they are interested in (ibid).

This input may have the form of a sight, a sound, an utterance, or a memory, etc. An individual might reach at conclusions via answering a question in one’s mind, improving knowledge on a certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression.

Generally, the Theory of Relevance, and that of inferential pragmatics in particular, help overcome most of the shortcomings in several approaches to the relationships between utterances and inferences. It makes use of all the possible types of knowledge available on the used language, language users, and the contextual
linguistic factors such as the occasion, theme, topic, style, etc. All are employed in the process of identifying the intended meaning behind an utterance and exclude what seems foreign to the intention of speakers.

4.5. Inferential and Code Models of Communication
Owing to the development of Grice’s claims, Wilson and Sperber (2002) propose a new perspective in pragmatics according to which an inferential model of communication has been founded as opposed to the classical code model. The main difference between the two is the reliance on the linguistic element as a linguistically coded message or a linguistically coded piece of evidence.

According to the code model of communication, a communicator encoded his/her intended message into a signal. The hearer or audience should decode that message by using an identical copy of the code. An utterance is then just a message decoded into a linguistic element.

As for the inferential model of communication, a communicator does not only provide a decoded message to be identically encoded but s/he also provides a linguistically decoded piece of evidence. In this regard, the linguistic meaning recovered by decoding the message represents just "one of the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process [emphasis added]" (ibid.: 249-50) that leads to an interpretation of the speaker’s meaning.

Cain et al. (2001: 850 in Saed (2006: 60)) state that there are two types of inference: coherent and elaborative. Coherent inferences are so essential for interpreting a text that they provide some links among the different premises of that text. They are significant for adequate comprehension of the text and are required to gain a linkage between the different linguistic items of that text. Elaborative inferences do not need such a linkage as they are not
essential in textual cohesion. They only provide explanatory elaborations on the text information and, thus, enrich text representation rather than suggest critical text understanding.

Among the fallacious arguments, there are arguments where the speaker diverts the theme to be within the elaborative rather than coherent inferences. This mostly results in different reconstructions of a text representation for the sake of achieving a different function. This is what Cain et al (ibid.: 851) explains as problems in ‘generation of inferences’. In case of coherent inferences the reader/listener integrates information from within the text whereas in elaborative inferences the participant integrates text information with his/her prior or general knowledge.

The process of interpretation then is based on inferences. Garnham (1985: 157-8 in Saed, 2006: 61) thinks that in a theory of text comprehension, “inferences… drawn as sentences are encoded inferences”. The term ‘encoded inference’ presupposes its opposite, i.e., ‘non-encoded inference’. Taking into consideration Cain et al’s (2001 in Saed, ibid) classification, it may seem plausible to categorise inferences as:

1. encoded
   a. coherent
   b. elaborative

Accordingly, text interpretation is an integration of the coherent and elaborative non-encoded inferences within the encoded inferences of that text. This integration suggests a fuller representation of a text. Furthermore, this classification suggests that the understanding of a text, in a successful communication, includes the move from the encoded to non-encoded inferences. Yet, the question is still the extent to which the two types of inference should be relevant in order to achieve a better
understanding of the participants’ meaning in the communicative process.

5. The Model of Analysis
Based on the related literature presented in the theoretical background of this study, a model of analysis has been eclectically designed to approach argumentative discourse. It is eclectic as it is based on some models, theories, terms, and notions of each of the following: Eemeren and Grootendorst (1995), Walton (1995), Sandvik (1997), Dascal (2001), Wegar (2001), Hample (2001), Ikuenobe (2002), Eemeren and Grootendorst (2003), and Braybrook (2003)

Sorting out such approaches represents one of the serious difficulties in this study. So, out of the various approaches to argument and argumentation that the present study has surveyed, these contributors have been selected while others are excluded for many reasons.

First, certain approaches to language in relation to argumentation seem philosophically oriented. Accordingly, Aristotle’s approach to fallacy, for example, has been excluded. Second, Dascal’s (2001) alternative Model of Rationality has been chosen because it represents a compensation for the limitation of the argumentative dichotomies of Kant, Kuhn, and Popper. It, furthermore, excludes some other dialectical, formal or informal, logical approaches to argumentation, such as deductivism. Third, among the pragmadialectical models, the model of the present study heavily relies on Walton (1995), Sandvik (1997), Hample (2001), and Eemeren and Grootendorst (2003). Among these four, Walton’s (1995) is considered as the ideal in the model in comparison to all other contributors. The others directly or indirectly contribute to it through terms, definitions, and notions, etc.
Meanwhile, excluding any of the approaches other than those listed above seems, in one way or another, justified. Some pragmadialectical models, like Walton’s (1998) model for legal disputation for instance, seems irrelevant to the nature of studying either the topic or the text. Besides, fallacy theories seem to be highly restricted in notion and scope:

a. Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (1987) model limits itself to the notion of pragmadialectical rules only.

b. Power’s (1995) One Fallacy Theory is restricted to equivocative or ambiguous aspects of argumentation.

c. Ikuenobe’s (2002) theory seems merely epistemic in scope and, thus, seems limited too.

The contribution of each of these contributors is usually added as the model is being developed gradually. Each is credited for his own particular addition to the whole body of the model. Thus, the model is attempting to compromise between the various views of the contributors and gear them towards the analysis of the text. Generally, these contributions are made explicit by listing the components of the model then trying to define each component operationally, i.e., as used in the model.

5.1. Components of the Model

The model has identified its constituent parts and levels of analysis as follows: an argumentation is a communicative process that takes a form of language use and can be analysed at two different levels: a linear and a hierarchical reconstruction. At each level, any of the three argumentative polemical exchanges, i.e., controversy, dispute, or discussion, could be analysed in different terms.

Linearly, an exchange, such as a dispute for instance, could be analysed in terms of statements and metastatements. A statement could then be further analysed in terms of locutionary,
Illocutionary, or perlocutionary speech acts. These are the analytical formal or structural units. Hierarchically, that exchange could be analysed in pragmadiialectical terms into arguments, either true- or false-arguments, each of which consists of one or more premise, inference, and conclusion. These are the analytical functional units of analysis. The analysis, moreover, follows the five stages of the modified version of Amsterdam School’s Pragmadialectic Protocol. These have been called the stages of development in debate. A difficulty faces the design of the model; it is the terms used by the different schools of thought, or even thinkers of the same school. Thus, it has been found necessary to limit the kind of terms required in the identification of the different components of the model.

5.2. Levels of Analysis
For Wegar (2001: 313), a pragma-dialectical perspective represents an extension behind the traditional normative approach in two respects:

1. arguments in a pragma-dialectic perspective can be evaluated by standards for reasonableness
2. these standards have:
   a. functional focus, as well as
   b. structural focus

Therefore, the eclectic model of the present study, in both pragma and dialectic types of operation, requires its analytic units of analysis to be at two levels: formal/structural and functional respectively. Besides, to avoid any clash or misunderstanding between the analytical units as being argumentative constituents or pragmatic speech acts of different types, two types of reconstruction have been proposed. Though it is used here in some different sense, this dichotomy is originally proposed by Sandvik (1997: 419): a linear and a hierarchical reconstruction
As Figure 1 below shows, within the linear reconstruction, two types of statements are expected to be met. Firstly, there are statements that contribute to the resolution of the critical discussion. These are acts beginning as locutionary then understood as illocutionary whereas the perlocutionary force of each might represent a form of intention, want or belief required to be altered or changed through the debate. Secondly, metastatements refer to statements that do not really contribute to the progression of the content of the conversation; they are only framing and focusing moves. Examples of such metastatements could be Green’s repeated use of the following statements in the text:

a) Dr. Badawi continues with his leaflet
b) Dr. Badawi concludes his leaflet

A linear reconstruction can be seen as an analytical step towards a higher level of abstraction, i.e., the hierarchical reconstruction. At this level, both T- and F-arguments are typically expected to have the same components; each has

a. One or more premise
b. One or more inference
c. One or more conclusion

These components are represented in forms of dialogue moves that forward develop the polemical exchanges into the speech acts in the hierarchical structure of the argumentative dialogue (cf. Figure 2 below).

Hence, an argument is a premise-inference-conclusion construction that clusters around a single theme, subject matter, or a point of controversy, dispute, or discussion. The argument here is regarded as a premise-inference-conclusion sequence of units each of which has a certain dialectical function and has to put forward the critical discussion towards its objectives. Judging as to whether the units are happy components of argument or not
heavily relies upon the relationship of reasonableness between the units. If the argumentation reasonably moves among stages the argument is T-argument, otherwise it is F-argument. The type of argument is determined by the kind of polemical exchange under debate. The different polemical exchanges in debate vary in the type of arguments they use due to the object, overall aim, procedure, opposition, and mode of resolution. While a dispute, for instance, is debate in which mostly no conclusion is expected to be reached at because each disputant often tries to convince or persuade the other only, a controversy is a debate in which the arguers suspend, but do not abandon, their standpoints. Dialectically, an explicit argumentation consists of a set of standpoints. Each standpoint is linguistically encoded by an utterance or a set of utterances. The realisation of the discoursal function of an utterance intrinsically requires all the commitments and the understandings that constitute the ‘disagreement space’ (5). Roughly speaking, disagreement space refers to all that could be argued about and all that need to be fulfilled via the analysis. It is this disagreement space that drives and directs the entire process of argumentation. It, however, should be controlled by certain rules of critical discussion that help judging the argument as fallacious or not. In a pragma-dialectical approach, the identification of the standpoint is a critical first step in the analysis of argumentative discourse. What the standpoints are and to what they amount are not always clear. In a debate, however, the point of departure might be the assumption that in a critical discussion both parties have a burden of proof for one’s own standpoint. Besides, whereas the focus of the linear reconstruction is on the development of the interaction, the focus of the hierarchical reconstruction is on the abstract presentation of the relationship between the standpoints and their arguments. Both types of
reconstruction create a basis for an evaluation of the argumentative discourse. The relationship between the two levels at which linear and hierarchical reconstructions work is that of extension. The pragmatic components of the texts, such as speech acts, contextual elements, etc., protrude into the disagreement space by virtue of their functions as types of premises, inferences, conclusions, etc.

According to the pragmadialectical ideal of reasonableness, in case of different opinions, the protagonist and the antagonist (6) of a standpoint should attempt to find out by means of a critical discussion whether the protagonist’s standpoint is capable of withstanding the antagonist’s criticism (see Figure 3 below). Badawi’s issues, thus, have been reproduced according to Green’s disagreement space, i.e., to his understandings and commitments for the purpose of identifying the points believed to be relevant to the argument on “Muhammad in the Bible”. This process of reconstructing or understanding an argument is an analytical way for further description and criticism.
Figure (1) The Model’s Linear Reconstruction
The process of argumentation is believed to move steadily in forms of different moves that participants take. At each of such stages, the participants contribute to the entire enterprise of the debate till the close off of the argument. To account for such moves, the present model has made use of Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2003) stages of critical discussion. Braybrooke (2003: 415) calls these stages as the Protocol of Amsterdam School to which he adds an initial stage that could precede Eemeren and Grootendorst’s (2003) first stage. It is the provocation or try-out stage in which a statement may express someone’s commitment to a particular standpoint. These stages are:

- Stage one: the try-out stage in which someone expresses commitment to a certain standpoint or proposition
- Stage two: the confrontation stage in which a difference of opinion manifests itself
- Stage three: the opening stage in which the procedural and material points of departure for a critical discussion about the standpoints at issue are established.
- Stage four: the argumentation stage where the standpoints are challenged and defended
- Stage five: the concluding stage with which the critical discussion closes and in which the results of the discussion are determined

According to these stages, the arguments of the selected text might be sliced for the sake of a closer examination.

5.3. The Text Analysis
5.3.1. The Layout of the Text
Green, at the outset, proclaims that sections of Badawi’s material have been reproduced for ‘academic’ review and that, despite appearances, the text given is exact. Apparently, this reproduction is based on Green’s understandings of Badawi’s original text.
According to the present model, it is a kind of reconstruction that can be seen as: linear and hierarchical.

Green selects eight basic points out of Badawi’s entire leaflet and reproduces them in order to be examined in order. Each point is an issue to which Green should respond. In his examination, each of these eight issues is reconstructed in terms of a set of speech acts of different kinds.

A. Group One includes Issues 1, 2, 5, and 6
   - Issue 1 Blessings of Ishmael and Isaac
Figure 3 The Disagreement Space of Argumentation
- Issue 2 Muhammad: The Prophet Like unto Moses
  - Issue 5 The Qur’an (Koran) Foretold in the Bible?
  - Issue 6 That Prophet - Paraclete – Muhammad
B. Group Two includes Issues 3, 4, and 7.
  - Issue 3 The Awaited Prophet Who was to Come from Arabia
  - Issue 4 Muhammad’s Migration from Mecca to Medina: Prophesied in the Bible?
  - Issue 7 Was the Shift of Religious Leadership Prophesied?
C. Group Three includes Issue 8, which is a concluding one only.
  - Issue 8 Out of Context Coincidence?
Since each of these issues is, in fact, an issue/response combination, each would be treated as consisting of Badawi’s issue vs. Green’s response. In as much the same way, such a combination seems to be only a version of the traditional argumentative technique of question-and-answer, which is
initiated by the philosophers using the Socratic elenchus and the Platonic dialectic.
Towards the end of the text-analysis, it has been found that Issues 2, 5, and 6 show as the same procedure in presentation as in Issue 1. Similarly, the same way of analysis of Issue 3 seems applicable to Issues 4 and 7 in Green’s responses to Badawi’s statements. This suggests that these eight issues can be reclassified into three groups, according to the procedures the arguers follow and the way of analysis that the model uses to approach each of them. These groups are (cf. Figure 4 below):
5.3.2. The Linear Reconstruction
5.3.2.1. Group One
The first point is concerned with “Blessings of Ishmael and Isaac” and includes both Badawi’s issue and Green’s response. According to the linear reconstruction, the following analytical remarks could seem plausible:

- **Issue 1: Blessings of Ishmael and Isaac**
  A. Issue 1: Badawi’s issue
  1. Green identifies Badawi’s theme or issue under discussion and puts it in a form of a question, which is a locutionary speech act with the illocutionary force of begging an answer for the raised problem. The question is:
  - Was the first born son of Abraham (Ishmael) and his descendants included in God’s covenant and promise?
  2. Green sums up Badawi’s possible answers for this question in five statements, from Biblical verses, taken to be declarations that affirm the theme to be really proved. These are:
    - **Genesis 12: 2-3** speaks of God’s promise to Abraham and his descendants before any child was born to him.
    - **Genesis 17: 4** reiterates God’s promise after the birth of Ishmael and before the birth of Isaac.
Figure 4 The Layout of the Text
2. In Genesis ch. 21, Isaac is specifically blessed but Ishmael was also specifically blessed and promised by God to become "a great nation" especially in Genesis 21: 13,18.
3. According to Deuteronomy 21: 15-17 the traditional rights and privileges of the first born son are not to be affected by the social status of his mother (being a "free" woman such as Sarah, Isaac’s mother, or a "Bondwoman"; such as Hagar, Ishmael’s mother), This is only consistent with the moral and humanitarian principles of all revealed faiths.
4. The full legitimacy of Ishmael as Abraham’s son and "seed" and the full legitimacy of his mother, Hagar, as Abraham’s wife are clearly stated in Genesis 21: 13 and 16: 3.

3. Following these statements there is a group of three statements that, at first, seem as Badawi’s conclusion that his proposition is true, as based on the previous declarations. These statements are:
   a. After Jesus, the last Israelite messenger and prophet, it was time that God’s promise to bless Ishmael and his descendants be fulfilled.
   b. Less than 600 years after Jesus, came the last messenger of God, Muhammad, from the progeny of Abraham through Ishmael.
   c. God’s blessing of both of the main branches of Abraham’s family tree was now fulfilled
Yet, the second of these three statements tends to show a different illocutionary force. It tends to raise a kind of suspicion about, rather than confirmation on, the stated proposition. The adverbial phrases need to be carefully considered:
‘less than 600 years after Jesus’, and
‘from the progeny of Abraham through Ishmael’
This might give a sense of contradiction in the statement of facts.

B. Issue 1: Green’s response
Green’s response contains a set of statements that are put in parallelism with the statements sequenced in Badawi’s issue. References are made to the ‘Geneses’ of the quoted Biblical verses in order. The statements are mostly linked by sequential markers such as ‘then’ and ‘next’.
As a point of departure for Green, the first statement declares an agreement with Badawi referring to a Genesis, which is subordinated to the main clause of the statement. The agreement is expressed by the word ‘correctly’:
Jamal Badawi correctly refers to Genesis 12:2-3 as the promise God gave to Abraham to bless all nations through him…[emphasis added]
The main question of the issue is then repeated and the third statement comes to refer to another Genesis which is not quoted this time and whose meaning is only interpreted. The next locution is a request beginning with ‘let’; it is an appeal for reading the verses in the other
Genesis and for finding out whether the interpretation of this Genesis is true or not:

Let us read these verses in context to judge whether this interpretation is true.

The verses are then given in full text in order to support Green’s claim that Badawi does not really refer to the proper context of the Genesis. The request, thus, seems to have another illocutionary force: charging Badawi of interpreting a verse out of its context.

It is noticeable that the statements have been gradually redirected to give this sense of charging. The first statement uses the adverb ‘correctly’; the word ‘no’ is high-lightened in the quotation of Genesis 17; then the last commentary statement comes to declare frankly that the Genesis says ‘the exact opposite’ of Badawi’s ideas:

When Genesis 17 is read in context it says the exact opposite of what Dr. Badawi is teaching.

In reply to Badawi’s third point, the statement referring to Genesis 21, Green proclaims that Badawi’s reference to Ishmael’s covenant is only implicit, as the scripture does not state that in words. The contradiction between Badawi’s reference and Green’s proclaim is expressed by the use of cohesive tie ‘but’:

But this scripture does not say that Ishmael received the covenant... Thus, Genesis 21 does not say that Ishmael will mediate God’s covenant of blessing to the world.
Moreover, Green’s denial is stated in more than one place by the repetition of the verbal phrase ‘does not say’ which carries the illocutionary force of both negation and denial. In the first time it is used, this verbal phrase just negates the fact that the scripture says that Ishmael received any covenant, whereas in the second time it denies Badawi’s claim because the phrase comes within a concluding statement beginning with ‘thus’.

In Green’s responses to Badawi’s statements 4 and 5, Green thinks paradoxically that Badawi’s main idea in the argument is that of the inheritance of the covenant and promise.

Points 4 and 5 of Dr. Badawi’s argument seek to show that Ishmael was the legal heir of Abraham, and thus would inherit the covenant and promise.

But in fact, neither the concerned Geneses nor Badawi himself clearly state that. The shift from what is really mentioned by both to what Green only ‘infers’ is indicated by the concluding conjunct ‘thus’. This improper offshoot has been unhappily elaborated on in the rest of the statements that show contradiction to Badawi’s proposition by using words like ‘however’, ‘rather’ and ‘but’. The last statement mistakenly comes to conclude that it is Isaac who inherits the covenant. Green uses the word ‘inherit’ to give the right of covenant to Isaac in exactly the same sense he claims Badawi to use.

A metastatement then follows to introduce the next issue:
Dr. Badawi continues his leaflet =>
This way of analysis seems applicable to issues 2, 5, and 6. Towards the end of the paper, Green mostly uses the same type of statements and vocabulary. He keeps on sequencing his statements in a form of direct responses to his partner’s; propositions and illocutionary forces are often put to conflict.

5.3.2.2. Group Two

- Issue 3: The Awaited Prophet Who was to Come from Arabia

C. Issue 3: Badawi’s issue

In issue three, propositions are again taken from Badawi to be stated and put forward into critical discussion. There, the statements are often centered on meanings of specific words. The meaning of these words either literally or metaphorically is taken to be the weak point of the protagonist. Badawi takes his evidence from the Deuteronomy 33: 1-2, Psalms 84: 4-6, and Isaiah 42: 1-13.

The key words of the dispute are Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, Sinai, Seir, and the valley of Paran. Taken from Deuteronomy, the Bible, and Isaiah, Badawi introduces his proof which Green cites as:

- Deuteronomy 33:1-2 combines references to Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. It speaks of God (i.e. God’s revelation) coming from Sinai, rising from Seir (probably the village of Sa’ir near Jerusalem) and shining forth from Paran. According to Genesis 21:21, the wilderness of
Paran was the place where Ishmael settled (i.e. Arabia, specifically Mecca).

- Indeed, the King James Version of the Bible mentions the pilgrims passing through the valley of Ba’ca (another name of Mecca) in Psalms 84:4-6.
- Isaiah 42:1-13 speaks of the beloved of God. His elect and messenger who will bring down a law to be awaited in the isles and who "shall not fail nor be discouraged till he has set judgement on earth". Verse 11 connects that awaited one with the descendants of Ke’dar. Who is Ke’dar? According to Genesis 25:13, Ke’dar was the second son of Ishmael, the ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad.

Accordingly, Badawi has stated three facts about:

1. God’s revelation coming from Sinai, raising from Seir, and shining forth from Paran.
2. Paran is the place where Ishmael settled (Arabia, specifically Mecca).
3. The beloved of God

These represent Badawi’s basic propositions. Therefore, he relies on their resources to support his propositions and takes them as a burden of proof.

D. Issue 3: Green’s response

At the first glance, the way Green understands and reconstructs these propositions expresses a sense of satisfaction to the extent that the third statement is reformed in a way that one could hardly judge whether it is of Badawi or Green; it is stated as:
Indeed the King James Version of the Bible mentions the pilgrims passing through the valley of Ba’ca (another name of Mecca) in Psalms 84:4-6. The word ‘indeed’ seems to carry this sense of satisfaction.

1. God’s revelation coming from Sinai, raising from Se’ir, and shining forth from Paran

Sooner this sense of satisfaction elapses as one reads Green’s response in his first statement:

Dr. Badawi claims that Deuteronomy 33:1-2 predicts that revelation will come from Sinai, Jerusalem, and Mecca

The verb phrase ‘Claims’ is the first sight of the anti-evidence that Green prepares his reader to receive. At the very beginning, Green adds ‘Jerusalem’ as a new key word and claims that it is predicted by Badawi but in fact it is not. Green cites the following verses that Badawi refers to:

This is the blessing with which Moses the man of God blessed the children of Israel before his death. He said, "The LORD came from Sinai, and dawned from Se’ir upon us; he shone forth from Mount Paran" (Deuteronomy 33:1-2,…)

Then, he denies that the verse has actually mentioned the idea of revelation in words; therefore, they do not ‘speak’ about revelation at all. This seems irrelevant to the very
theme of discussion: revelation. Consider his second statement:

Firstly, these verses do not even mention revelation of any sort at all. So the verse is not even speaking about revelation. Furthermore, this way of treatment might presuppose a heavy reliance on the literal meaning of the verse rather than its implication, i.e., what it actually states rather than what it could be interpreted to. He denies the two locations of ‘Se’ir’:

Secondly, Dr. Badawi has incorrectly identified two of the locations: he says that Se’ir is near Jerusalem. It is not. Se’ir is in the country of Edom…south of the Dead Sea while Jerusalem is to the north of the Dead Sea

and ‘the Wilderness of Paran’:

Then he claims that the Wilderness of Paran is Mecca; again this is wrong. The Wilderness of Paran is about 200km south west of the Dead Sea (NBD) and is approximately 1000km from Mecca!

Then, Green uses the same way of denial to proclaim that Psalm 84 does not literally say a ‘Prophet’ will arise from Baca Valley. Quoting the verse, Green proceeds to deny that the ‘Baca Valley’ is Mecca:

Blessed are the men whose strength is in thee, in whose heart are the highways to Zion. As
they go through the valley of Baca they make it a place of springs; the early rain also covers it with pools. (Psalm 84:5-6…).

To direct the attention farer from the rise of Prophecy towards the pilgrimage travel, he sticks to the literal meanings of the verse in order to deny the idea that a prophet will arise from there:

These verses only tell how pilgrims travel through the Baca Valley; they do not say that a Prophet will arise from there. Therefore, even if the Baca Valley of Psalm 84 is the same as the Bakkah of Mecca that does not prove that a Prophet will arise from there.

The explanation of the meaning of Baca Valley as the Valley of weeping seems irrelevant to both the identification of the location it refers to and to the idea of prophecy as the theme under discussion. Notice this kind of explanation:

The Bible, however, uses valleys to describe our experience of God. In Psalm 23 there is the Valley of the Shadow of Death, in Joel 3:14 the Valley of Decision, and in Isaiah 22 the Valley of Vision. The word בַּקָּךְ (Baca) is Hebrew for weep(ing)...So the Valley of Baca is literally translated the Valley of Weeping. In this Psalm it symbolises the weeping and difficulties that pilgrims have to endure when
they travel across harsh terrain on their pilgrimage.

Besides, the use of analogy between Baca Valley and the Valley of Vision or that of Shadow of Death in a metaphorical way contradicts Green’s insistence on the use of the literal meaning of words in his argument. Accordingly, this explanation might be used for some further purposes instead of that of supporting the main idea of the argument.

2. The beloved of God

The other question is related to the beloved of God, the awaited servant connected with the descendants of Ke’dar. For Green, the verses that Badawi quotes are truly connecting the Servant to Ke’dar. This is again the antagonist’s temporary agreement with the protagonist:

It is true that they are connected,…[the awaited with the descendants of Ke’dar]

Nevertheless, Green follows up with the idea that the awaited is connect-ed to ‘the people of Sela’ and to ‘all people from the end of the earth’ too.

Again, Green is playing with words. This time the verb ‘connect’ is used ambiguously. Green reports that:

Dr. Badawi claims that Isaiah 42:1-13, connects the awaited one with the descendants of Ke’dar

However, neither does Green nor Isaiah 42 make clear the meaning and the nature of connection. Green claims that Isaiah 42 does not say from which nation the Servant will
come; Isaiah tells only about the nations that will praise God when his Servant comes. If the meaning is taken to refer to Ke’dar as the ancestor of the awaited, green then should have been falsifying things when he considered that the awaited is connected to ‘the people of Sela’ and to ‘all people from the end of the earth’. Otherwise, understanding the connection in terms of glorifying the Lord for the grace of the Servant seems irrelevant to Badawi’s issue. It could be another issue as to whether the meaning is literally or metaphorically understood or the reference to Isaiah 42 is out of place.

As Badawi’s quotations have no direct reference to Isaiah’s Servant and to the place he raises from, Green proposes the alternative. He states that the Bible ‘actually tells’ who the Servant of Isaiah is. He, then, quotes Matthew 12: 15-18:

And many followed him (Jesus), and he healed them all, and ordered them not to make him known. This was to fulfil what was spoken by the prophet Isaiah: "Behold, my servant whom I have chosen, my beloved with whom my soul is well pleased. I will put my Spirit upon him" (Matthew 12:15-18, …)

Then, he claims that Isaiah 53: 1-12 foretells more about his Servant (See appendix I).

Paradoxically, quoting all of these verses, Green does not make use of any direct reference to either the Servant or the place wherein he raises. All what he quotes are
descriptions interpreted according to his understanding in order to point out that the intended man is Jesus. None of the thirteen quotations Green makes nominates the Servant; therefore, he proceeds to assign the descriptions to Jesus only with no burden of proof to support his claim. To psychologically assure his audience of this ‘claim’, he begins his argument with the word ‘actually’ and ends it with the factual verb phrase ‘is’. But he commits the same fallacy he charges Badawi of: not literally stating what he is driving at. Instead, he relies on inferring the Evangelical descriptions according to his interpretations, assigning them to Jesus as if Jesus were the only Prophet to whom they could apply. These descriptions seem so general that they could be applicable to all the prophets of God. Consider Green’s inference:

There has only ever been Servant who was an offering for sin, who bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors. This Servant is Jesus who died on the cross to pay for our sins.

To back this inference, Green quotes Mark 10: 45 and Peter 3: 18:

Jesus said of himself: For the Son of man also came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many. (Mark 10:45, …) For Christ also died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God. (1 Peter 3:18, …)
5.3.3. The Hierarchical Reconstruction
In this kind of reconstruction, the components of the text are recognised at another level and seen from another point of view: the functional level of dialectic. These components are identified in the light of their relationship as elements of a complicated enterprise of thought within the process of argumentation. They are the dialectical functional units of arguments: premise, inference and conclusions.
Henceforth, the eight issues of the linear reconstructions are considered arguments of different types. The analysis of each follows the stages of the debate-development of the Protocol of Amsterdam School.

5.3.3.1. Stages of the Debate
At the very beginning, Green, on the one hand, commits himself to a set of claims that show his primary intentions behind his arguments.
First, he claims that the discussions he is making are only issues raised with some Muslims. These are supposed to be based on Green’s readings of some translations of the Qur’a’n\(^7\), most of the hadith, the early Sirat material, and other references that these resources recommend.
Secondly, he commits himself to take the Muslims’ objections seriously, even if he has never heard them before, and to investigate the related issues as objectively as possible in order to see if they were true. Thus, he confirms that they are not attacks against Islam but rather an examination of some issues that Muslims raise against
Christianity. In the prologue to his paper, he proclaims that:

One of my joys has been to discuss the things of God with them. In doing so I have read translations of the Qur’an, much of the hadiths, the early sirat material, and other books that they have recommended…Many of the issues…raised I had never heard before …I did not know what to think. I decided that I must take [them] seriously and investigate them to see if they were true.

Badawi, on the other hand, commits himself to defend the issue of Prophet Muhammad being foretold in the Bible. On his title page, he quotes the following Qur’nic verse:

Those who follow the Apostle, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own Scriptures, in the Torah and the Gospel” (Qur’an 7: 157, Yusuf Ali) (8)

He, accordingly, has committed himself twice: to defend a fact that his Holy Book, the Qura’n, has stated for him; his advocate defence must provide a burden of proof from the Bible as the Holy Book of his antagonist, Green.

Evidently, Badawi seeks to demonstrate that Muhammad is fore-told in the Bible; thus, he presents this theme supported with whatever he thinks a suitable proof. Green stands against Badawi’s proclamation and is ready to introduce his own proof against that of Badawi.
Then, the procedural and material points of departure for a critical discussion about the standpoints at issue should be established. For Green, sections of Badawi’s material have been reproduced under the claim of being ready for academic review and being responded to in order. Green’s sources are:

1) The Bible translation used is the "Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version" published by Thomas Nelson (RSV)
2) The New International Version (NIV), in addition to
3) The New Bible Dictionary (NBD)

At this particular stage, the argumentation where the standpoints are being challenged and defended begins. Noticeably, Green begins each of his arguments with the point where Badawi ends his. Badawi’s conclusions and some premises are put forward as premises for Green. This means that the speech acts, i.e., statements, of the linear reconstruction have now the significant roles of the constituents of arguments.

Badawi’s premises, on the one hand, represent his burden of proof taken from the Bible and some other Christian Holy Books such as Deuteronomy, and the Psalms. Noticeably, Badawi does not support his standpoint by evidence taken from his own Islamic resources. Instead, he, delicately, fully relies on his antagonist’s resources. Logically, this is the rule of self-obligation, i.e., someone is obligated to what he obligates himself. Badawi uses the
Geneses he quotes as evidence of conviction to persuade Green that Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, has already been foretold in the Christian Holy Books. On the other hand, Green’s responses to what Badawi has issued represent his arguments to refute Badawi and to defend his own standpoint.

Regardless of the judgement on where the truth is, it is necessary to account for the way Green argues for his points and the type and construction of arguments he uses. As for the tactics that Green uses in his argument, the following remarks are worth mentioning:

1. Generally, green’s arguments are essentially based on Badawi’s premises and conclusions; he takes them to be his premises. He, for instance, uses Badawi’s five conclusions of Issue 1, Group One above, to be his premises in the argument against the point of “Blessings of Ishmael and Isaac”.

2. He tends to quote fully, from their main resources, some of the Geneses to which Badawi refers. These quotations serve more than one purpose:

   a. They represent an extra range of propositions that Green uses as a basis for his later elaborations.

   b. Green uses most of them to argue against his protagonist. Therefore, he does not always quote the relevant Geneses. He, for instance, quotes Genesis 17: 3-21 in order to charge Badawi of quoting Genesis 17: 4 and using it out of context. Thus Green presents the full quotation of the Genesis to reveal
Badawi’s. Yet, he, in the same argument, only refers to Genesis 21: 13. He repeats what Badawi quotes and gives himself the right to talk about the rest of the Genesis in a form of interpretation:

Thus, Genesis 21 does not say that Ishmael will mediate God’s covenant of blessing to the world.

3. Green recites the quotations when he wants to interpret certain ideas or assign some other senses to the words that Badawi uses. Green claims that he is correcting the meanings of Badawi’s key-words. What seems disambiguation here is in fact a use of words with more than one referent.

4. Until the end of the text, Green charges Badawi of misinterpreting the resources he refers to and of decontextualising the verses that he manipulates just to seem true. To convince his audience with Badawi’s unreasonable argument, Green keeps on quoting the same references with a special emphasis on what-is-so-called Badawi’s points of misinterpretation of the evangelical facts. As the debate goes on, this type of persuasion increases until it reaches its climax in Argument 8.

After all, the critical discussion closes and the results of the discussion are determined. Green, ultimately, comes to the conclusion of conclusions for the entire argumentation in Argument 8 Group Three. Green then states:
Yes, Jamal Badawi has taken verses of the Bible out of context and misrepresented the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. He has misquoted J. Hastings’ dictionary, and misled his readers in the identification of geographical locations. These methods show that Dr. Badawi has no academic credibility. As a result, he has failed to show that Muhammad is foretold in the Bible. Muhammad is not foretold in the Bible as the Qur’an claims.

The question here is how has Green reached this conclusion? The following sample of analysis may suggest the answer.

6. Tricks in Argumentation
Arguments are believed to be either rational, i.e., influenced by reason, or irrational, i.e., influenced by emotion, bias, and prejudice. Non-rational arguments are often controversial as to whether they are really arguments or not; yet, the commonest view consider them special types of argument that could be described as eristic, tricky, or fallacious.

The different types of tricks or fallacies traced in this study have been classified according to their different bases. Hence, there are psychological, linguistic, and logical bases for tricks where each of them represents the source of a problem or difficulty in argumentation (see Thouless, 1930: 77).
One of the psychological bases of tricks in argumentation is prejudice. Related to prejudice is bias which is, indeed, a failure in argumentation due to the lack of critical thinking. Accordingly, the main psychological tricks is suggestion, it relies on three basic devices: repeated affirmation, confident insistent method of speaking, and prestige. The trick of repeated affirmation manipulates certain personal characteristics of the audience who tend to believe in the thing that are repeated over and over again regardless of whether they agree or disagree with the reasons on which these beliefs are based. Some speakers may heavily rely on a prestigious reference to social, religious, political, or advantageous status of their people’s life (ibid.: 83).

Throughout the issues of Group Two, Green has practiced a kind of psychological effect that could help him to be more convincing. He tries to practice an effect upon the audience through his prestige, repeated affirmation, and the confident insistent way of presenting his idea. The trick of deceit begins with a word that is added to the protagonist’s text though he does not really use it “Jerusalem”. Then, it proceeds to redirect the main theme of discussion and to deny the literal mentioning of the basic key words of revelation and Prophecy altogether.

As for the linguistic bases of tricks in argumentation, language, as both a means of communication and a tool for thinking, could be a source of deceit in arguments. Indistinct definitions, vague use of vocabulary, and
ambiguity could be manipulated or improperly used in an argument in order to achieve some special purposes. Badawi’s main problem in the dispute with Green seems to be the use of some ambiguous words. His key words are all identified with different referents, whether persons or locations. Therefore, Green often uses the other referent of each of these words to charge Badawi of being “wrong” or “incorrectly” identifying the locations of, for instance, both Seir and Paran. Although Badawi depends upon Deuteronomy as his historical resource, Green seems surer than Badawi in his reference to the same word that could refer to more than one historical opinion.

Logical tricks often spring from reasoning or the way people think as they move from premises to conclusions. Among the logical tricks is the use of some sophistical formulae that imply forcing an extension to an argument for the sake of merely winning the debate. Diversion of dialectical shift is another common trick in controversy (see Thouless, 1930: 50, and Walton, 1993: 96). Diversion refers to defending a proposition by proposing another proposition which diverts the discussion to a question rather than proving the first one. The trick takes advantage of the ignorance of the listener in order to persuade him of recognizing a position. It is a tactic that heavily relies on the denial of the main theme or topic of the argument for the sake of a minor one and fastening on the denial.

7. Results and Conclusions
Throughout the results of the analysis carried out so far, the following conclusions are inferred:

1. Green’s text is an issue/response Christian-Muslim critical discussion that comes as a reply to Badawi’s leaflet ‘Muhammad in the Bible’. The case under investigation is common among both Christians and Muslims, whether they accept or reject it.

2. Green selects eight basic points out of Badawi’s entire leaflet and reproduces them in order to be examined in order. Each point is an issue to which Green responds. They, then, have been reclassified into three groups, according to the procedures the arguers follow and the way of analysis that the model uses to approach each of them. (see fig. 4, p 29).

3. As the nature of their writings about Christian and Muslim subject matters reflects, both Badawi and Green are, to the best knowledge of the researchers, well-known thinkers who are supposed to be as moderate and free-minded as possible.

4. Each of the discussants obligates himself to a set of commitments that help identify his own standpoint, i.e., the position he adopts and is supposed to defend. Both claim that they are truth-seekers who argue as objectively as possible and investigate whether the related issues are true or not.

5. Both discussants apparently commit themselves to present burdens of proof taken from the Bible only, as this is stated in the title of the dialogue. Badawi commits
himself to provide his proof from the Bible since the Qura’n does not commit Green, as well as any other non-Muslim, to follow his propositions and legislations. Instead, Badawi logically uses the rule of self-obligation, i.e., someone is obligated to what he obligates himself. His burden of proof addressed to Green is based on the Bible and some other Christian Holy Books such as Deuteronomy and the Psalms.

6. The linear reconstruction of the discussion has shown the following:

Whereas Group One includes issues where the arguments are based on statements of full propositions and speech acts that are put into conflict, Group Two includes statements centered on certain key words that are mostly considered as ambiguous. The core of each statement is mostly the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning of each word and the referent that word denotes, whether a location or a person.

The statements in the first group are sequenced in issue/response parallelism by both the protagonist and the antagonist. As far as their illocutionary forces are concerned, these statements can be seen as speech acts of different types:

A. Speech acts of agreement

These, in turn, could be seen as speech acts of agreement that represent:

a. Only statements on the tongue of Badawi and do not necessarily say what Green means, e.g.,
ii. Dr. Badawi is right to refer to Deuteronomy 18:18.

b. Superficial agreements that imply the otherwise, e.g.,
   • Dr. Badawi says that the word brothers indicates that the prophet was to come from the Ishmaelite tribe since the Ishmaelites were a brother tribe of the Israelites. This is both true and false.

c. Preliminary understandings that later on develop into something else. It is in one way or another the same as the first type of speech acts of agreement, e.g.,
   • Genesis 17 teaches that Ishmael is to be blessed and become a great nation.

B. Speech acts of denial, e.g.,
   • But this scripture does not say that Ishmael received the covenant…

C. Speech acts of accusation, e.g.,
   • Points 4 and 5 of Dr. Badawi’s argument seek to show that Ishmael was the legal heir of Abraham, and thus would inherit the covenant and promise

D. Speech acts of justification for the denial and the accusations, e.g.,
• However, the covenant of God’s blessing is not a simple matter that follows the law of inheritance for earthly possessions.
• There are three reasons why Dr. Badawi’s identification of Muhammad as the fulfilment of Deuteronomy 18:18 is incorrect.

E. Speech acts of proclamation or proposing new facts, e.g.,
• Abraham had at least six other sons along with Ishmael and Isaac.

F. Speech acts of concluding or proposing the otherwise, e.g.,
• Muhammad’s prophecy (the Qur’an) does not agree with the Law of Moses and therefore Muhammad is not a prophet like Moses.

The source of problem in the issues of Group Two consists in the conflict between locutionary stating and interpreting the propositions behind the statements. Of course, it is not the entire statement which is the target but some of its key words. Generally, two types of difficulty has been identified in the understanding of these words:

First : words with literal meanings that denote more than one referent or the same referent taken from more
than one point of view, e.g., Se’ir and the Wilderness of Paran. Second: words that are metaphorically interpreted then manipulated for some other purposes, e.g., the Baca Valley.

7. The components of the text are recognised at a higher level of dialectic and could be seen at another one where these components are recognised in the light of the relationship among them as elements of a complicated enterprise of thought within the process of argumentation. Hence, such components could be seen from the point of view of their functions in this enterprise. Thus, according to the hierarchical reconstruction of this type of analysis, the following remarks have been identified:

a) As a kind of argumentation, the present text is debate, which is a polemical dispute between Green and Badawi. Green’s argument is dispute rather than a discussion or controversy because he insists on showing off Badawi’s weak points and fallacies and, thus, he mentions none of Badawi’s good points or \( T \)-arguments.

b) The overall form of analysis according to this type of reconstruction identically copes with the stages of the Protocol of Amsterdam School for Pragmadilectics.
c) The relationship between the text components at pragmatic level and those at the dialectical level is the realisation of a function or more at the latter level for each one at the former. The disagreement space, accordingly, might include a statement with one or more illocutionary speech acts that can be functioning as premises, inferences, or conclusions.

d) In his responses, Green seems to rely on arguing against each of Badawi’s arguments. He begins where Badawi ends and what was once premises and conclusions for Badawi could become a while later only premises for Green who proceeds to announce his conclusions accordingly.

e) Again, the conflict of ideas appears to be between what is expressed by words in sentences and what a sentence implies according to its arguer’s inference, i.e., between what is locutionarily stated in a sentence and is inferred by the arguers.

8. Green practices several irrelevant objections in his dispute with Badawi. Though he charges Badawi of using his burden of proof out of context, he himself practices three types of fallacy:

a. Thematic diversion, as in the case of Ishmael being the legal heir of Abraham (Issue I Group One).

b. Irrelevant inference, as in the case of the beloved of God (Issue 3 Group Two).

c. Manipulation of the context or ‘forced analogy’, using Thouless’s (1930: 144) term as reflected in the
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comparison between the law of punishment of Moses and Muhammad’s ‘physical punishment’ (Issue 2 Group One).

These types of tricks validate hypothesis one of the current study which reads: “the polemical debate tends to use certain linguistic strategies and tactics that are designed to undermine the opponent’s arguments and overcome him deceitfully”

Green, then, is proved to be irrelevant in more than one place of his dispute with Badawi. Furthermore, it has been found that the kind of flouting in the present study proves to be not limited to the Gracean Cooperative Principle. Violation has been found in more than one respect:

First: the main cause of fallacy is flouting rationality.

Accordingly an argument is either T-argument or tricky or fallacy or F-argument.

Second: Due to violation of some such logical principles, instances of forced analogy, and irrelevant objections, there might be a failure in argumentation.
This article examines the teaching of Dr. Jamal Badawi in his leaflet called, Muhammad in the Bible. Dr. Badawi quotes the following Qur'anic verse on his title page: Those who follow the Apostle, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own Scriptures, in the Torah and the Gospel (Qur'an 7:157, Yusuf Ali). He then seeks to demonstrate that Muhammad is foretold in the Bible. Sections of Dr. Badawi's material have been reproduced for academic review and are responded to in order. The Bible translation used is the RSV or NIV, and the New Bible Dictionary [1] is abbreviated to NBD. (sic) indicates that despite appearances, the text given is exact.

Dr. Badawi begins his leaflet =>

Muhammad in the Bible. - by Dr. Jamal Badawi.

Abraham is widely regarded as the Patriarch of monotheism and the common father of the Jews, Christians,
and Muslims. Through his second son, Isaac, came all the Israelite prophets including such towering figures as Jacob, Joseph, Moses, David, Solomon and Jesus. May peace and blessing be upon all of them. The advent of these great prophets was the partial fulfilment of God's promises to bless the nations of the earth through the descendants of Abraham (Genesis 12:2-3). Such fulfilment is wholeheartedly accepted by Muslims whose faith considers the belief in and respect of all prophets an article of faith.

Issue 1: Blessings of Ishmael and Isaac.

Was the first born son of Abraham (Ishmael) and his descendants included in God's covenant and promise? A few verses from the Bible may help shed some light on this question:

1) Genesis 12:2-3 speaks of God's promise to Abraham and his descendants before any child was born to him.

2) Genesis 17:4 reiterates God's promise after the birth of Ishmael and before the birth of Isaac.

3) In Genesis ch. 21, Isaac is specifically blessed but Ishmael was also specifically blessed and promised by God to become "a great nation" especially in Genesis 21:13,18.
4) According to Deuteronomy 21:15-17 the traditional rights and privileges of the first born son are not to be affected by the social status of his mother (being a "free" woman such as Sarah, Isaac's mother, or a "Bondwoman"; such as Hagar, Ishmael's mother). This is only consistent with the moral and humanitarian principles of all revealed faiths.

5) The full legitimacy of Ishmael as Abraham's son and "seed" and the full legitimacy of his mother, Hagar, as Abraham's wife are clearly stated in Genesis 21:13 and 16:3.

After Jesus, the last Israeliite messenger and prophet, it was time that God's promise to bless Ishmael and his descendants be fulfilled. Less than 600 years after Jesus, came the last messenger of God, Muhammad, from the progeny of Abraham through Ishmael. God's blessing of both of the main branches of Abraham's family tree was now fulfilled.

Response: Jamal Badawi correctly refers to Genesis 12:2-3 as the promise God gave to Abraham to bless all nations through him: ... in you all the families of the earth will be blessed. Dr. Badawi then asks, Was the first born of Abraham (Ishmael) and his descendants included in God's covenant and promise? Then Dr. Badawi refers to Genesis 17:4 to show that God's blessing and covenant made with Abraham were passed to his son Ishmael. Let us read these
verses in context to judge whether this interpretation is true:

Then Abram (Abraham) fell on his face; and God said to him, "Behold, my covenant is with you, and you shall be the father of a multitude of nations ... And I will establish my covenant between me and you and your descendants after you throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant" ... And Abraham said to God, "O that Ishmael might live in thy sight!" God said, "No, but Sarah your wife shall bear you a son, and you shall call his name Isaac. I will establish my covenant with him as an everlasting covenant for his descendants after him. As for Ishmael, I have heard you; behold, I will bless him and make him fruitful and multiply him exceedingly; he shall be the father of twelve princes, and I will make him a great nation. But I will establish my covenant with Isaac, whom Sarah shall bear to you at this season next year." (Genesis 17:3-21, RSV)

Genesis 17 teaches that Ishmael is to be blessed and become a great nation, but the covenant, through which God will bless the world, is specifically taught to be passed to Isaac and not to Ishmael. When Genesis 17 is read in context it says the exact opposite of what Dr. Badawi is teaching.

Next, Dr. Badawi refers to Genesis 21 to imply that the blessing given to Ishmael means he also received the
covenant by which all nations would be blessed. But this scripture does not say that Ishmael received the covenant; it says that he is blessed to become a nation: And I will make a nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he is your offspring. (Genesis 21:13). Thus, Genesis 21 does not say that Ishmael will mediate God's covenant of blessing to the world.

Points 4 and 5 of Dr. Badawi's argument seek to show that Ishmael was the legal heir of Abraham, and thus would inherit the covenant and promise. However, the covenant of God's blessing is not a simple matter that follows the law of inheritance for earthly possessions. Rather, it is always given by the sovereign choice of God and not on the basis of position in a family. God is not responsible to anyone and chooses as he wills: he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills (Romans 9:18, RSV). Abraham had at least six other sons along with Ishmael and Isaac. Abraham's sons were blessed by God and many of them also became nations along with the Israelites and the Ishmaelites (see Genesis 25). But from among the sons of Abraham God chose Isaac to inherit the covenant.

Dr. Badawi continues his leaflet =>

**Issue 2: Muhammad: The Prophet Like Unto Moses.**
Long (sic) time after Abraham, God's promise to send the long-awaited Messenger was repeated this time in Moses' words. In Deuteronomy 18:18, Moses spoke of the prophet to be sent by God who is:

1) From among the Israelites, "brethren", a reference to their Ishmaelite cousins as Ishmael was the other son of Abraham who was explicitly promised to become a "great nation".

2) A prophet like unto Moses. There were hardly any two prophets who were so much alike as Moses and Muhammad. Both were given comprehensive law code of life, both encountered their enemies and were victors in miraculous ways, both were accepted as prophets/statesmen and both migrated following conspiracies to assassinate them. Analogies between Moses and Jesus overlooks not only the above similarities but other crucial ones as well (eg. the natural birth, family life and death of Moses and Muhammad but not of Jesus...)

Response: Dr. Badawi is right to refer to Deuteronomy 18:18 as a verse which predicts the coming of another prophet after Moses. This verse from Deuteronomy is part of the law that God gave to Moses. Here is the verse:

I will raise up for them a prophet like you (Moses) from among their brothers; I will put my words in his mouth,
and he will tell them everything that I command him. (Deuteronomy 18:18, NIV)

The question that is before us is is Muhammad the fulfilment of this prophecy or is it someone else or is the prophet still to come? Dr. Badawi claims that Muhammad is the fulfilment for two reasons. Firstly, Muhammad was a descendent of Ishmael and the Ishmaelites are the "brothers" who are mentioned in Deuteronomy 18:18. Secondly, Muhammad is like Moses and Deuteronomy 18:18 says that the prophet will be like Moses.

There are three reasons why Dr. Badawi's identification of Muhammad as the fulfilment of Deuteronomy 18:18 is incorrect.

Reason 1. The title of Dr. Badawi's leaflet is, Muhammad in the Bible. And as the title suggests, and the content of the leaflet shows, Dr. Badawi is attempting to teach from the Bible. Now the Bible actually tells us who the prophet of Deuteronomy 18:18 is.

(Jesus said:) If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote of me. (John 5:46, RSV)

The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of our fathers, has glorified his servant Jesus. You handed him over to be killed, and you disowned him before Pilate, though he had decided to let him go. You disowned the Holy and Righteous One and asked that a murderer be
released to you. You killed the author of life, but God raised him from the dead. We are witnesses of this. ... Now, brothers, I know that you acted in ignorance, as did your leaders. But this is how God fulfilled what he had foretold through all the prophets, saying that his Christ would suffer. Repent, then, and turn to God, so that your sins may be wiped out, that times of refreshing may come from the Lord, and that he may send the Christ, who has been appointed for you--even Jesus. He must remain in heaven until the time comes for God to restore everything, as he promised long ago through his holy prophets. For Moses said, "The Lord your God will raise up for you a prophet like me from among your own people; you must listen to everything he tells you. Anyone who does not listen to him will be completely cut off from among his people." (Acts 3:13-23, NIV)

These verses from the Bible indicate that Jesus is the prophet that Moses spoke of. If Dr. Badawi genuinely wanted to show from the Bible who the prophet is, then why did he not refer to these Bible verses? They explain that prophet like Moses is Jesus.

**Reason 2. In Deuteronomy 18:18 God says:**

I will raise up for them a prophet like you (Moses) from among their brothers ... (Deuteronomy 18:18, NIV)

Dr. Badawi says that the word brothers indicates that the prophet was to come from the Ishmaelite tribe since the
Ishmaelites were a brother tribe of the Israelites. This is both true and false. It is true that the Ishmaelites were a brother nation to the Israelites - but so too were the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, and many others nations. So it is false to assume that the word brothers automatically means Ishmaelites for it could apply to any of these other brother nations. Who it applies to depends upon the context. In the Law of Moses the word brother normally refers to a brother Israelite. When the word brother is meant to apply to Israel's brother nations the context makes this clear, usually by referring to which nation it means (see Deuteronomy 3:4). But the context of Deuteronomy 18:18 does not refer to any of these other nations. Therefore, from the context, the word brothers just has the normal meaning of fellow Israelite. This means the prophet like Moses is to be an Israelite.

**Reason 3. In Deuteronomy 18:18** God says that he will raise up for the Israelites a prophet like Moses. Dr. Badawi says that Muhammad is more like Moses than Jesus is, and therefore Muhammad is the prophet like Moses. The error Dr. Badawi has made here is that he has chosen what aspects to compare between Moses, Muhammad and Jesus rather than listening to what God says must be compared. In Dr. Badawi's comparison he has compared aspects like military activity, the nature of their birth and death, and other aspects of their lives. He has also conveniently chosen not to compare certain aspects which don't agree with his conclusion, eg. which men were Jewish and
which performed miracles? By his selective choosing of which aspects to compare and which to ignore Dr. Badawi can make Muhammad appear like Moses. This situation leaves us with an important question, which aspects are essential to compare in order to know if a prophet is like Moses?

God has graciously told us one aspect that must be compared if a prophet is to be like Moses:

To the law (of Moses) and to the testimony! If they do not speak according to this word, they have no light of dawn. (Isaiah 8:20)

In this verse we see that for a prophet to be a genuine prophet of God his prophecy must agree with the word that God gave to Moses. Therefore what the prophet like Moses says must agree with what Moses said. This is the crucial comparison that must be made. If a prophet contradicts what Moses said then it doesn't matter how many other aspects of his life are like Moses; he has failed the essential comparison, and so it not like Moses.

So the question for us is, does Muhammad's prophecy (the Qur'an) agree with what Moses said in the Law? The answer to this is no. Muhammad contradicts Moses at many major points and so is not a prophet like Moses. Here is one major example - the concept of justice.
In the Law of Moses the punishment for stealing is that the thief must repay the property he stole plus an additional amount to compensate (Leviticus 6:1-5, Exodus 22:3-4). If the thief cannot repay then he is forced to work to repay his debt (Exodus 22:1). The maximum length of time that he can work is six years, then he must be released (Deuteronomy 15:12-14). This type of justice is property punishment for a property crime.

In the Qur'an however a thief is to have his hand cut off (Qur'an 5:38). This type of justice is a permanent lifelong physical punishment for a property crime and is a fundamentally different type of justice to that found in the Law of Moses. Muhammad's prophecy (the Qur'an) does not agree with the Law of Moses and therefore Muhammad is not a prophet like Moses.

Dr. Badawi continues his leaflet =>

**Issue 3: The Awaited Prophet Who Was To Come From Arabia.**

Deuteronomy 33:1-2 combines references to Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. It speaks of God (i.e. God's revelation) coming from Sinai, rising from Seir (probably the village of Sa'ir near Jerusalem) and shining forth from Paran. According to Genesis 21:21, the wilderness of Paran was the place where Ishmael settled (i.e. Arabia, specifically Mecca).
Indeed the King James Version of the Bible mentions the pilgrims passing through the valley of Ba'ca (another name of Mecca) in Psalms 84:4-6.

Isaiah 42:1-13 speaks of the beloved of God. His elect and messenger who will bring down a law to be awaited in the isles and who "shall not fail nor be discouraged till he have set judgement on earth". Verse 11 connects that awaited one with the descendants of Ke'dar. Who is Ke'dar? According to Genesis 25:13, Ke'dar was the second son of Ishmael, the ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad.

**Response:** Dr. Badawi claims that Deuteronomy 33:1-2 predicts that revelation will come from Sinai, Jerusalem, and Mecca. These verses say:

This is the blessing with which Moses the man of God blessed the children of Israel before his death. He said, "The LORD came from Sinai, and dawned from Se'ir upon us; he shone forth from Mount Paran" (Deuteronomy 33:1-2, RSV)

Firstly, these verses do not even mention revelation of any sort at all. So the verse is not even speaking about revelation. Secondly, Dr. Badawi has incorrectly identified two of the locations: he says that Se'ir is near Jerusalem. It is not. Se'ir is in the country of Edom (NBD) south of the Dead Sea while Jerusalem is to the north of the Dead Sea. Then he claims that the Wilderness of Paran is Mecca;
again this is wrong. The Wilderness of Paran is about 200km south west of the Dead Sea (NBD) and is approximately 1000km from Mecca!

Next, Dr. Badawi refers to Psalm 84 and says that the Baca Valley is Mecca. The verse from Psalm 84 is:

Blessed are the men whose strength is in thee, in whose heart are the highways to Zion. As they go through the valley of Baca they make it a place of springs; the early rain also covers it with pools. (Psalm 84:5-6, RSV).

These verses only tell how pilgrims travel through the Baca Valley; they do not say that a Prophet will arise from there. Therefore, even if the Baca Valley of Psalm 84 is the same as the Bakkah of Mecca that does not prove that a Prophet will arise from there. The Bible, however, uses valleys to describe our experience of God. In Psalm 23 there is the Valley of the Shadow of Death, in Joel 3:14 the Valley of Decision, and in Isaiah 22 the Valley of Vision. The word באה(Baca) is Hebrew for weep(ing) (NBD). So the Valley of Baca is literally translated the Valley of Weeping. In this Psalm it symbolises the weeping and difficulties that pilgrims have to endure when they travel across harsh terrain on their pilgrimage.

Then, Dr. Badawi claims that Isaiah 42:1-13, connects the awaited one with the descendants of Ke'dar. Let us consider some of these verses:
Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my Spirit upon him, he will bring forth justice to the nations ... Sing to the LORD a new song, his praise from the end of the earth! Let the sea roar and all that fills it, the coastlands and their inhabitants. Let the desert and its cities lift up their voice, the villages that Kedar inhabits; let the inhabitants of Sela sing for joy, let them shout from the top of the mountains. Let them give glory to the LORD, and declare his praise in the coastlands. (Isaiah 42:1-12, RSV)

It is true that they are connected, but so too are the people of Sela. In fact, all people from the ends of the earth are connected and will praise God when he brings his chosen Servant. Isaiah 42 is not saying from which nation the Servant will come, as Dr. Badawi claims; it just tells us that many nations will praise God when his Servant does come.

The Bible actually tells us who the Servant of Isaiah 42 is:

And many followed him (Jesus), and he healed them all, and ordered them not to make him known. This was to fulfil what was spoken by the prophet Isaiah: "Behold, my servant whom I have chosen, my beloved with whom my soul is well pleased. I will put my Spirit upon him" (Matthew 12:15-18, RSV).

In Isaiah 53 God foretells more about his Servant:
Who has believed our message and to whom has the arm of the LORD been revealed? ... 

Who has believed our message and to whom has the arm of the LORD been revealed?

He grew up before him like a tender shoot, and like a root out of dry ground. He had no beauty or majesty to attract us to him, nothing in his appearance that we should desire him.

He was despised and rejected by men, a man of sorrows, and familiar with suffering. Like one from whom men hide their faces he was despised, and we esteemed him not.

Surely he took up our infirmities and carried our sorrows, yet we considered him stricken by God, smitten by him, and afflicted.

But he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was upon him, and by his wounds we are healed.

We all, like sheep, have gone astray, each of us has turned to his own way; and the LORD has laid on him the iniquity of us all.

He was oppressed and afflicted, yet he did not open his mouth; he was led like a lamb to the slaughter, and as a
sheep before her shearers is silent, so he did not open his mouth.

By oppression and judgment he was taken away. And who can speak of his descendants? For he was cut off from the land of the living; for the transgression of my people he was stricken.

He was assigned a grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death, though he had done no violence, nor was any deceit in his mouth.

Yet it was the LORD's will to crush him and cause him to suffer, and though the LORD makes his life a guilt offering, he will see his offspring and prolong his days, and the will of the LORD will prosper in his hand.

After the suffering of his soul, he will see the light of life and be satisfied; by his knowledge my righteous servant will justify many, and he will bear their iniquities.

Therefore I will give him a portion among the great, and he will divide the spoils with the strong, because he poured out his life unto death, and was numbered with the transgressors. For he bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors. (Isaiah 53:1-12, NIV)
There has only ever been Servant who was an offering for sin, who bore the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors. This Servant is Jesus who died on the cross to pay for our sins. Jesus said of himself: For the Son of man also came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many. (Mark 10:45, RSV) For Christ also died for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God. (1 Peter 3:18, RSV)

Dr. Badawi continues in his leaflet =>

**Issue 4: Muhammad's Migration From Mecca To Medina: Prophesied In The Bible?**

Habbakuk 3:3 speaks of God (God's help) coming from Te'man (an Oasis north of Medina according to J. Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible), and the holy one (coming) from Paran. That holy one who under persecution migrated from Paran (Mecca) to be received enthusiastically in Medina was none but prophet Muhammad.

Indeed the incident of the migration of the prophet and his persecuted followers is vividly described in Isaiah 21:13-17. That section foretold as well about the battle of Badr in which the few ill-armed faithful miraculously defeated the "mighty" men of Ke'dar, who sought to destroy Islam and intimidate their own folks who turned to Islam.
Response Again Dr. Badawi refers to Paran being Mecca. We have already seen that Paran is 1000km from Mecca. He also claims that, J. Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, says that Teman is an oasis north of Medina. Hasting's dictionary [2] does not! Look at a scanned copy from Hastings' dictionary for yourself:

**TEMAN.**—A tribe (and district) of Edom, p. 897

Edom was an ancient country just south of the Dead Sea (NBD). Teman was a major well known district in Edom; it is about 800km from Medina! The details Jamal Badawi has referred to from Hasting's dictionary are not those for Teman, but in fact those for Tema:

**TEMA.**—In Gn 25:15 (1 Ch 1st), a son of Ishmael. The country and people meant are still represented by the same name—the modern Ta'ima, a large oasis about 200 miles S. E. of the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah, and the same distance due N. of Medina in W. Arabia. p. 897

Tema is the oasis town north of Medina, not Teman. Dr. Badawi has taken the information of Tema and said that it applies to Teman! This is poor scholarship and deceitful. If Jamal Badawi wants to be taken seriously as an academic then he must quote information correctly and not
twist it. What makes his misquote all the more serious is that in his next quote from the Bible (Isaiah 21:13-17) the Tema of Arabia is mentioned and so Dr. Badawi must have known that there was a difference between Tema and Teman:

The oracle concerning Arabia. In the thickets in Arabia you will lodge, O caravans of De'danites. To the thirsty bring water, meet the fugitive with bread, O inhabitants of the land of Tema. For they have fled from the swords, from the drawn sword, from the bent bow, and from the press of battle. For thus the Lord said to me, "Within a year, according to the years of a hireling, all the glory of Kedar will come to an end; and the remainder of the archers of the mighty men of the sons of Kedar will be few; for the LORD, the God of Israel, has spoken." (Isaiah 21:13-17, RSV)

Dr. Badawi claims that Isaiah 21:13-17 predicts the Battle of Badr (one of Muhammad's battles). This is an extreme example of teaching out of context for this Scripture clearly says, Within a year, and this word of God came to Isaiah around 700 B.C. That is 1300 years before Muhammad.

Dr. Badawi continues in his leaflet =>

**Issue 5:** The Qur'an (Koran) Foretold In The Bible?
... Was it another coincidence that Isaiah ties between the messenger connected with Ke'dar and a new song (a scripture in a new language) to be sang unto the Lord (Isaiah 42:10-11). More explicitly, prophesies Isaiah "For with stammering lips, and another tongue, will he speak to this people" (Isaiah 28:11). This latter verse correctly describes the "stammering lips" of prophet Muhammad reflecting the state of tension and concentration he went through at the time of revelation. Another related point is that the Qur'an was revealed in piece-meals over a span of twenty-three years. It is interesting to compare this with Isaiah 28:10 which speaks of the same thing.

Response: Dr. Badawi teaches that when Isaiah 42:10 says: Sing to the LORD a new song, it is foretelling a scripture in a new language. This is a ridiculous interpretation of this verse. Firstly, there no mention of any scripture, new or old, in this verse, so how can it foretell the coming of any scripture? Secondly, Dr. Badawi makes the ridiculous claim that the word song means language. The word song means song!

Next, Dr. Badawi teaches that Isaiah 28 foretells Muhammad's state of tension and concentration. What is the context of Isaiah 28? After the death of King Solomon, Israel engaged in civil war and the kingdom of Israel was divided between north and south. Ephraim was a major tribe of the northern kingdom. This kingdom began to
worship two golden calves (1 Kings 12:28). Moses had warned Israel that if they turn to other gods then:

The LORD will bring a nation (army) against you from afar, from the end of the earth, as swift as the eagle flies, a nation whose language you do not understand, a nation of stern countenance, who shall not regard the person of the old or show favor to the young (Deuteronomy 28:49-50, RSV)

Isaiah 28 is God's reminder to faithless Ephraim (Northern Israel) that he is now going to send this army whose language you do not understand to punish Ephraim:

Woe to the proud crown of the drunkards of Ephraim ... The proud crown of the drunkards of Ephraim will be trodden under foot ... Nay, but by men of strange lips and with an alien tongue the LORD will speak to this people ... that they may go, and fall backward, and be broken, and snared, and taken. (Isaiah 28:1-13, RSV)

This historical event happened in 722 B.C. when the Assyrian army conquered Israel; it has nothing to do with Muhammad's state of tension and concentration.

Dr. Badawi continues his leaflet =>

**Issue 6: That Prophet - Paraclete - Muhammad.**

... In the Gospel according to John (Chapters 14,15,16) Jesus spoke of the "Paraclete" or comforter who will come
after him, who will be sent by (sic) Father as another Paraclete, who will teach new things which the contemporaries of Jesus could not bear. While the Paraclete is described as the spirit of truth (whose meaning resemble Muhammad's famous title Al-Amin, the trustworthy) he is identified in one verse as the Holy Ghost (John 14:26). Such a designation is however inconsistent with the profile of that Paraclete ... It was Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) who was the Paraclete, Comforter, helper.

**Response:** The Greek word \( \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha} \kappa\lambda\tau\omicron\omicron\varsigma \) (paraclete) refers to someone who acts as a counsellor, a helper, an intercessor, or a representative for someone else. Jesus acted this way for his disciples as he taught them about God and begged God to be merciful to them. Jesus was the first Paraclete. However, Jesus promised that after he had returned to heaven, God would send another Paraclete to be with the disciples. Jesus said:

And I will pray the Father, and he will give you another Counsellor (Paraclete), to be with you forever. (John 14:16, RSV).

Jesus then tells us that the Paraclete is the Holy Spirit:

These things I have spoken to you, while I am still with you. But the Counsellor (Paraclete), the **Holy Spirit**,
whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things. (John 14:25-26, RSV).

This is very clear teaching; Jesus directly identifies the Paraclete as the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since Muhammad is not the Holy Spirit he is not the Paraclete. However, against what Jesus clearly teaches Dr. Badawi claims that the promised Paraclete is in fact Muhammad. To better understand who the second Paraclete is, and why Jesus calls him the Holy Spirit, we must consider what the Bible teaches about the Holy Spirit.

The Bible records how God gave his Holy Spirit to his Prophets and other individuals to empower them to know and do his will. However, God promised that a time would come when all his people would have the Holy Spirit:

I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes and be careful to observe my ordinances (Ezekiel 36:27, RSV).

And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit (Joel 2:28, RSV).

These two prophesies were revealed hundreds of years before Jesus. The Prophet, John the Baptist, said that Jesus was the man who would fulfil God's promise and give the Holy Spirit to God's people:
And John bore witness, "I saw the Spirit descend as a dove from heaven, and it remained on him (Jesus). I myself did not know him; but he who sent me to baptize with water said to me, `He on whom you see the Spirit descend and remain, this is he who baptizes with the Holy Spirit.'" (John 1:32-33, RSV)

Jesus promised that those who believed in him would receive the Spirit after he had been glorified through death and resurrection:

Jesus stood up and proclaimed, "If any one is thirsty, let him come to me and drink. He who believes in me, as the scripture has said, `Out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water.'" Now this he said about the Spirit, which those who believed in him were to receive; for as yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. (John 7:37-39, RSV)

Jesus particularly told his Apostles that the Holy Spirit would come and help them remember and know all his teaching, so that they could be faithful witnesses:

These things I have spoken to you, while I am still with you. But the Counsellor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you. (John 14:25-26, RSV)
After his death and resurrection (see John 19ff), Jesus told his Apostles that the time had come for them to receive the Holy Spirit:

you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth (Acts 1:8, RSV).

After Jesus said this, he ascended into heaven and left his Apostles (Acts 1:9). Then the Spirit came, as Jesus promised, and the Apostles were all filled with the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:4, RSV). The Spirit then taught the Apostles just as Jesus had promised in John 14:25-26:

Now we (Apostles) have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:12-13 also Ephesians 3:4-6, RSV).

The Apostle Peter proclaims God's promise for us today:

And Peter said to them, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins; and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." (Acts 2:38, RSV).
Jesus calls the Paraclete the Holy Spirit because the Paraclete is the Holy Spirit. God announced, through his prophets, that he would give his Holy Spirit to his people. Jesus came and fulfilled this promise. Jesus gave the Holy Spirit to his Apostles, and as they preached the Gospel more people received the Holy Spirit. The Paraclete in John 14, 15, 16, is the Holy Spirit, as Jesus clearly said and not Muhammad.

Dr. Badawi continues with his leaflet =>

Issue 7: Was The Shift Of Religious Leadership Prophesied?

Following the rejection of the last Israelite prophet, Jesus, it was about time that God's promise to make Ishmael a great nation be fulfilled (Genesis 21:13,18).

In Matthew 21:19-21, Jesus spoke of the fruitless fig tree (A Biblical symbol of prophetic heritage) to be cleared after being given a last chance of three years (the duration of Jesus' ministry) to give fruit. In a later verse in the same chapter, Jesus said "Therefore I say unto you, The Kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruit thereof" (Matthew 21:43). That nation of Ishmael's descendants (the rejected stone in Matthew 21:42)
which was victorious against all super-powers of its time as prophesied by Jesus: "And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken, but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder" (Matthew 21:44).

Response: Dr. Badawi is right to quote Matthew 21:43 to indicate that Jesus saw a Shift in Religious Leadership. Dr. Badawi has failed, however, to refer to the rest of the chapter to get this verse in context. Jesus clearly indicates who he is shifting the religious leadership to:

And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the powers of death shall not prevail against it. I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven (Matthew 16:18-19, RSV).

When the hour came, he (Jesus) sat at table, and the apostles with him. And he said to them ... "as my Father appointed a kingdom for me, so do I appoint for you" (Luke 22:14-19, RSV).

Jesus gave the religious leadership to Peter and his other Apostles. These 12 Apostles signified the 12 tribes of the new nation of Israel who were to witness for God.

Then, Dr. Badawi claims the rejected stone in Matthew 21:42 is the nation of Ishmael's descendants and the military conquests of Muhammad. Dr. Badawi offers no evidence to support his opinion. He also ignores the fact that the Bible teaches that Jesus is the stone:
... be it known to you all, and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom you crucified, whom God raised from the dead, by him this man is standing before you well. This is the stone which was rejected by you builders, but which has become the head of the corner. And there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved. (Acts 4:10-12, RSV)

Dr. Badawi concludes his leaflet =>

Issue 8: Out Of Context Coincidence?

Is it possible that the numerous prophesies cited here are all individually and combined out of context misinterpretations?..

Response: Yes, Jamal Badawi has taken verses of the Bible out of context and misrepresented the Jewish and Christian Scriptures. He has misquoted J. Hastings' dictionary, and misled his readers in the identification of geographical locations. These methods show that Dr. Badawi has no academic credibility. As a result, he has failed to show that Muhammad is foretold in the Bible. Muhammad is not foretold in the Bible as the Qur'an claims.

The evaluation of Jamal Badawi's leaflet has finished but you are invited to read two related topics

1. What about Jesus? Jesus claimed that he was foretold:

   He (Jesus) said to them, "This is what I told you while I was still with you: Everything must be
fulfilled that is written about me in the Law of Moses, the Prophets and the Psalms." (Luke 24:44)

Is Jesus' claim true? Is he really foretold or is the evidence for Jesus just like the evidence for Muhammad? The article entitled, "The Message of the Prophets" examines some of the prophecies that Jesus fulfils. You may like to examine the evidence for yourself and make up your own mind.

2. The Qur'an claims that Muhammad is foretold in the Bible but as we have seen he is not. This fact has led some Muslims to write their own Gospel so that it now foretells the coming of Muhammad. Click here to learn about the false Gospels that Muslims have written.

References


The author welcomes your response via email.

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Responses to Dr. Badawi….Answering Islam Home Page

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Footnote

(1) In an interview conducted in May 1984, just before Foucault’s death Paul Rabinow asked Michel Foucault about polemics.

(2) From Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 208–9)

(3) Using these ideas, she develops a model for pragmatic argumentation based on a pragmadialectical approach of argumentation schemes. An argumentation scheme is a specific relation between an argument and a standpoint, or a specific form of a causal relation, in the case of pragmatic argumentation.

(4) See also Jacobs (2000) and Goodwin (2000) for the relationship between dialectics and rhetoric.
(5) This concept has been borrowed from Hample (2001: 135) in the same sense he uses.

(6) The terms ‘protagonist’ and ‘antagonist’ are suggested in this type of context by Eemeren and Grootendorst (2003: 365).

(7) To be as neutral as possible, the researcher avoids using such honorifics as ‘Glorious’, ‘Holy’ Qura’n or Muhammad ‘(PUH)’, etc.

(8) الأَلْحَزَّةِ يَتَّبِعُونَ الرَّسُولَ النَّبِيَّ الأُمِّيَّ الَّذِي يَجِدُونَهُ مَكْتُوبًا عِندَهُمْ فِي التَّوْرَاةِ وَالإنْجِيلِ.

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