

*President Carter Policy Toward Arabian Gulf
Carter Doctrine How It Was Drawn?*

Dr. Saif Mohammed Albedwawi

Assistant Prof

**Department of History & Islamic Civilization College of
Arts, Humanities, Social Sciences University of Sharjah**

Saif4933@hotmail.com

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ABSTRACT:

The aim of this study is to discuss United States of America foreign policy toward the Arabian Gulf during President Carter Administration. The emphasis of the paper is on the role of the National Security Adviser namely Zbigniew Brzezinski securing Carter Doctrine as a policy.

After the Iranian revolution and the Soviets invasion of Afghanistan, US policy toward the Gulf region was rather passing through tremendous changes. To protect the American interests in the area, President Carter had to draw a new policy. In the end he came up with Carter Doctrine. This research is more interested in the decision-making during Carter's era. Therefore, the process of this policy and how it came about would be discussed in detail. Furthermore, a background of those participants in drawing that policy as well as the struggle among them would be discussed too.

Keywords: Brzezinski, Carter, Afghanistan, Soviet Unions, Doctrine

Introduction

President Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 with a style of foreign policy that had been developed in conscious opposition to the policies and methods pursued by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.

In principle, the Carter administration wanted more "team effort" not only a single dominant figure as Kissinger had been. However, behind the facade of "collegiality" between Brzezinski*, Brown**, and

Vance*** to keep strains to a minimum, serious strains did develop, especially between the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department.

One of those issues that President Carter had to compromise was how to cope with the Soviet behavior in the Middle East, especially the Arabian Gulf area.

The Carter Doctrine was designed to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region. The reasons causing Carter to link the security of the Gulf with the security of the U.S. were as follow:

- For the next decades, the U.S. and her allies will have to depend on this oil-rich area for energy requirements. As Saunders (Adviser to President Carter) has told the Committee in Congress: "First, more significant American interests come together in this part of the developing world today. Second, it is one of the fastest changing areas of the world."¹
- The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.
- Iran revolution and the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing countries.

* Zbigniew Brzezinski: National Security Adviser to President Carter. A Polish immigrant who was born in Warsaw in 1928 and died in 2017; He advocated anti-Soviets Union policy and thus influenced President Carter toward his ideology. See Betty Glad, *An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy*. USA: Cornell University Press, 2009.

** Harold Brown: Defense Secretary at President Carter Administration. Brown was born in [Brooklyn, New York](#), his parents were secular [Jews](#). He was a scientist in physics and had hold different political jobs. See Betty Glad, *Ibid*.

*** Cyrus Vance: Foreign Secretary at President Carter Administration.

Cyrus Vance was born on March 27, 1917, in [Clarksburg, West Virginia](#) and died in 2002. He was a lawyer who joined politics since President Kennedy. He favored negotiations and arms reduction instead of confrontations. See Betty Glad, *Ibid*.

It is the aim of this research to examine how this policy was constructed, emphasizing mainly the role of the National Security Adviser.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CARTER: THE ROLE OF BRZEZINSKI

The personality and background of a policymaker are important and may influence the policy process. Thus, this section will be devoted to a general discussion of several top officials regarding their personalities, backgrounds, and their roles in shaping Carter's foreign policy.

Jimmy Carter was born in 1924 in Plains, Georgia, and graduated from Georgia Institute of Technology in 1943. He serviced in the Marines under the Admiral Hyman Rickover who was famous for his concern with efficiency. Carter's only previous important experience in government was one term as governor of Georgia (1971-75).²

Carter's relations with the Trilateral Commission started in 1973.³ As he said, "Service on the Trilateral Commission gave me an excellent opportunity to know national and international leaders in many fields of study concerning foreign affairs"⁴ Therefore, when Carter declared his presidency in 1974, Brzezinski (who was the Chairman of the Trilateral Commission) had approached him for the reason, "I felt that he would spread the Trilateral Commission's concept of closer and more cooperative relations between the United States, Europe, and Japan."⁵

When Jimmy Carter went to the White House, he wanted a cabinet government. He attacked the highly personal diplomacy of Kissinger. Carter called for an end to a 'secretive Lone Ranger foreign policy'.⁶ However, Carter saw himself personally as a policy initiator and manager who would make the decisions himself after reviewing different views of his senior advisers.⁷ He wanted a communications structure in which he was at the center of the wheel with opportunity for direct contact with several officials and advisers. And at the same time, Carter wanted to be involved in the process before any opinions could be recommended for his consideration.⁸

Another way to explain Carter style is that while he advocated a formally structured NSC staff and relied on its studies for help in making decisions and issuing directives, yet he regularly scheduled luncheon meetings (Friday breakfast) with his top national security advisers.⁹

As Carter wrote in his memoirs, "I found through experiences that a collegial approach is good."¹⁰ "However, he expressed his distress with the leaking problem. Carter found the solution in having fewer Cabinet meetings, and "substituting instead smaller sessions."¹¹

In short, Carter's cognitive style of self-efficiency had led him to find comprehensive solutions for difficult issues like Camp David. He was successful when he dealt with one problem, but his technocratic approach was less successful in handling many balls at the same time.¹²

The organization of the NSC was in a way a formalistic model. The NSC was divided into two committees, the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Cooperation Committee.

The roles that the PRC played concerned foreign policy issues, defense, and international economic issues like oil prices. On the other hand, the NSC was responsible for those issues that cut across departmental lines, such as intelligence issues of a sensitive or covert activity, SALT* and arms control, and in case of crisis. The former committee is chaired by any appropriate cabinet member; however, the NSC is always chaired by the National Security Adviser.¹³

The Cabinet meeting steps, and structure are shown in Figure 1.

They go as follows:

1. Carter and Brzezinski would decide what issues would be reviewed, which committee would deal with them, and who would be in charge in case an issue was assigned to PRC.

2. Once the decisions were made, a Presidential Review Memorandum was circulated, identifying the issues, and directing that policy research be undertaken by appropriate agencies.
3. A meeting would be held, and each member was expected to bring his prepared view of the issues. The subjects departed, and different opinions and views would be sent to the President, either in the form of a unanimous recommendation or a report on alternative policy

* Strategic Arms Limitation Talks .

recommendations. The options would go to the NSC staff to sort and summarize them.

Special Assistant, Rick Inderfurth, who managed the NSC papers flow, would check them before they went to Brzezinski deputy, Aaron. Aaron would give a final check before the National Security Adviser to see that each issue was fairly explained. Finally, Brzezinski would take them to the President.

4. The President would consult with his NS Adviser and other high officials and then make his decision either in the form of a Presidential Directive (PD) or simply a decision memo.¹⁴


Finally, it seems that Carter was a collegial who wanted to be an active president. The Friday presidential breakfast filled that need. This informal meeting permitted more freewheeling discussion. The members were the President, Vance, Mondale*, and Brzezinski. However, the number in early 1978 was extended to have Ham Jordan, Brown, Hedley Donovan (Carter's senior Adviser) and the President's other senior adviser Lloyd Cutler.¹⁵

The other informal mechanism meeting was the V-B-B senior adviser Luncheon, later renamed the M-B-B Luncheon. The purpose of this meeting was to solve issues for which there was no need to have a formal NSC meeting. The result of this meeting would be taken to the President by his NS Adviser.

The third kind of grouping was set up within the NSC structure itself. Some problems that proved to be too complex to be dealt with simply through memoranda were turned over to a problem-solving group that would be set up, chaired by NSC staff, and mid-level officers from many departments would participate.

* Mondale was the Vice President.

Walter Frederick Mondale was an American lawyer and politician who served as the 42nd vice president of the United States from 1977 to 1981 under President Jimmy Carter. He was born in Minnesota in 1928 and died 2021. See his memoir: *The Good Fight: A Life in Liberal Politics*. University of Minnesota Press, 15 Dec 2013.

Figure 1. Policy making steps

Issue PD to different departments

During 1979 and 1980, a group was set up on Middle East problems with a few middle-level officers who were used to working together on the Middle East. Out of this group, rather than through the regular channels, came the Carter Doctrine.¹⁶

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Brzezinski made his way to enter the Democratic Party's foreign policy establishment by serving as a "think tank" consultant to Lyndon Johnson. His attitude toward the Vietnam War was to remain silent and see loyalty over principle. This behavior set him up to be chief academic adviser to the Democratic presidential candidate, Hubert Humphrey. During Nixon's years, he was involved with the Trilateral Commission Institution, and in 1973 he met Jimmy Carter.

To summarize Zbigniew Brzezinski's personal background might throw some light on his political thinking about foreign policy priorities. For example, his religious background, namely, Roman Catholic; his class status as upper-class; his Polish origins with personal interests in Eastern Europe; as a specialist in Soviet affairs; and his connection with the Eastern Establishment.

The priority that Brzezinski had in mind was to identify the United States, and perhaps the West more generally, with certain fundamental values which are other than just material. This is where human rights become very important. Brzezinski saw that "America could again make itself the carrier of human hope, the wave of the future."¹⁷

Brzezinski's second priority is to build a wider, more competent, international order going beyond the traditional alliance and becoming less preoccupied with East-West confrontation. To support this order, Brzezinski would assign special roles to the "regional influential" around the world. Those power centers around which neighboring countries could cluster and join the U.S. and its allies in common endeavor. The countries chosen by Brzezinski for this leadership such as Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria in Africa; Korea, India, and somewhat "China" in Asia; Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East.¹⁸

Brzezinski told James Reston of the New York Times Magazine:

"Today, Soviet ideological appeal is close to nil; no revolution anywhere, when thinking of a model for the future, thinks of the Soviet Union. Soviet military power, although it has grown substantially, is not enough to dominate the U.S. or the world; but it is enough to make the resolution of regional conflict much more difficult. Today, the World needs this framework [people can cooperate on behalf of central ideas] for the fulfillment of the ideas of human liberty and justice. We can help not by domination, but by spinning a web of more cooperative relationships."¹⁹

Thirdly, is for the United States to help resolve these conflicts which threaten international order, notably the Middle East and Southern Africa.

Fourthly, to cope with such emerging global issues as nuclear proliferation and arms transfers.²⁰

In the following pages different cases would be diagnosed to point the role of Brzezinski in formulating Carter foreign policy.

The Soviet Union

As Carter took office, there were three different strategies being debated concerning U.S.-Soviet Union relations. The former officials of the State Department, centered on the Carnegie Endowment's Foreign policy journal, argued that the United States should no longer subordinate its "Trilateral" allies (Japan, Canada, and Western Europe) and its "North-South" relations with less-developed countries to traditional East-West rivalries. Those planners believed that if U.S. befriended with those countries that were pro-Soviet, then those countries would align themselves with the capitalist world because of its economic superiority. They believed also that the Soviet Union and China might be brought into the capitalist world. Those analysts have called the "traders and their views were based on Walt Rostow."²¹

The second group of analysts is on the opposite side and has been called the "Prussians." The Prussians were neo-conservative, labor leaders, and some former officials who had served in the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. Their spokesman and theorist was Paul Nitze, who believed that the Cold War strategy should never have been abandoned. He liked huge increases in U.S. military spending. He believed, also, that the Soviet Union is going to destroy the free world, through nuclear war if necessary.²²

Between those two factions comes the White House "idea man" with his theory of "global constructive engagement." His strategy combined the trader North-South with more aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union. He kept Kissinger's theory of "linkage" and at the same time he saw an American alliance with China as an essential counterweight against the Soviet Union.²³

Simon Serfaty, of the *Foreign Policy Magazine*, wrote that Brzezinski, in writing about the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union said in the 1950s "implicitly apocalyptic conflict," in the 1960s "explicitly relativistic competition," and in the 1970s, "remains a key problem for U.S. foreign policy but it may no longer represent the central problem." And I think in the 1980s mainly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Brzezinski has gone back to his 1960s convictions.²⁴

Brzezinski clearly believed that the Soviets were pursuing a global grand strategy, facing the U.S. with a world-wide challenge. He wanted, on one hand, a detente more "reciprocal and comprehensive" than the one he thought Kissinger had pursued; and, on the other hand, a return to certain Kissingerian methods, such as the threat of force and "linkage."²⁵

President Carter entered the White House without coherent policy toward the Soviet Union. However, the invasion of Afghanistan made him accept Brzezinski views on the Soviets. Before that, President Carter did not accept Brzezinski's advice on the Horn of Africa war of Somali and Ethiopia. Also, during the Cuban crisis, Brzezinski's idea was rejected, and the President had sided with his Secretary of State, Vance. However, the President sided with his National Security Adviser on the China issue, and

on the Carter Doctrine in meeting the Soviets behavior in the Persian/Arabian Gulf area.

China

Brzezinski wrote in his "Power and Principle", the ten goals of U.S. foreign policy. Number five was "to normalize U.S.-Chinese relations because we saw that relationship as a central stabilizing element of our global policy and a keystone for peace."²⁶

Brzezinski gave explanations that normalization of relations with China would greatly enhance the stability of the "Far East" and it would be to the U.S. advantage in her global competition with the Soviet Union.²⁷

Vance's first trip to Beijing on August 23, 1977, did not satisfy Brzezinski so he asked for the Chinese to invite him through Mike Oksenberg.²⁸ Harold Brown helped him to press the bureaucracy for a more favorable attitude toward the transfer of sensitive military technology to China.

Vance's point was that "playing the China card" was always a dangerous ploy, and it was especially risky at a time when SALT negotiations were at a sensitive point. For SALT and Normalization to come to Congress at the same time won't give the administration ability to guide these two great issues safely through public and congressional debate.

However, Brzezinski got Carter to announce the agreement with China about normalizing relations on December 15, 1978 (during a trip by Vance to the Middle East). The announcement came two weeks earlier than the date expected by the State Department. The State had hoped that talks with Gromyko at Christmas would bring the SALT 11 negotiations to an end. However, the meeting with Gromyko went very badly, and Vance mentions Gromyko's many critical references to America's China policy.²⁹

Like Kissinger, Brzezinski has performed an "outside leadership" in conducting U.S.-China normalization. This role is one of the main points that made Vance and Brzezinski fight the most.

Brzezinski and Iran

The environment in Washington during the fall of 1978 was full of stress and rushing seriously to meetings. Besides Camp David process, there was meeting over SALT negotiations, at the same time as the "secret U.S.-China negotiations; in the Caribbean the crisis of Nicaragua was beginning; Vance was busy in his Middle East negotiations, and

Brown was in a difficult battle with the President over the defense budget.³⁰

During this time, the fate of Iran had to be discussed. The first meeting on the subject had been held in the Situation Room as an urgent meeting of the SCC on November 2, 1978. The U.S. Ambassador in Tehran, Sullivan, requested guidance within forty-eight hours. In attendance were Warren Christopher (representing Vance), Harold Brown, and General David Jones as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Stansfield Turner, as well as David Aaron and Commander Gary Sick, who was responsible for Iran.³¹

There were different views on how to respond. Brzezinski wanted the Shah to set up a military government and crush the rebellion. Further, when the Shah's regime weakened, Brzezinski argued for a military coup.³²

The State Department's position was that the Shah had to make his own decisions, and at the same time D.S. should open channels of communication with Khomeini, so as to encourage some accommodation between the army and the revolutionaries.³³ The President, on the whole, refused to support Brzezinski yet he did not want to accept the logic of Vance's position. Caught between Brzezinski and Vance, Carter accepted Treasury Secretary Blumenthal's idea of calling on George Ball to review the situation. Later, he accepted the idea of a coalition government headed by Bakhtiar.³⁴

Brzezinski was interested in saving the Shah, so he had opened his own "back channels" to Ambassador of Iran Zahedi, and to Jean Francois-Poncet, the French Minister. He phoned the Shah many times and had sent "my own emissary" to Iran.³⁵

The other point that reopened Brzezinski-Vance split over Iran was how to free the American hostages in Iran. Even though both had agreed to David Rockefeller's request to let the Shah enter U.S.A for medical treatment.³⁶

The President agreed to Brzezinski's idea in April 1980 to launch the rescue mission. In response to Vance's opposition, Carter remarked that "Our national honor was at stake."³⁷ The rescue attempt failed, however, for Brzezinski; even if the rescue attempt failed and hostages got killed, it had made people in the D.S. feel happier, and had relieved public pressure for a large-scale American military action against Iran.³⁸

Vance, on the other hand, had argued against using force in a very risky operation so shortly after having assured the allies that Washington would not use force. Vance wrote, "It became later a matter of principle on which I should resign."³⁹

Brzezinski's Relations with President Carter

The first meeting between Brzezinski and Carter was at one of the Trilateral Commission meetings in early 1970, when Brzezinski was its director. As Brzezinski pointed out:

On the Commission they wanted a forward-looking Democratic governor who would be congenial to the trilateral perspective. Carter was elected because he was courageous on civil rights, bright and upcoming Democrat, interested in developing trade relations between Georgia and the Common Market and Japan, and he looks an outsider.⁴⁰

When Carter declared his presidency in 1974, Brzezinski praised him, and Carter answered him back by asking him to send any "memos or articles which would be instructive to me."⁴¹ Then they joined each other in a Trilateral Commission meeting in Kyoto, where Brzezinski became impressed by Carter as a new and fresh face. Brzezinski wrote in his *Power and Principle*, "I saw in him decency and humanness, and I also felt that there was a great deal of steel underneath."⁴² In 1975, Brzezinski became

Carter's preferred foreign policy adviser, and Carter from time to time asked him to develop an outline for speeches or statements on foreign policy.

In 1977 President Carter had chosen Brzezinski as his National Security Adviser for many reasons. The most important was that President Carter wanted "the final decisions on basic foreign policy to be made by me in the Oval Office, and not in the State Department," as he later wrote in his book, *Keeping Faith*. The man who could help him do that must be aggressive and ambitious like Brzezinski.⁴³ The other reasons were Brzezinski was knowledgeable about historical causes affecting the industrialized nations; he was a firm believer in defending democracy; he was a first-rate thinker (idea man), and as a college professor and author made Complicated issues simple.⁴⁴

Of his professional association with Carter, Brzezinski said that he would give the President advice only when asked and he didn't see himself as a policymaker. But he does "help in the process of making

policy."⁴⁵ In answering the *New York Times'* question of his role as "a neutral policy manager rather than as an assertive policy advocate," he said, "I try to do both."⁴⁶ He claimed that the President wanted him to look beyond the problems of the immediate and help him to find a direction.

The question that was once raised by politicians whether Brzezinski did control the President or no was rather vague. Brzezinski did not control the President, but he created an environment where his suggestions would be supported by many influential top leaders in the meetings. For example, Brzezinski saw that Jordan and Joy (advisors) were liked by the President, so he got along well with them. Later he asked the President to call them for the Friday Luncheon.

Another example is that he wanted the President to be tough on the Soviet invasion regarding Afghanistan, so he asked Turner (Director of the CIA) to write to the President a report like the one he was writing. He knew how to be the most influential man in the administration. As a State Department official said, "There's no question that he picks his issues carefully, and when he decides to weigh in, he gets his way."⁴⁷

Relations with Vance

Vance was born on March 27, 1917, in Clarksburg, West Virginia. After he had graduated from Law School at Yale University, he entered the navy, and then was a practicing attorney. During his work in the Senate as a Special Counsel on the Space Science Committee, which was chaired by Lyndon Johnson, he became close to Johnson, who had recommended him to Kennedy for a high position.

During his years in the Kennedy administration, Vance worked closely with McNamara (former defense secretary) to reorganize the army. From 1964-1967 he was a Deputy Secretary of Defense. From 1968 to 1969 he was U.S. Paris Peace Talks representative. Through the Johnson administration, he was one of Johnson's closest aides and worked as a "troubleshooter" in many important countries.

During the student violence at the University of Mississippi, he advised Kennedy to send troops to put down the violence; and finally, he

participated in recommending to Johnson the bombing of North Vietnam after the "Bay" incident.⁴⁸

When Carter was filling his administrative staff, Vance was recommended by Brzezinski. The reason Brzezinski gave for choosing Vance was that he was like Dean Rusk, who saw the job of Secretary of

State as a personal adviser to the President, and the President would define the nation's overall goals and objectives.⁴⁹

In the first year and a half, Vance dominated the administration; but after that, little by little, he was pushed away. The main reason was that Vance had gone through the tough advice of bombing and killing as in Vietnam. This made him hesitate to share Brzezinski's tough approaches again. The second reason was their way of looking at the world. For Brzezinski the behavior of the Soviets should be linked to SALT negotiations. For Vance, the regionalist, those problems such as the Horn of Africa, were local problems. Thirdly, Vance was a cool man who felt nervous about speaking up on sensitive questions, while Brzezinski was more outspoken. Carter mentioned in his book, *keeping Faith*, that: "One of the roles of Secretary of State is to be the educator of the American public about our foreign policy; Secretary Vance was not particularly inclined to assume this task."⁵⁰

The only important place left for Vance was the Middle East; however, Carter later got the Texas businessman, Robert Strauss, to handle the job. This appointment by the President diminished Vance's authority, and it humiliated him, especially since Strauss would not report to the State. Brzezinski, however, saw Robert Strauss's appointment as both a weakening of Vance's authority and a reinforcement of his own. But Strauss got angry at Brzezinski, who handed him a sealed envelope that was signed by the President and contained a rigid list of instructions about the Palestinian Resolution. Those instructions gave him no room to bargain.⁵¹ Cyrus Vance was overshadowed by the White House Adviser in the end. The role of the Secretary of State as the President's principal adviser on foreign policy was assumed by many other tough persons. This is the way it was working: Secretary of State for China—Brzezinski; Secretary of State for South Korea--Harold Brown; Secretary of State for the Middle East--Robert Strauss; Secretary of State for Africa--Andy Young; for Cuba--Senator Frank Church; for SALT II--Senator Henry Jackson; for Rhodesia--Senator Jesse Helms. That left Vance as Secretary "of What's Left," so in April 1980, he left the office.⁵²

The President chose Maine's Senator Muskie to replace Vance. The new polish was tough, but he had little time to minimize Brzezinski. When he tried to persuade Carter to bar Zbigniew, the President said, "I need Zbig to speak out publicly. He can go after my enemies. He can protect my flanks".⁵³

Brown and Brzezinski

Brown was born on September 19, 1927, in New York City. He is a scientific man who is majoring in nuclear physics and has a main interest in atomic weapons development. In 1965, he served as Secretary of the Air

Force. After that, he became President of California Institute of Technology; and in 1977, Carter called upon him to be his Secretary of Defense.

During his job in the Johnson administration, he worked closely with McNamara in bombing North Vietnam, and he defended the administration's opinion on television. Later, he liked peaceful talks.⁵⁴ From 1977-78, Brown was close to Vance, but from mid-1978 on, he moved to Brzezinski on "the need to build up American power." As Brzezinski put it, "In 1978, Harold Brown pushed harder, and I simply supported him."⁵⁵

While Vance was busy traveling, a gradual alliance developed between Brzezinski and Brown. They carried the day on two important issues. One was nuclear weapons new strategy, called the "countervailing" strategy. It was based on the ability to destroy every class of Soviet targets, and to respond to every conceivable Soviet move, at all military levels, to deny Moscow victory at any stage.⁵⁶ This strategy became Carter's Presidential Directive 59, (PD) adopted in the summer of 1980.⁵⁷

The other policy on which Brzezinski and Brown joined forces and won, was the Arabian Gulf policy of Rapid Deployment Force.⁵⁸

In a way, Brown had to behave as he did, or he would lose the respect of the military leaders. He showed stateside concern over the question of the Cubans in Africa, and he was not supported by the Brzezinski group during the Iran problem. Nonetheless, he was Brzezinski's closest partner as Brzezinski wrote in his book, *Power, and Principle*, "Without Brown, I would have been much more isolated on the critical issues during the more difficult phase of the Carter Presidency."⁵⁹

CARTER DOCTRINE

Let our position be absolutely clear: Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.⁶⁰

In January 1968, the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Great Britain would withdraw her military presence from East of Suez by the end of 1971.⁶¹ This decision meant that the Indian Ocean-Arabian Gulf area would become a power vacuum in world politics. The United States shortly thereafter announced that U.S. not intended to fill the vacuum left by the British departure and would, instead, depend upon local security arrangements among the region's powers to replace the British.⁶² The local powers, however, after the Iranian revolution and the overthrow of the Shah had no interest in playing the police role.

The Carter administration handled this problem with the fear that the Soviets were going to fill the "vacuum," knowing that they were closer now than ever after their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

The situation was that the "new foreign policy" of the Carter administration was influenced by the election year, by the Americans feeling humiliated by Khomeini, and many of those doves in the

administration like Andrew Young, Paul Warnke, and Leslie Gelb, who had resigned due to the issue.⁶³

Carter came to office in 1977 and told the people that "we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in our fear."⁶⁴ But this position had moved slowly, slowly until December 25, 1979, it was abandoned completely.

When Carter had appointed Schlesinger as Secretary of Energy rather than Defense, he was initially more inclined to the Vance- Brzezinski world view of North-South system rather than East-West revival.⁶⁵ However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a shock. Carter publicly denounced this unexpected behavior from the Soviet Union when he said it "made a more dramatic change in my opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals are than anything they have done in the previous time I have been in office."⁶⁶

The routine work of the administration, as it has been mentioned earlier, was managed in a formalistic model: Brzezinski daily meeting with the President and briefing him of world events, and in the evening, Vance sent the President the State memorandum so he could read it overnight.

Brzezinski used his daily meeting with the President to "warn" him about the Soviet intentions. For example, in late March, early April, and in early May. Later, Brzezinski tried many times to provide the President with the information approved by some historical facts. For example, he explained to the President that if the Soviets would control Afghanistan, they would be able to promote a separate Baluchistan which would give them access to the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area. This dream of getting to the "warm water" is an Old Russian dream.

Brzezinski's approach was to create a regional security framework containing Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and other Arabian Gulf states. The concept had been discussed many times in numerous SCC sessions. Those who participated in drawing it, like General William Odom, tried also to convert others to accept it. It became like a dogma with its followers going from one department to another to preach it.

General Odom had influenced key officials in the Defense Department like Under Secretary Robert Komer and Graham Claytor and Brown, with the help of those generals, was won over to the concept.⁶⁷ In early September, the President had asked Brzezinski to develop different options concerning the subject. The State opinion about the subject was that there were no clear proofs of a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan yet and if U.S. tried to publicize the idea, then the Soviets would see U.S. as meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs.⁶⁸

The State Department was working hard on SALT negotiations, and they saw Brzezinski's approach as an obstacle. By December 25, he knocked everybody down after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and more than 100,000 troops went to Kabul.

They moved to a crisis meeting on December 26, and Brzezinski chaired the meeting. They all agreed to hold a formal meeting of NSC with the President chairing it (the President at that time was at Camp David.)⁶⁹

Brzezinski's turning point started here; he became "the sort of guy we should have listened to," and had more influence on Carter's policy toward the Soviet Union than before. Vance's star, after Afghanistan's invasion, faded quickly and he resigned a few months later.⁷⁰

Brzezinski was able to convince the President to move this subject to a collegial debate. The President instructed Vance to chair a meeting of PRC.⁷¹ In the SCC meetings in the beginning of 1980; the subject was brought up again. Brzezinski continued for months to give more information and to press the President and the NSC, Friday Breakfasts, and VBB Luncheon meetings, again and again. Off course every time, his proposal was rejected mainly by Vance, Christopher, and David Newson.

The National Security Adviser, to get more attention and adherence to his proposal, "warned" the President again and again, and he reached out to the press, more public speeches and more interviews. However, during all this period the maximum the President had done was to ask the State Department to inform Afghanistan's neighbors about the situation and give more propaganda.

By January of 1980, Brzezinski completely got Carter's ear in dealing with the Soviet Union. Carter asked him to outline his State of the Union speech. Brzezinski wrote in his book, *Power and Principle*, "That gave me the opportunity to include wording modeled on the Truman Doctrine and to insert into the speech my notion of a "regional security framework."⁷²

The Doctrine clearly showed a change in both Brzezinski's and Carter's perceptions about the Soviet Union. Brzezinski went back to his 1960s conviction, and Carter had been forced to defend his political future by accommodating the hard-liners. Finally, Brzezinski became freehanded; he even asked the President to let him go to the Afghanistan frontier, and he was pictured carrying an AK-47 Chinese rifle.⁷³

The outcomes of the Doctrine were: reaffirming U.S.-Pakistan agreement of 1959; development of Rapid Deployment Force; increase in the defense budget; encouraging closer security cooperation with friends and allies; proposing the draft; grain embargo; and the Olympics boycott.⁷⁴

Conclusion:

In 1977 Jimmy Carter, a man from the deep South, made his way to the Oval Office, criticizing the previous administration and the highly personal diplomacy of Henry Kissinger. In addition, the priorities in U.S. foreign policy should be reordered. He wanted the relationship with the Soviet Union and China to take second place to the new order of "a working partnership" with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan.

Also, Carter laid particular stress on the need to restore public trust in government, which had fallen sharply in the wake of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and other corruption and errors.

This research has been organized in a way that comes from general

U.S. foreign policy and different personalities influencing it i.e. Carter, Brzezinski, Vance and Brown, to a case study of the Carter

Doctrine. The main emphasis throughout the paper was on Brzezinski's function. The role of Brzezinski and his views were explained in detail, and the conflict with Vance over Iran and China has also been explained.

This major policy of Carter Doctrine came about due to the efforts that played by the National Adviser Mr. Brzezinski. The steps he followed to move the President and the administration to act on the issue were rewarding. First of all, he utilized his daily meeting with the President to bring the issue up repeatedly; he used the methods of rewarding and "warning." For example, he "warned" the President about the Russian historical dream of getting to the "warm water" of the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, he explained to the President the rewards in becoming tough as Truman did. The challenge of facing the "new" Soviet behavior in Afghanistan might sound nice to the people and make them happy after they had been frustrated by Khomeini.

Finally, Brzezinski kept pressing the issue in almost every meeting of NSC. By December 1979, it was almost ripe, and when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 25, he had knocked the State Department and had got Carter Doctrine as a policy.

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سياسة الرئيس الأمريكي كارتر تجاه الخليج العربي مبدأ كارتر كيف تم إعداده ؟

د. سيف بن عبود البدواوي

أستاذ مساعد في قسم التاريخ والحضارة الإسلامية

جامعة الشارقة/الإمارات

الخلاصة

تهدف هذه الورقة إلى مناقشة مبدأ كارتر الذي رُسم في مرحلة الرئيس جيمي كارتر (١٩٧٧-١٩٨١)، بوصفه نوعاً من السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية تجاه الخليج العربي

بعد الثورة الإيرانية، وغزو الإتحاد السوفيتي أفغانستان، شهدت السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية تغيرات عدّة تجاه منطقة الخليج العربي. من أجل حماية المصالح الأمريكية تجاه تلك التطورات كان على الرئيس الأمريكي ومساعدوه إيجاد سياسة جديدة لمواجهة تلك المواقف. من أجل ذلك ظهر مبدأ كارتر.

سوف يكون التركيز في هذه الورقة بوصفها قراءة تاريخية لكيفية صنع ذلك القرار وأثر الشخصيات الرئيسة فيه مستشاراً الأمن القومي، بريزبنسكي، ووزير الخارجية فانس، ووزير الدفاع، هارولد ويلسون في التصارع بينهم من أجل خروج تلك السياسة.

كلمات دالة: مبدأ كارتر، بريزبنسكي، فانس، أفغانستان